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I. INTRODUCTION
The Colorado Supreme Court recently decided that the state's
"anti-speculation" doctrine applies to changes of water rights.' The
effect of the decision is to enlarge public control over decisions respecting reallocation of water and to discourage non-governmental
entities from participating in the reallocation process. In this "era of

t
wishes
of this
1.
(Colo.

Of Counsel, Porzak Browning & Bushong LLP, Boulder, Colorado. The author
to thank Professor Charles W. Howe and Michael F. Browning for their review
article and their helpful suggestions.
High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo.Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 714
2005). For articles written by opposing counsel in the case, see Scott A. Clark &

Alix L. Joseph, Changes of Water Rights and the Anti-Speculation Doctrine: The Continuing
Importanceof Actual Beneficial Use, 9 U. DENy. WATER L. REV. 553 (2006), and Harvey W.
Curtis et al., The Anti-Speculation DoctrineExtended to Change of Water Rights Cases: A New
Dilemmafor Water Rights Owners, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 577 (2006).
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reallocation," the court's reasoning emphasizes the public nature of
water and the role of government in overseeing private uses of water.2
The anti-speculation doctrine first emerged in Colorado in the
context of a private water development company's plans to obtain
rights to divert and store water on the western side of the Continental
Divide for sale to users in the heavily populated Front Range. 3 In Colorado River Water ConservationDistrictv. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that an appropriator of water not itself the
user must have
4 a definite commitment for actual use of water to obtain
right.
a water
In the recent Colorado Supreme Court decision in High Plains
A&M, LLC v. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District, the court
extended this requirement from the initial appropriation of water to
changes of use of existing water rights. 5 Now, before a nongovernmental purchaser of water rights can go through a change of
use proceeding to determine how much water the purchaser may
transfer to a new use, the purchaser must have final contracts with
specified users and be able to identify both a point of diversion and
place of use. 6 Speculation remains a concern, the Colorado Supreme
Court ruled, despite the fact the water rights in question had been in
existance for more than 100 years]
High Plainshighlights two competing models for water reallocation
in the prior appropriation West, here broadly characterized as public
2.

For a good explanation of the "era of reallocation," see NAT'L RESEARCH

COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQuITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT

16

(1992).
3. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d 566,
567-68 (Colo. 1979) (en banc).
4. The court held:
[T]he evidence presented regarding future needs and uses of water by the
municipalities contacted by Vidler falls short of what is necessary to indicate
an intent to appropriate. Vidler has no firm contractual commitment from
any municipality to use any of the water. ... The mere negotiations with
other municipalities clearly do not rise to the level of definite commitment
for use required to prove the intent here required.
Id. at 568.
5.

High Plains, 120 P.3d at 720.

6. Id. at 720-21. Colorado law distinguishes between governmental and nongovernmental appropriators in numerous respects. Of importance here is the statutory provision precluding appropriation of water by a non-governmental entity as
speculative if it does not have a legally vested interest in the lands or facilities it intends
the proposed appropriation to serve. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (I) (2006).

See infra text accompanying note 54. Note the chicken and egg dilemma presented
under the High Plains decision: the non-governmental applicant for a change must
have final contracts for use of the water before it knows if it can obtain the change of
use that enables it to deliver the water and provides confirmation of the transferable
quantity of water available for contract.
7. High Plains, 120 P.3d at 714-15. The primary water rights for the Fort Lyons
Canal originated in the 1880s.
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versus private.'
It unreservedly embraces the public-as-supervisor
model, finding support for this approach in what the decision describes as the "agrarian, populist" roots of Colorado water law.9 This
comment evaluates the legal and policy basis of the High Plains decision. It begins with a consideration of the resource itself and its legal
status under prior appropriation law. It focuses on the portion of water consumptively used under a valid appropriation and suggests that
such consumptive use effectively privatizes the water. It then turns to a
discussion of the High Plains decision and its extension of the antispeculation doctrine to matters of water reallocation. It questions the
purpose of following this doctrine as applied to reallocation of historically beneficially-consumed water. Finally, it proposes an alternative
reallocation approach based on treating consumed water as private
and explores the implications of following such an approach.
II. PUBLIC WATER AND APPROPRIATED, CONSUMED WATER
Water is a classic common resource. It is widely but irregularly distributed. It is renewable, but with considerable variation in amounts
and timing during the year and from year-to-year. It is not fixed in
place like land but in constant motion in the hydrologic cycle. Water
performs innumerable functions as it passes through the cycle beyond
those directly benefiting humans, and many human uses can share the
benefits of the same molecules of water. These fundamental characteristics of the resource and the broad distribution of its functions and
benefits argue against water's private ownership.
Water in its various forms, moving without confinement in the hydrologic cycle, is unowned.' Under the doctrine of prior appropria8. More accurately, one might describe this as "public as supervisor" versus "public
as guardian", since the state's role is not as the initial decision-maker but as the overseer of water suppliers' and water users' proposed actions. Despite the overarching
public nature of water, the appropriator's actions initiate water appropriation for human use, subject to a state agency's verification and approval. Similarly, water reallocation derives from the decision of the owner of the water right to sell or otherwise trans-

fer the right to another party, subject to a state agency's review. The distinction here is
between a reallocation process with substantial public review and supervision that at
least implicitly includes an evaluation of whether the proposed new use is "good," and
a process that operates with minimal public involvement only as necessary to safeguard
other water rights and legislatively-specified interests.
9. High Plains, 120 P.3d at 719, n.3. The note refers to the historical analysis provided in David B. Schorr, Appropriation as Agrarianism: DistributiveJustice in the Creation
of Property Rights, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 3 (2005).
10. Ownership connotes human control or possession. Law has struggled with
characterizing those things of value but without specified ownership because, in general, such things are outside the scope of the legal system. Modern protection of the
natural environment proceeds by placing limitations on human actions involving disposal of pollution into the unowned environment or otherwise unacceptably impairing
some valued dimension of the natural environment, not by the more traditional tech-
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tion, when that water is in a stream or aquifer and susceptible of capture for direct human use, it is public property and openly available for
non-exclusive uses such as navigation or recreation. 1 Humans also
make certain exclusive private or individual uses of water. Such uses
require physical control of water in a manner necessary to enable the
12
use.
In Colorado and other prior appropriation states, the act of appropriation of water (control or possession of water combined with its actual beneficial use) establishes the legal right to make such uses. 3 The
user maintains the right through continued use. 4 Extensive scrutiny of
proposed new uses reflects water's status as a public, and widely shared,
resource. Since any use of water potentially excludes other uses, western states supervise private control of water resources to ensure that

nique of declaring ownership and providing protection for that ownership. However,
traditional riparian law (natural flow) contained essentially property-law-based limitations on impairment of water quality affecting the usability of the water. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3:65, at 3-112 to -114 (Thomson/West
1988 & Supp. 2006). Prior appropriation law has, at times, suggested the water right,
as a property right, enjoys protection of water quality as necessary to enable continued
use of water. Id. at § 5:92, at 5-165.
11.
"The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the
state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, and the same is
dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter
provided." COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5. Roman law declared running water and the
oceans to be common property, available generally for use. JAMES HADLEY,
INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAw 157-58 (D. Appleton & Co. 1878). As with wildlife, individuals' capture of water rendered the common resource private. Dean Lueck, The
Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law, 38 J.L. & ECON. 393, 393-94 (1995).
Once no longer in possession, however, such things "recovered [their] natural liberty,"
in the words of the Institutes of Justinian. CoRPUSJURIS CIVLIS, INSTITUTIONES: THE
INSTITUTES OFJuSTINIAN 37 (J.B. Moyle trans., Oxford Univ. Press 5th ed. 1913) (1883).
In Geer v. Connecticu4 the United States Supreme Court fell back on the theory of ownership, here state ownership of wildlife, to rationalize state law limitations on removing
captured or killed wildlife from the state as against a negative Commerce Clause claim.
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1896). Western states adopted the notion
of public or state ownership of water as the basis for establishing rules respecting its
use. More contemporary scholarship has demonstrated the potential efficacy of other
kinds of rule-making regimes for common resources. See generally ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS:

THE EvOLUTION OF INSTrrurIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION

(1990).

12. The Colorado Supreme Court described the importance of physical control of
water to establishing the appropriation necessary to a legally-protected water right in
City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 929-31 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
13. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-103(3) (a), -305(9) (b) (2006).
14. Nonuse coupled with intent to abandon results in loss of the water right. CF&I
Steel Corp. v. Purgatoire River Water Conservancy Dist., 515 P.2d 456, 457-58 (Colo.
1973) (en banc). A water right is a possessory right; failure to exercise the possession
constitutes an assumption of abandonment. Knapp v. Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist., 279 P.2d 420, 425 (Colo. 1955) (en banc).
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the use will produce actual benefits.1 5 Once the user has allocated water to a particular use, however, and thus removed it from the common
pool, control of the water shifts from the state to the user under the
terms of state law. The user has met the minimum standards of beneficial use required to take a public resource for a private use.'6 The
right to divert and use water under a vested water right continues indefinitely, so long as the user maintains its use.' 7 Because consumed
water does not return to the common pool, the general public no
longer has any direct interest in this water requiring protection, except
that the user might abandon the use and return the previouslyconsumed water to the common pool.'8 Water in the possession of an
appropriator thus becomes "personal property."' 9

15.

See generally ELWOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS (1903).

Mead brought the

sensibility of a scientific manager to the problem of water. He was generally appalled
by the lack of good records respecting water use and the often wildly excessive claims
to water that court decrees established. He believed active public supervision was essential to promote more efficient and effective use of water, a belief he was successful
in institutionalizing in Wyoming and that other western states eventually followed.
ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS 99-132 (1983).
To Mead, the efficient use of water in economic development was an exercise in both scientific management and social planning. Intensive irrigation
would reshape arid lands and revolutionize rural life. In Mead's vision of a
more perfect America, the agrarian ideal required an infusion of ideas and
attitudes consistent with what American historians have branded the American Progressive movement. Although American progressivism accommodated a wide range of individuals and agendas, its complex amalgam contained several elements that Elwood Mead championed. Expert management, technology, and orderly, business-like arrangements would transform
the rural yeoman farmer into an agrarian factory manager able to produce
larger quantities of food for the cities. Equally important to Mead was the
social revolution that his methods would foster: more efficient farm management produced better crops and better citizens.
Robert E. Rook, An American in Palestine: Elwood Mead and Zionist Water Resource Planning, 1923-1936,22 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY 71, 73 (2000).

16. A decree is a court's determination that the appropriator has fully met state law
requirements. In Colorado, the decree does not create the water right but merely
confirms its existence. Ready Mixed Concrete Co. v. Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation
Co., 115 P.3d 638, 642 (Colo. 2005) (en banc).
17. Thus a water right, although a property right, is not a fee simple absolute; it is
defeasible because the right-holder may lose the right by abandonment. Knapp, 279
P.2d at 425.
18. If a user abandons water that the user has historically diverted and used, the
water simply becomes available to other appropriators according to their priorities.
19. "However, when an appropriator has actually diverted water from the stream
under his priority, the water he has taken is no longer a right, but a possession; it is not
an interest in real estate, but personal property." Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 237 P.2d 116, 120 (Colo. 1951) (en banc). "Water in possession is personal
property; the right to divert water from a stream is an interest in real estate." West End
Irrigation Co. v. Garvey, 184 P.2d 476, 479 (Colo. 1947). But see Bijou Irrigation Dist. v.
Empire Club, 804 P.2d 175, 184 (Colo. 1991) (en banc) ("Although we have stated that
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Typically, a user takes far more water from a source for use than it
consumes in the use.2 ° For example, it is common for irrigation of
crops, a major use of water in arid and semi-arid regions, to consume
roughly half the water withdrawn from a stream or aquifer, with the
remainder returning to the source.2 ' Domestic uses typically consume
much less than this. Water returning to the source is then available
for others' use. What is the legal status of that portion of water consumed during use? In most respects, consumptively-used water meets
all the usual standards for private ownership.3 It is completely under
the control of the possessor. It is a definable and measurable quantity.
Its use is exclusive. Appropriators can prevent others from interfering
with its use. The user controls all benefits of its use. The user enjoys
the right of use, but no one can compel the user to continue the use.
Prior appropriation states even allow the user to sell, lease, or otherwise transfer the use of this portion of water to another or to put this
water to a different use. 24
Yet prior appropriation law is clear that the act of appropriation
does not result in acquiring ownership of the water. 25 Rather, appropriation establishes a legally protected right of use, which courts treat

water once diverted becomes the personal property of the appropriator, this somewhat
overstates the scope of right.") (citation omitted).
20. See, e.g., Daniel S. Young & Duane D. Helton, Developing a Water Supply in Colorado: The Role of an Engineer, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 373, 380 (2000).

"'Beneficial

use' is the use of that amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully made... " COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (2006). Most uses
of water are non-consumptive. For example, many indoor human uses are for washing
or carrying away human wastes. Irrigation water uses, while becoming more efficient
over time, are still primarily based on open ditch, gravity flow systems that operate on
the basis of using at least as much water for physical transport as the plants use for
their growth. Evapotransporation by plants or solar evaporation cause most water
consumption.
21. "Farm efficiencies might range from thirty percent for basic flood irrigation
systems to seventy-five percent for sprinkler irrigation systems." Young & Helton, supra
note 20, at 380 (footnote omitted).
22. "The amount of consumptive use for indoor water use is generally estimated as
ten percent for septic systems and five percent for water treatment facilities." Id. at 381
(footnote omitted).
23. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1362-63 (1993) (listing
the Blackstonian bundle of land entitlements, including ownership by a single individual; in perpetuity; with absolute rights to exclude would-be entrants; with absolute
privileges to use and abuse the land; with absolute power to transfer the whole (or any
part carved out by use, space, or time) by sale, gift, devise, or otherwise).
24. See Strickler v. City of Colo. Springs, 26 P. 313, 316 (Colo. 1891).
25. See Wheeler v. N. Colo. Irrigating Co., 17 P. 487, 490 (Colo. 1888). "The right
to water does not involve outright ownership of water but rather gives the holder the
right to use water for a particular beneficial use with a specific priority relative to other
users from the same source." VRANESH'S COLORADO WATER LAw 229 (James N. Corbridge, Jr. & Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1999) [hereinafter VRANESH].

PUBLIC WATER-PRIVATE WATER

Issue I

as a property right.2

6

The property interest is the priority right of use,

not ownership of water.27 The appropriator's legal interest in the water
is usufructuary-a right to enjoy its benefits without actual owner281
ship.
III. WATER REALLOCATION
Water resources are overcommitted in many locations in Colorado
and the West.2 9 Existing water uses are increasingly switching to new

uses as the primary means for meeting changing needs. ° In particular,
water historically used to irrigate crops is shifting to municipal and
other non-agricultural uses to meet growing urban demands.3 '
The process governing such changes of water use is complex, often
contentious, time consuming, and expensive.32 To protect other water
26. See Strickler, 26 P. at 316.
27. See Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1147 (Colo.
2001) (en banc); see also Nichols v. McIntosh, 34 P. 278, 280 (Colo. 1893).
28. As the Colorado Supreme Court stated in Navajo Development Co. v. Sanderson:
A usufructuary right gives its holder the right to use and enjoy the property of
another without impairing its substance. In other words, water may be applied beneficially by the holder of a water right without destroying the resource; the water molecules are not altered by the use of the water. Unused
or waste water will be discharged back into the river system or otherwise recycled and therefore available for use by other appropriators. The uncertain
nature of the property right in water is evidence that its primary value is in its
relative priority and the right to use the resource and not in the continuous
tangible possession of the resource.
Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) (citations
and footnotes omitted). In a footnote to Navajo Development, the court added:
We have characterized the usufructuary interest in water in this way:
"[A]fter appropriation, the title to the water, save, perhaps, as to the limited
quantity that may be actually flowing in the consumer's ditch or lateral, remains in the general public, while the paramount right to its use, unless forfeited, continues in the appropriator." The concept is analogous to an easement allowing a person to cross another's land: The property interest is not
consumed in the use.
Id. at 1377, n.2 (citation omitted).
29. James N. Corbridge, Jr., Historical Water Use and the Protection of Vested Rights: A
Challengefor Colorado Water Law, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 503, 510 (1998); see also generally
W. WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER IN THE WEST: THE CHALLENGE FOR

3-1 (1998) ("The pressures of rapid population growth and changing economies, coupled with degraded aquatic systems and unmet tribal water rights
and needs, present western water managers with considerable challenges for achieving
sustainable water use.").
30. VRANESH, supra note 25, at 223.
31. "Over [fifty] percent of water rights changes in Colorado over the past few
decades have involved changes from agricultural to municipal and other nonagricultural uses." Id. at 223-24.
32. For a discussion of the "transaction" costs associated with making a change of
use, see generally Charles W. Howe et al., Transaction Costs as Determinants of Water Transfers, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 393 (1990); LAWRENCEJ. MACDONNELL ET AL., NATURAL REs.
THE NEXT CENTURY
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rights from possible harm, Colorado employs a water court review
process. An extensive engineering analysis is necessary to document
the manner in which the previous appropriators have used the water
right. 34 The process includes consideration of such factors as: How
many acres of lands have been irrigated? What kinds of crops have
been grown? How much water has been diverted? What is the estimated consumptive use of the crop?3 5 How much water has returned
to the stream? What has been the pattern of diversions and return
flows? Commonly, there is an analysis of the proposed new use as well:
When will the water be diverted? How much will return to the stream?
What will be the timing of the return flows? What will be the net effect
on stream conditions after the transfer?
In addition to matters of potential injury to other water rights,
Colorado law now includes provisions addressing other possible adverse effects. Thus, changes of irrigation water rights that would dry
up croplands must provide measures for revegetation of the lands and
for management of noxious weeds.3 6 To offset any property tax and
bond repayment losses associated with the removal of 1000 acre-feet
("AF") or more of consumptively used water, Colorado law requires the
transferor to make "transition mitigation payments"
and "bonded in37
debtedness payments" to the affected county.
In short, the water reallocation process involves extensive scrutiny
to ensure protection of third party interests. Not only does the process
protect all other water rights from impairment, but it also protects local landowner interests and direct county revenues. The High Plains
decision now has added the matters of speculation and continued
beneficial use of water to the list of considerations encountered in water reallocation.
IV. HIGH PLAINS
High Plains declares that the "essential" function of a change-ofwater-right proceeding is to "confirm that a valid appropriation continues in effect under decree provisions that differ from those contained in the prior decree." 8 Traditionally, the "essential" purpose of a
change proceeding was to ensure that the change of use of water could
Transfers of Water Use in Colorado, in 2 THE WATER TRANSFER
PROCESS AS A MANAGEMENT OPTION FOR MEETING CHANGING WATER DEMANDS (1990).
LAW CTR., UNIV. OF COLO.,

33.
34.

§ 37-92-302(1) (a) (2006).
See Young & Helton, supra note 20, at 379-80; see also LEONARD
COLO. REV. STAT.

RIcE & MICHAEL

D. WHITE, ENGINEERING ASPECTS OF WATER LAW (1987).

35. The most commonly used method for calculating the crop water consumption
is the Blaney-Criddle method. SeeYoung &Helton, supra note 20, at 379.
36. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(4.5) (a) (2006).
37. §§ 37-92-103(10.7),-305(4.5)(b).
38. High Plains A&M, LLC v. Se. Colo.Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 719
(Colo. 2005).
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be made without injury to other water rights and other statutorilyprotected interests."
Certainly, only a valid existing water right serves as the legal basis
for using water, and only a valid right qualifies for a change of use.
Thus, for example, a court may consider the matter of abandonment
Moreover,
of all or a portion of the right in a change proceeding.
irrespective of the decree, a court will scrutinize an appropriation in a
change proceeding to determine actual historical use of water." The
39. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(3) (a change shall be approved if it will not
cause injury). The Colorado Supreme Court has held that: "If a holder of a decreed
water right can put the water to better use by obtaining an amendment to the decree,
such conduct should be encouraged if the proposed change will cause no injury to
other users or owners of water rights." In re Application for Water Rights for Aurora
and Colorado Springs, 799 P.2d 33, 37 (Colo. 1990) (en banc). The court first suggested a broadened view of its role in Santa Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass'n v.
Simpson:
Contrary to Santa Fe Ranches' contention that a change of use proceeding
focuses only on injury to other water rights, the continuous stream of Colorado water law demonstrates that change of use involves two primary questions: (1) What historic beneficial use has occurred pursuant to the appropriation that is proposed for change? and (2) What conditions must be imposed on the change to prevent injury to other water rights?
Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 53 (Colo. 1999)
(en banc). The court further stated: "[T]he fundamental purpose of a change proceeding is to ensure that the true right-that which has ripened by beneficial use over
time-is the one that will prevail in its changed form." Id. at 55. In Farmers Reservoir &
IrrigationCo. v. ConsolidatedMutual Water Co., , the court stated:
Essential functions of change of water right proceedings are to: (1) identify
the original appropriation's historic beneficial use; (2) fix the historic beneficial consumptive use attributable to the appropriation by employing a suitable parcel-by-parcel or ditch-wide methodology; (3) determine the amount
of beneficial consumptive use attributable to the applicant's ownership interest; and (4) affix protective conditions for preventing injury to water rights in
operation of the judgment and decree.
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Consol. Mut. Water Co., 33 P.3d 799, 807 (Colo.
2001) (en banc).
40.
Santa Fe Trail Ranches, 990 P.2d at 57 ("Inquiry into total or partial abandonment is also germane to a change of water right proceeding."); see also City & County of
Denver v. Snake River Water Dist., 788 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1990) (en banc). Originally
Colorado courts resisted consideration of abandonment in change proceedings. See
Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Changing Uses of Water in Colorado: Law and Policy, 31 ARIZ. L.
REv. 783, 788 (1989) [hereinafter MacDonnell, Changing Uses]; see also VRANESH, supra
note 25, at 252 n.157.
The no-injury rule traces back to Kidd v. Laird, 15 Cal. 161, 167 (1860), and
41.
Colorado adopted the rule in Strickler v. City of Colorado Springs, 26 P. 313, 316
(Colo. 1891). Likely this rule is simply a reflection of general nuisance principles that
one is entitled to the quiet enjoyment of one's property as against the injurious effects
of others in the use of their property, commonly expressed as "sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedus." See STEPHEN C. McCAFrREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES:
NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES 135 (2001).
There are really two questions in a change case: (1) What is the vested property interest you are seeking to change the use of? and (2) Can you accomplish the proposed
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extent of this demonstrated use limits the transferable interest.42 What
is new in High Plainsis the view that the water court must confirm the
"validity" of the appropriation with the changed terms included in the
new decree.43 In particular, such validity requires demonstration of "a
legally vested interest in the land to be served by the change of use and
a specific plan and intent to use the water for specific purposes." 44 Citing to a statutory provision for temporary transfers of water, the court
concluded the General Assembly intended that the change proponent
must identify the location of use for both temporary and permanent
transfers in a change proceeding.5 The High Plains decision asserted
change without harm to the property of others? The focus on defining the property
interest inquires into the extent of the established right by historic beneficial use.
Thus, one cannot change a water right (or a portion thereof) that the user has abandoned or never actually used. For example, in Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 371 P.2d
775 (Colo. 1962) (en banc), the Colorado Supreme Court limited a change of use to
only the portion of the decreed right actually diverted and used. The more difficult
issue is the historically established extent of that use. The court and numerous parties
to water rights litigation have expended much effort over the years in change cases to
define the extent of use, including that portion consumed in the use. The importance
of determining consumption is that courts generally regard consumed portions as
transferable to another use without questions of injury.
42. The Colorado Supreme Court has held that, "a change of water right application reopens the prior decree for determination of the true measure of the appropriative water right's consumptive use draw on the river system." Ready Mixed Concrete Co.
v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 115 P.3d 638, 646 (Colo. 2005) (en banc); see
also Weibert v. Rothe Bros., 618 P.2d 1367, 1371-72 (Colo. 1980) (en banc); City of
Westminster v. Church, 445 P.2d 52, 56 (Colo. 1968) (en banc). Earlier decreed
changes of water rights that did not include analysis of historic use will not serve as a
bar to the subsequent consideration of historic use under the original water right. Orr
v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217, 1225-26 (Colo. 1988). See generally
Corbridge, supra note 29.
43. This decision has an important subtext that likely affected its outcome. Private
investors purchased 115 farms irrigated with water from the 150-mile-long Fort Lyon
Canal in the Lower Arkansas Valley of Colorado together with their water right shares.
The investors also held options to purchase additional shares in the canal company,
giving it ownership or control of about thirty percent of the company's total shares.
High Plains, 120 P.3d at 714-15. This region of Colorado has long been the target for
such purchases of agricultural water rights for transfers to growing cities located along
Colorado's Front Range. See LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL, FROM RECLAmATION TO
SUSTAINABILITY: WATER, AGRICULTURE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE AMERICAN WEST 5174 (1999) [hereinafter MAcDONNELL, FROM RECLAMATION TO SUSTAINABILITY]. Impacts

on the local economy resulting from the loss of irrigated agriculture and its associated
businesses have galvanized both local and state-level opposition to water transfers. See
id. at 77-79.
44. High Plains, 120 P.3d at 720.
45. Id. at 724. Temporary transfers assume the original use will resume at some
point. In the meantime, the user must take the historically irrigated lands out of production. Thus, it is important to know the location of both the original use and the
new use to be able to verify there is no enlarged use. In the case of a permanent transfer, the historical use disappears. The location of the new use is relevant only for purposes of determining potential injury in the case of an upstream transfer and for ordinary purposes of water right administration.
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the interest of the titular public owner of the resource, in a change of
use, to ensure "that an appropriation of the public's water resource
must be for an actual beneficial use." 6 In the court's view, applicants
can meet this requirement through "identification of the structures
and delivered
through which the appropriated water will be diverted
47
for identified beneficial uses at identified locations.
High Plains, the corporate purchaser of the water shares, restricted
its application to change the use only of the historically consumed portion of the water used for irrigation.4 8 Thus, it made no claim to the
use of the associated carriage water. 49 It requested the ability to use
this consumptive-use portion of water for a wide range of purposes in
geographic areas along the Colorado Front Range with the highest
population and thus, the most likely sources of demand.5 0 To keep its
options as open as possible, it named numerous potential points of
diversion.5'
The water court rejected High Plains' application as too indefinite to
enable determination of injury to other water rights or to demonstrate
continued beneficial use of water, and thus violative of Colorado's antispeculation doctrine." The Colorado Supreme Court focused only on
the matter of continued beneficial use and anti-speculation.
A. ANTI-SPECULATION DOCTRINE

The Colorado Supreme Court has expanded the reach of the antispeculation doctrine in recent years. Following the Vidle 3 decision,
the Colorado General Assembly modified the definition of "appropriation" in the statutory section applying to surface and tributary ground
water to state:
[B]ut no appropriation of water, either absolute or conditional, shall
be held to occur when the proposed appropriation is based on the
speculative sale or transfer of the appropriative rights to persons not
parties to the proposed appropriation, as evidenced by either of the
following:
46. Id. at 716.
47. Id. at 716-17.
48. Id. at 716. High Plains asked for the right to use this consumptive share to
extinction because, by definition, there are no return flow dependencies on water
beneficially consumed under a vested water right.
49. Water right holders use a considerable portion of water diverted pursuant to
the water right to help transport water to the fields where growing plants take it up
directly. This unconsumed portion of the water is often referred to as "carriage" water.
See supra note 20.
50. High Plains,120 P.3d at 715.
51.

Id.

52.
53.

Id. at 714.
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d 566

(Colo. 1979) (en banc).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 10

(I) The purported appropriator of record does not have either a legally vested interest or a reasonable expectation of procuring such interest in the lands or facilities to be served by such appropriation,
unless such appropriator is a governmental agency or an agent in fact
for the persons proposed to be benefited by such appropriation.
(II) The purported appropriator of record does not have a specific
plan and intent to divert, store, or otherwise capture, possess,
and
5
control a specific quantity of water for specific beneficial uses. 4
In 1987, the Colorado Supreme Court determined the anti-speculation
doctrine applied to applications for ground water in designated basins,
appropriations covered in a separate statutory scheme.55 In 1999, the
court applied the anti-speculation doctrine to applications for reasonable diligence for already-decreed conditional water rights. 56 In 2003,

the Court extended the doctrine to Denver Basin designated ground
water. 57 In general, anti-speculation applies only to appropriators intending to provide water to others for their use.58
There are legitimate reasons for wanting to discourage the creation
of private rights to the control of public water beyond demonstrated
need for its use. Such control could exclude others' uses, including
public instream uses. Water right holders could conceivably use this
control to monopolize the supply of water in certain areas. 59 The con54.

COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (2006).
55. Jaeger v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, 746 P.2d 515, 523 (Colo. 1987) (en
banc).
56. Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Oxy USA, Inc., 990 P.2d
701, 709 (Colo. 1999) (en banc).
57. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n v. N. Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Mgmt. Dist., 77
P.3d 62, 80 (Colo. 2003) (en banc). However, the court has declined to apply the
doctrine to non-tributary ground water. E. Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation
Dist. v. Rangeview Metro. Dist., 109 P.3d 154, 157 (Colo. 2005).
58. See generally supra text accompanying note 4.
59. The Vidler court seemed particularly concerned about this possibility:
Our constitution guarantees a right to appropriate, not a right to speculate.
The right to appropriate is for use, not merely for profit. As we read our
constitution and statutes, they give no one the right to preempt the development potential of water for anticipated future uses of others not in privity
of contract, or in any agency relationship, with the developer regarding that
use. To recognize conditional decrees grounded on no interest beyond a
desire to obtain water for sale would-as a practical matter-discourage those
who have need for use for the water from developing it. Moreover, such a
rule would encourage those with vast monetary resources to monopolize, for
personal profit rather than for beneficial use, whatever unappropriated water remains.
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d 566, 568
(Colo. 1979) (en banc). Fear of monopoly was widespread in the American West in
the latter part of the 19'h century. See RICHARD Moss ALSTON, COMMERCIAL IRRIGATION
ENTERPRISE, THE FEAR OF WATER MONOPOLY, AND THE GENESIS OF MARKET DISTORTION IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICAN WEST 126-28 (1978). Colorado courts long before

Issue I

PUBLIC WA TER -PRIVA TE WATER

cept of beneficial use emerged early in prior appropriation law specifically for this purpose.6
The anti-speculation doctrine goes beyond beneficial use, however,
in its opposition to private development of water for profit. In Colorado, such opposition traces back to the generally unhappy experience
of early settlers with private land companies that sold both land and
the water supply necessary to irrigate the land and of water users with
carrier ditch companies that sold them water. 2 Irrigators needed water, but few could afford to pay the cost of having someone else provide it. The initial solution was the mutual ditch company in which
users banded together to share the labor and costs. As water development became more costly, governmental entities with their taxing and
bonding powers took over the task of water supply. Federally supported reclamation projects developed supplies in a manner that sub63
stantially subsidized the costs of water. As a consequence,
most water
users do not pay anything close to today's cost of water.64

Vidler had expressed the view that an appropriator could not claim water for uncertain
future uses. Combs v. Agric. Ditch Co., 28 P. 966, 967 (Colo. 1892) ("[N]either [a
corporation] nor any stockholder.. .can thus withhold the water from beneficial use,
nor reserve it for the future use of junior appropriators to the prejudice of prior appropriators nor to the exclusion of those who in the meantime may undertake, in good
faith, to make a valid appropriation thereof."). The court made an exception, however, in the case of "great and growing cities." City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96
P.2d 836, 841 (Colo. 1939) (stating that appropriation for future use by city not speculation "but the highest prudence on the part of the city to obtain appropriations of
water that will satisfy the needs resulting from a normal increase in population within a
period of reasonable time."). For elaboration of the Great and Growing Cities Doctrine, seeVRANESH, supranote 25, at 317-18.
60. See Schorr, supra note 9, at 46-47; see alsoJanet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste,
and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Law, 28 ENVTL. L. 919,
963-65 (1998).
61. A path breaking book published in 1960 noted the "water is different" mentality, which includes a deep-rooted opposition to treating water like other natural resources, including allowing its private ownership. JACK HIRSHLEIFER ET AL., WATER
SUPPLY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLICY 4-5, 367-68 (1960).
62.

See ALSTON, supra note 59, at 107-25. See MAcDONNELL, FROM RECLAMATION TO

SUSTAINABILrIY, supra note 43, at 51-74, for a discussion of examples of failed private
investment in land and water in the Arkansas Valley of Colorado. See ALSTON Supra
note 59, at 101-03, for a discussion of impacts to the Grand Valley.
63. See generally RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE BUREAU OF REcLAMAInon (1989). In a 1996 report, the United
States General Accounting Office ("GAO") found that:
[The United States Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau")] has determined that
$16.9 billion..of the $21.8 billion investment in water projects is reimbursable to the federal government. Of these reimbursable costs, the largest portion - $7.1 billion - has been allocated to irrigators. However, ..the irrigators
are scheduled to repay only $3.4 billion. On the basis of a determination
that the irrigators are unable to pay the full amount of $7.1 billion, $3.4 billion of their obligation has been shifted to the projects' other beneficiaries
for repayment, primarily through power revenues. In addition, irrigators
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Embedded in this history is an implicit belief that water is a quasipublic good, that it should be freely available for use (that is, there
should be no charge for diverting water from a stream or withdrawing
water from an aquifer), that it should be either collectively or governmentally provided, and that the costs of its provision should be kept
low through governmental support of various kinds. 5
Most of these concerns go to the initial allocation of water, however, and do not readily apply in the case of rights to water historically
consumed in an existing beneficial use. This is water that appropriators have completely removed from the source. The appropriation has
already excluded others from downstream use, and upstream juniors
from consumption and the consumption of associated carriage water.6
Upstream seniors have not claimed this portion of water. Whether the
beneficial user was public or private makes no difference; nor does the
particular purpose of use, so long as it was beneficial. In most cases,
the water right under which the water has been consumed is purchased
from the historical user. By its willingness to spend money buying the
right (plus the money to go through water court, find a user, and get
water to the user), the purchaser has demonstrated its intention to
continue beneficial use of the water, presumably to be able to recoup
its investment. While the purchaser may not know the water's ultimate users and uses, there is little doubt about the continued beneficial use of the water.
The state has a legitimate role in ensuring that individual use of
public water meets basic beneficial use standards, and in protecting
have been relieved of $373.1 million of their repayment obligation through

charge-offs.
U.S. GEN.

AccOUNTING OFFicE, GAO/RCED-96-109, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION: INFORMA-

TION ON ALLOCATION AND REPAYMENT OF COSTS OF CONSTRUGTING WATER PROJECTS

4-5

(1996).
64. Charles W. Howe, The Functions, Impacts and Effectiveness of Water Pricing:Evidence
from the United States and Canada,21 WATER RES. DEv. 43, 48 (2005).
65. HIRSHLEIFER ET AL., supra note 61, at 367. A true public good is something that
any and all can use without diminishment of its value; no one can exclude users from
using it, like air. Charles W. Howe, Protecting Public Values in a Water Market Setting:
Improving Water Markets to Increase Economic Efficiency and Equity, 3 U. DENV. WATER L.
Rev. 357, 363 (2000). As discussed above, water flowing in a stream approximates the

idea of a public good. Once an appropriator controls water for a particular use, however, it loses its public good character.
66. This is the effect of the priority system in which a senior right may divert its full
right ahead of all junior users. A water right typically includes water required for both

consumptive and non-consumptive beneficial purposes. Thus, a senior right can "call"
for the full extent of its rights, not just its consumptive-use portion. All upstream juniors are obligated to allow this amount of water to pass their points of diversion if necessary to satisfy the downstream senior.
67. A purchaser is concerned with continuing the existing use until the purchaser
can establish a new use, both to maintain the full extent of the water right and to earn
income to help offset costs. Presumably, the purchaser expects the new use will gen-

erate enough benefits to justify the investment.
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established uses from infringement by new uses. Once an appropriation dedicates water to individual use, the state retains an interest in
that portion of the water returning to the sources upon which other
users rely. High Plains asserts a continuing state interest in assessing
whether a proposed new use of historically beneficially-consumed water is beneficial and not speculative, an assessment that requires foreknowledge of actual use, including point of diversion and place of
use. 68
Information respecting point of diversion and place of use is relevant for consideration of matters of injury. 69 Diversions physically remove water from the stream at the point of diversion, a matter of considerable interest to downstream water users-especially those whose
points of diversion are between the point of diversion and the point
where return flows enter the stream. Purpose of use and place of use
are important for evaluating beneficial use of a new appropriation.
In short, while there may be a continuing state interest in protecting other water rights from injury caused by a change of use, the state
interest in evaluating a proposed change of use to prevent speculation
is less clear-particularly when the quantity of water proposed for
change is limited to that amount historically beneficially consumed.
V. PRIVATIZING CONSUMED WATER
What would it mean to treat water historically beneficially consumptively used as private? In some respects, little would change. To
meet the no injury requirement in a transfer proceeding, the transferable quantity of water under a water right is commonly limited to that
quantity of water the transferor can divert in the new use without increasing net depletion of water from the source.7 ° While legally the
68. So, what is the speculative concern? Perhaps it is the dislike of private investors
making a profit from the sale of water, especially when that water comes from an already stressed local economy. The effect, however, will not be to stop the transfer of
agricultural water to urban uses but simply to limit the ultimate purchasers of agricultural water to cities. Private investors will continue to work as brokers, as they do now,
using options to put together packages of water rights that they can "sell" to cities.
69. In its initial application, High Plains requested numerous alternate points of
diversion. Thereafter, however, it committed to keeping the original point of diversion
at the Fort Lyon headgate. Its intention was to construct a pipeline that would carry
the historically consumed portion of water back to the presumed metropolitan market.
Using this approach eliminated any possibility of injury that might result from a
change of point of diversion.
70. "Safeguarding junior appropriators' right to immutable stream conditions in
the face of a change from agricultural to municipal use requires that there be parity in
the consumptive use of the right before and after the change-and that this parity
endures." Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden, 44 P.3d 241, 246-47
(Colo. 2002) (en banc); see also Danielson v. Kerbs Agric., Inc., 646 P.2d 363, 373
(Colo. 1982) (en banc) ("It is a fundamental principle that the consumptive use of
water may not be increased to the injury of other appropriators."); City of Westminster
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transferor is transferring the water right, not the water itself, in practice the water right is now a specified volumetric quantity of water.7'
The priority, important in establishing the pattern of diversion and use
under the original right, now is relevant only for potential administrative purposes. v Presumably the rate of diversion would remain the
or moves downstream,
same. If the point of diversion stays theS same
73
there will be no injury issues to consider. It is only if the proposed
new use for the consumed water is located upstream that concern
about potential injury to other water rights arises, and then only in very
limited situations.74
Treating consumed water as privatized would potentially facilitate
its conversion to new uses. There would no longer be a need for public review of the proposed new use to consider concerns about speculation or whether the use is "beneficial." So long as the diverter removes
v. Church, 445 P.2d 52, 59 (Colo. 1968) ("Defendant City of Westminster could not
enlarge upon its predecessors' use of the water rights by changing periodic direct flow
for irrigation to a continuous flow for storage. Such a change would necessarily increase the ultimate consumption from the stream to the detriment of other appropriators."); Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629, 635
(Colo. 1954) (en banc) (holding that a change in water right from agricultural to municipal use must not increase consumptive use of the water transferred and that satisfying this condition requires balancing agricultural consumptive use before the transfer
with the anticipated municipal consumptive use after the transfer); MacDonnell,
Changing Uses, supra note 40, at 791 ("[T]he Colorado courts have emphasized an injury analysis that has been described as 'an exercise in balancing depletions.' Essentially, this approach seeks to keep the stream intact by ensuring that the depletion of
the stream by new use does not exceed the depletion of the stream caused by the
original use.").
71. Presumably, the decree would describe the volume in time increments such as
some number of acre-feet of water per month during the period of its historic use,
while the rate of diversion at the headgate would stay the same as under the original
decree.
72. If the original use would have been out of priority under prevailing stream
conditions, the changed use cannot divert water. Thus, there would need to be a condition imposed in a change of use prohibiting diversion of water until the Division
Engineer is notified of the point of diversion.
73. Generally, moving just the consumptive use portion of a water right upstream is
not a problem because, historically, this amount of water (plus associated carriage
water) was available at the downstream point of diversion. Under Colorado's hydrology, virtually all water originates as precipitation in the mountains and flows downstream. So long as diverters do not move water above points at which large tributaries
provide a significant portion of the stream flows, there is likely to be sufficient water in
the source to enable the diversion and consumption of water higher in the system.
Diversion of non-consumptive use water could potentially be a problem for another
diverter located downstream of the new point of diversion and upstream of the point
of return flows but would not affect other downstream users.
74. Potential impacts on exchanges are likely to be of concern on overappropriated rivers such as the Arkansas and the South Platte. To satisfy the no injury
requirement, the change applicant will have to demonstrate the ability to divert the
consumptive use amounts at any of the proposed points of diversion for the new use
without harm to existing rights including exchanges.
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the water from the source at its historic point of diversion (or downstream), injury review would be unnecessary. Assuming the owner of
the water is 7interested
in its sale, transaction costs would be less of an
5
impediment.
A. THE ISSUES

There is no free lunch, however. A public process would still be
necessary to determine the consumptive use portion of water historically diverted and applied to a beneficial use. While the proponent
could potentially streamline such a process through use of generic
crop consumptive use estimates, use of comparable analyses previously
completed in the same area, or other means, objections from other
water right owners could still force detailed evaluations of placespecific actual use.76 Once a transferable consumptive use unit of water
is established, however, there would be no need for future reviews in
subsequent transfers.77
Presumably, it will still be necessary for a party proposing to move
consumptive use units of water upstream from the original place of use
to present evidence of no injury to other water rights. 8 In virtually all
cases, it should be straightforward to meet this standard because of the
consumptive-use nature of the water.
In many places, existing users already consume more than enough
water to readily meet future consumptive use needs. The legislature
should consider the possibility of a cap on total consumptive uses from
any given source of water. 79 Such a cap would further encourage transfers of water and would help maintain existing instream flow levels. It
would encourage efficient use of that portion of water already diverted
and consumed in human uses.
75. See Howe et al., supra note 32, at 396-401.
76. For example, the Colorado State Engineer developed consumptive use factors
for water proposed for deposit in the Arkansas River Pilot Water Bank. Prospective
depositors are to use these factors to calculate the transferable quantity of water, subject to rebuttal with specific historic consumptive use analyses. Colo. Div. of Water
Res., Colo. Dep't of Natural Res., Rules Governing the Arkansas River Water Bank Pilot
Program, Rule 8 (2002), availableathttp://water.state.co.us/pubs/rule reg/
arkpilotrules052302.pdf.
77. Colorado has already completed consumptive use analyses for many irrigation
ditches in the Colorado Front Range. The Colorado Supreme Court has expressed its
willingness to allow such analyses from previous cases for use in subsequent cases involving change of use of water from other lands under the same ditch. Farmers High
Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 975 P.2d 189, 203 (Colo. 1999) (en
banc). For such systems, it should be possible to convert diversion right shares into
consumptive use shares based on existing information.
78. See supranote 73.
79. The concept is to move towards "no net depletion" of water to meet new demands, a policy that could be achieved with relatively free transferability of consumptive use water within a given water source.
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Philosophically, there is the matter of consumptive-use water rights
becoming more like a commodity and the possibility of their sale for
profit. 0 Economists have, for many years, pointed out some of the
consequences of the "water is different" viewpoint.8 For example, the
artificially low prices most users pay for water encourages its overdevelopment and inefficient use. Governmental support for water development often tends to be based on political, more than economic,
considerations." Third party effects play a much more prominent role
respecting uses of water than for other natural resources. In fact, water
used for economic purposes is no different in character from the
standpoint of the user than any other factor necessary to accomplish
those purposes. The water resource must be "developed" to be economically usable-that is, it must be stored, diverted, transported, perhaps treated, delivered, and then applied to a use. All of these actions,
requiring the expenditure of human effort and money, transform a
portion of the public good of water in the hydrologic cycle into an
economic good for individual human benefit. Because of the nature
of most water uses, some amount of this water returns to the original
source to be available for use by others. But that portion consumed in
use is removed from this status. Only the use of this portion is here
proposed to be regarded as a commodity, with its use decided primarily through private decision-making. The remainder would continue
to be treated as a public resource while not in the possession of an appropriator.
Irrigated agriculture accounts for approximately ninety percent of
all water consumption in Colorado.83 On the one hand, a move to regard the use of water beneficially consumed in irrigation as private
80. Whether or not one regards the origin of the appropriation doctrine as reflective of principles of "distributive justice" in a frontier society as suggested by Schorr,
supra note 9, at 5, we live in a far different world today. Indeed, the impulse of individual action which drove the development of appropriation rules has been substantially modified by an overlay of state and federal laws that place a considerable degree
of governmental control of modern water use. The author submits that the extension
of public supervision required under High Plainsis in many respects more contrary to
the spirit of individual initiative reflected in the original appropriation approach than
would be the less restrictive reallocation approach proposed here. In any case, the real
question is what makes sense today. Given the enormous importance of water reallocation in the modern West, the author suggests a more market-like approach will better
serve this need than one with burdensome and questionable public regulationparticularly if it is limited to the transfer of the consumptive use portion of existing
water rights.
81. SeeHIRSHLEIFERETAL., supra note 61, at 4-5.
82. See NAT'L WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 128 (1973); see also generally
TERRY L. ANDERSON, WATER CRISIS: ENDING THE POLICY DROUGHT (1983); HIRSHLEIFER
ETAL., supra note 61, at 82-86.
83. SUSAN S. HUTSON ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCULAR 1268, Estimated Use
of Water in the United States in 2000, at 7 tbl.2 (2004).
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would tend to enhance the value of irrigation water rights. On the
other hand, this approach might further facilitate the shift of water
from agriculture to non-agricultural uses-a trend opposed by many in
Asserting public
the agricultural sector and in rural communities.
control over changed uses of water and increasing the requirements to
meet before courts allow changed uses, as the court did in the High
Plains decision, is one way to attempt to discourage agricultural to urban water transfers. Aside from its questionable legal basis, such an
approach also represents questionable policy since its effect is simply to
increase the transaction costs associated with transfers, not to help di85
rect resources into productive purposes.
B. POTENTIAL BENEFITS

Perhaps the greatest water-related challenge facing Colorado and
other water-limited states is how to meet new demands for consumptive
uses of water while maintaining and protecting important nonconsumptive uses such as fisheries, recreation, and water quality.
Competing uses already withdraw substantial quantities of water from
streams and aquifers to provide for existing consumptive uses. In
many places it may be possible to meet new demands through a combination of increased efficiency and transfer of existing consumptive
84. Irrigated agriculture is an important part of the economy and society in many
parts of Colorado and the American West. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A NEW ERA
FOR IRRIGATION 8 (1996). In some areas, however, irrigated agriculture is struggling to
survive in the face of growing competition from a world market for agricultural products and increasing costs. In certain of these areas, irrigation has been possible primarily because of the availability of good supplies of low cost water. Without question,
there are other uses today capable of paying much more for the use of this water. As
these users are given the opportunity to bid for the use of this water, irrigators are
faced with the choice of continuing with farming or selling their water rights. For
many family-farm irrigators, this is a painful choice. They see the limitations of irrigated agriculture as a source of livelihood, but agriculture is the only life they know
and the only life they can imagine living. See MACDONNELL, FROM RECLAMATION TO
SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 43, at 73. The challenge facing the non-corporate irrigated
agriculture community is to see their water rights as an economic asset which they can
invest in different options. There are choices in addition to either status quo or selling
off and going out of business. For example, one can lease a portion of one's water
rights and fallow lands temporarily, with revenues used to enhance farm productivity.
Rather than fighting water transfers, agriculture could see water as the enormously
valuable resource it is and use it more flexibly to strengthen its competitiveness.
85. High Plains must first have contracts in hand with actual users before it can
return to water court to determine the amount of water it may deliver. Likely, this will
mean either selling its water rights directly to cities not burdened by this requirement
or going through several change of use proceedings until it has found actual users for
all of its shares. The rate of movement of water out of irrigation to urban use is not
likely to be significantly different, but the cost to High Plains of having to go through
more than one change of use proceedings will obviously be greater. The public benefit of such increased costs is unclear.
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uses. Conceptually, the objective would be to stay within the net depletions of water currently existing in a watershed or basin. Thus, new
users would ameliorate new depletions through retirement of existing
depletions to the degree practicable. In overdeveloped water sources
such as the Arkansas River and the South Platte, unless diverters import additional water from other river basins, Colorado is effectively
already operating in this manner.
Giving more explicit definition to the transferability of historically
consumed water would simply facilitate a process that is already underway. 6 Existing water uses can and should change to different uses if
the original user no longer wants to continue the use. Users can usually avoid the single biggest concern, potential injury to other water
rights, if they limit the change to the consumptive use portion of the
original right. Defining existing water rights in terms of consumptive
use units would substantially reduce the need for detailed analysis of
potential injury. Once established, it would substantially simplify the
change of use process.
The commonly-used term "water marketing" misrepresents the existing water transfer process. Rather, such transactions are more in the
nature of negotiated sales, often involving a middle person who serves
as a kind of broker. The sale of the water right is only the beginning;
the real work is to get through the water court process. If water rights
were defined in consumptive-use units, something more akin to a market might actually emerge. 817 The value of having more of a market for
consumptive-use units of water is the ability to engage larger numbers
of sellers and buyers through which a more accurate price for water
would emerge. Existing users could better gauge the so-called "opportunity cost" of continuing their use of water versus leasing or selling
that water to others. New users would adjust their demand to a price
of water that reflects its full value in that location. With additional increments of water supply readily available, water suppliers would not
feel the need to acquire large blocks of water rights in advance of actual need."' Ultimately, there would be a more rational allocation of
the resource.
86. Agricultural to urban transfers in Colorado have been occurring at least since
the 1890s. See, e.g., Strickler v. City of Colo. Springs, 26 P. 313, 315 (Colo. 1891).
87. A model already exists within the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District in which units of water provided from the West Slope through the Colorado-Big
Thompson Project are freely transferable. Charles W. Howe et al., Innovations in Water
Management: Lessons from the Colorado-Big Thompson Project and Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District, in SCARCE WATER AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 171-200 (Kenneth D.
Frederick, ed., 1986).
88. There are economies of scale for traditional water development that motivate
development of large blocks of water in advance of actual use. For example, water
storage projects typically have developed a large quantity of water in advance of actual
use-in part, because of the substantial time required for such development. From an
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VI. CONCLUSION
Privatizing consumptively used water would represent a significant
shift in thinking about water. It would, however, more accurately reflect the distinction between shared uses and exclusive uses of water.
Shared uses would continue to operate with public supervision. Exclusive uses would be given more latitude to change.
It is time to further refine our thinking about water, to move beyond the simplistic divide between public versus private, and to recognize that water is sometimes public and sometimes private. Such further refinement in our understanding of water would improve our ability to determine when public supervision is appropriate and when private decision-making makes more sense.
In the absence of harm to other water rights and to protected
third-party interests, voluntary transactions for water reallocation involving sellers and buyers do not require governmental supervisionparticularly not to ensure continued beneficial use. That is a matter
for the buyer to decide.89
It may be time as well to come to terms with the idea that people
can make a profit from the sale of water.90 Voluntary transactions only
happen when both the buyer and the seller believe they are better off.
For the seller, that means either a profit or more income than would
be earned by the seller's use. It is worth considering why profit is considered a dirty word in relation to water while it is fundamental to every
other form of business transaction. 9'

economic perspective, the result is an overinvestment in water development. For an
early analysis of this issue see HIRSHLEIFER ET AL., supra note 61, at 359-61.

89. For example, why should a purchaser or lessor of a water right not be able to
simply cease diversion and out-of-stream use of the water if the objective the purchaser/lessor seeks is to improve stream flows at and below the point of diversion?
At present, the Colorado General Assembly permits only the Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB") to do this, but the CWCB has no funds with which to

purchase or lease water rights. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-60-122.2, 37-92-102(3)
(2006) (CWCB can only provide grant money to organizations seeking minimum
instream flow rights for protection of fish and wildlife).
90. Chuck Howe, New Realities Stress Colorado's Water Laws, DENVER POST, Mar. 19,
2006, at 4E.

91. The matter of privatizing previously publicly-provided water services has become a highly controversial, even emotional, issue. For a balanced consideration of
this issue

see NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PRIVATIZATION OF WATER SERVICES IN THE

UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF ISSUES AND EXPERIENCE (2002). A more critical
perspective appears in KARENJ. BAKKER, AN UNCOOPERATIVE COMMODITY: PRIVATIZING
WATER IN ENGLAND AND WALES (2003).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Reports indicate that natural gas producers will drill at least 4200
coalbed methane ("CBM") wells in Alberta, Canada this year.' In light
of the anticipated increase in commercial production from wet coals
within ten years and the controversy surrounding the impact of CBM
development on provincial water resources, this article reviews the current and emerging provincial regulatory framework that governs CBM
'B.A., B.Sc., LL.B, LL.M.; Associate Dean, Haskayne School of Business, member of
the Natural Resources Energy and Environmental Law Research Group, Faculty of
Law, University of Calgary, and Law Society of Alberta.
' Kevin Lo & Steven I. Paget, Coalbed Methane Activity Update, THE NEGOTIATOR, May
2
6
2006, at 5, available at http://www.capli.ca/member/publications/negotiator/ 00 /
Raising
Gas
Plans
may/2006 may.pdf; see also generally Laura Severs, Unconventional
Fears, Bus. EDGE, Mar. 16, 2006, available at http://www.businessedge.ca/printArticle.
cfm/newsID/12126.cfm (noting that the number of CBM wells in Alberta currently
exceeds 6000).
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produced water and the associated environmental impacts. 2 This article analyzes the emerging provincial regulatory system in western Canada in the context of the CBM development experience in the western
United States, American best management industry practices, and the
Alberta Multi-Stakeholder Advisory Committee Recommendations released in May 2006.
CBM is natural gas that occurs in coal seams. Several western Canadian states have commercially produced CBM for two decades; however, Alberta is the only province with appreciable commercial production. Much of central and southern Alberta is underlayed by coals with
the potential for CBM development. 3 Recently, EnCana Corporation
budgeted $4.5 billion, and other companies anticipate spending a total
of $9.1 billion, for CBM exploration and production in the next five
years.' In 2004, western Canadian CBM production constituted only
0.5% of the total provincial marketable gas production; however, the
Alberta Energy and Utilities Board ("EUB") predicts that by 2014, CBM
production will constitute twelve percent of that total.5 By the year
2025, it is anticipated that eighty percent of the new wells drilled in
Alberta will target CBM, and the energy resource will account for fifty
percent of the total marketable natural gas production. 6
To date, most of Alberta's CBM production from "dry" coal, containing little or no water, comes from the Horseshoe Canyon and Belly
River coal formations. In 2005, commercial production was reported
from wet coals in the Mannville Group." Currently, limited data exists
2. For a discussion of these impacts, see generally

MARR GRIFFITHS AND CHRIS

SEVERSON-BAKER, UNCONVENTIONAL GAS: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES OF COALBED
METHANE DEVELOPMENT IN ALBERTA (2003), availableat http://www.pembina.org/pdf/

publications/CBM Summary.pdf.
3. JEFFREY FIELL, OCTAGON,
UPSIDE

FOR

INVESTORS 14-15

OPPORTUNITIES IN COALBED

METHANE:

ECONOMIC

(2006), http://www.richardsoilandgas.com/industy

information/pdf/cbm 31012006.pdf (stating the Horseshoe Canyon formation is
thought to contain 66 trillion cubic feet ("tcf") of CBM, the Scollard Formation 53 tcf,
Belly River Group 66 tcf, and the Mannville Group 320 tcf potential resource-in place).
4. Paul Haavardsrud, Another Giant in the Making: Coal Bed Methane Has Done in a

Few Years What Took Decades for OilsandsBoosters: Attract the Big Money, NAT'L POST (Can.),
Apr. 3, 2006, at FP5.
5. ALTA. ENERGY & UTIL.

BD.,

ST98-2005,

ALBERTA'S

RESERVES

2004

AND

2005-2014, 4-9 (2005) [hereinafter ALTA. ENERGY & UTIL.
BD., ST98-2005], available at http: / /www.eub.ca/docs/products/sts/st98-2005.pdf.
6. Severs, supra note 1.
7. ALTA. ENERGY & UTIL. BD., BULLETIN 2006-33, 2005 ALBERTA COALBED METHANE
SUPPLY/DEMAND OUTLOOK

(2006), availableat http://www.eub.ca/docs/
documents/bulletins/Bulletin-2006-33.pdf (stating "[o]ver [ninety-five percent] of

ACTIVITY SUMMARY AND WELL LOCATIONS 1

Alberta's CBM wells are completed" in these two regions).
8.

Lynda Harrison, Horseshoe Canyon Can Be Wet; Corbitt Could Be a Giant, NICKLE'S
BULLTEN, Nov. 14, 2005; See also ALTA. ENERGY & UTIL. BD., ST98-2006,
ALBERTA'S ENERGY RESERVES 2005 AND SUPPLY/DEMAND OUTLOOK 2006 - 2105, 4-6
(2006) [hereinafter ALTA. ENERGY & UTIL. BD., ST98-2006], available at
http: //www.eub.ca/docs/products/STs/ST98-2006.pdf.
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on the volume of water that wet coals in western Canada may produce.
Recent media reports in Alberta have focused on the environmental
problems attributed to the surface discharge of produced water and
the reported problems associated with CBM development in the western United States, and potential problems that may occur in western
Canada due to methane migration from CBM wells into landowner
water wells. 9 For several years, provincial regulators in Alberta and
British Columbia monitored the CBM development experience in the
western United States and the potential environmental and social impacts from development.
II. PRODUCED WATER IMPACTS IN THE WESTERN UNITED
STATES
As CBM remains absorbed or attached to the coal due to overlying
pressure from rock and/or water, the facilitation of methane production requires the reduction of the pressure in the coal seam. Removing the overlying water through a dewatering stage separates the CBM
from the coal and allows pumping to the surface. Produced water refers to water pumped during this stage and subsequent production
stages. Regulators in the United States have had more experience in
managing large scale CBM development than in any other country.'0
CBM development in the western United States revealed that the quantity and quality of water produced from CBM wells will vary from basin
to basin and at individual sites within each basin." "Wet" coals, such as
those found in the San Juan and Powder River sedimentary basins have
produced significant volumes of fresh and saline water. 2 At some CBM
well sites in Wyoming, the produced water is of drinking water quality,
but at other sites the water is saline or contains natural salts and other
elements that may prompt treatment prior to discharge. 3 Produced
9. See Hanneke Brooymans, Taps of Fire Near Drill Site Spook Resident, CALGARY
HERALD, Dec. 13, 2005, at A3; Kelly Cryderman & Renata D'Aliesio, Farmers, Landowners
Voice Opposition to Coal Bed Methane: Info Sessions Tap Deep-Seated Suspicions, CALGARY
HERALD,June 19, 2006, at A6; Renata D'Aliesio, U.S. Rancher Warns of Coal Bed Methane's
Poison, CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 10, 2006, at B3; Andrew Nikiforuk, Coal Bed Worries Addressed Slowly, CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 10, 2006, at A24; Severs, supra note 1; W. ORG. OF
RES. COUNCILS, FACT SHEET: COALBED METHANE DEVELOPMENT:
RURAL RESIDENTS? (2003), http://www.worc.org/pdfs/cbm.pdf.

10.

See, e.g.,

BOON OR BANE FOR

MONT. DEP'T OF NATURAL RES. & CONSERVATION, RECORD OF DECISION:

STATEWIDE COAL BED METHANE EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT

(2003), available at

http://www.bogc.dnrc.state.mt.us/PDF/finalrod.pdf (approval of the 2003 environmental impact statement for CBM drilling and exploration throughout the entire State
of Montana).
11.

GARY BRYNER, UNIV. OF COLO. SCHOOL OF LAW, NATURAL RES. LAW CTR., COALBED

METHANE DEVELOPMENT IN THE INTERMOUNTAIN WEST: PRIMER 9

http://www.colorado.edu/law/centers/nrlc/publications/CBM
12. Id. at 13.
13. Id. at 16.

(2002), available at

Primer.pdf.
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water may contain drill bit cuttings, lubricants, oil, and diesel fuel that,
if improperly managed, can pollute surrounding creeks and rivers
when discharged on to the surrounding landscape. In addition to the
14
impacts from the discharge of produced water, methane migration
and the impact of CBM production on aquifers raise other important
questions. 5 In light of the American experience, the emerging provincial regulatory regimes need to address these issues.
III. PRODUCED WATER MANAGEMENT OPTIONS
As the natural chemical content of produced water can be different
in each well, the potential environmental impacts can vary at each
site.' 6 A regulatory framework that provides for mitigating environmental impacts from development must account for individual site
characteristics. Pumping water from CBM wells to facilitate methane
production has also raised questions about the impact of groundwater
removal on aquifers and the potential depletion of sources of potable
water for future domestic consumption and use.' 7 In regard to CBM
production from "wet" coals, the expense of water management and
disposal is a significant factor in the economic viability of CBM projects. 8 Management of produced water disposal occurs through surface discharge, subsurface injection, or beneficial use of the water.'
The type of water disposal approved by state regulators
requires analy20
content.
chemical
the
determine
to
water
the
sis of
If the produced water contains minerals, the water may require
treatment before disposal. Regulators in Wyoming and Montana
adopted different standards to evaluate the mineral content and quality of the water.'
Surface discharge of produced water releases the
14.

VITo Nuccio, U.S.

GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, COAL-BED METHANE: POTENTIAL AND

(2000), availableat http://pubs.usos.gov/fs/fs123-00/fsl23-00.pdf (explaining methane migration as the process under which methane can move from a CBM
well into the soil or water wells).
CONCERNS

15.

BRYNER, supra note 11, at 13-14.

16. Id. at 14 (listing some elements affecting water quality, such as sodium, calcium,
magnesium, sulfate, and chlorine).
17. Id. at 16.
18.

W. THOMAS GOEROLD, REVISED POWDER RIVER BASIN COALBED METHANE FINANCIAL
(2002), avialable at http://www.lookoutmtn.com/Documents/NRLC Revised
PRB CBM financial model.pdf.
19.
Id. at 14.
20. Id. at 25-26. The United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") relies on the Clean Water and the Safe Drinking Water Acts to monitor the quality of
water. If the water is determined to be saline, depending upon the mineral content of
the produced water (total dissolved solids), some state regulators will require treatment of the water before surface discharge. At some sites the mineral content of the
water will preclude treatment and subsurface injection will be required.
MODEL

21. Id. at 25. Wyoming regulators apply narrative standards to evaluate water quality; however, in Montana numeric standards are used.
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water along the land surface into creeks or rivers; or, if the produced
water is saline, into structures such as tailing ponds or excavated pits
for treatment. A United States Department of Energy report stated
that allowing the water to flow along the ground surface into creeks
and rivers is the "lowest cost option and results in the largest estimates
of economically recoverable gas." 22 Regulators in Alberta and British
Columbia are aware of the concerns of some landowners and environmental groups in the western United States about the environmental impacts arising from the surface discharge of water such as increased erosion, commingling of water of different qualities, and the
destruction of wildlife habitats and ecosystems.23 In 2004, the Governor of Montana objected to CBM development in southeastern British
Columbia near Fernie, due to concerns about the downstream impact
of produced water on the Flathead River that flows into the state.24
Regulations in several states restrict or prohibit the surface discharge
of saline water. 5
Due to the regulatory requirements or, in some cases, the significant expense of storing and treating saline produced water before surface discharge,2 6 the second method of water disposal frequently employed is subsurface injection. Injecting the produced water into subsurface disposal wells, insulated from groundwater, prevents the contamination of potential sources of drinking water. 7 A third water management method employed in the western United States is the beneficial use of produced water, such as diverting the water into storage for
watering livestock or irrigation.
IV. THE WESTERN GOVERNOR'S ASSOCIATION BEST
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
In response to lawsuits and controversies arising from CBM development in the western states, the governors of Wyoming, Montana,
22. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Energy, Nat'l Energy Tech. Lab., DOE Study Raises
Estimates of Coalbed Methane Potential in Powder River Basin (Dec. 16, 2002),
http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/press/2002/tl cbm powderriver.htmi.
23. Andrew Nikiforuk, Coalbed Worries Addressed Slowly, CALGARY HERALD, March 10,
2006, at A24; see also B.C. MINISTRY OF ENERGY & MINES, COALBED GAS: ENERGY FOR OUR
FUTURE 18 (2006), available at http://www.em.gov.bc.ca/dl/Coalbedgas/CoalbedGas
Doc web.pdf [hereinafter B.C. MINISTRY OF ENERGY & MINES, ENERGY FOR OUR FUTURE].

24. Scott Simpson, Gas Drilling Plan Sparks Fight: Cross-Border Dispute Erupts Over
Montana's Objections to a B.C. Bid for Coalbed Methane Development, VANCOUNVER SUN, July
24, 2004, at GI; Andrew Nikiforuk, BC's CBM Battle: The Montana Challenge, LAND
ADVOCATE, Sept. 2004, at 5, available at http://www.landadvocate.org/issues/Land

Advocate Sept 04.pdf.
25.

U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER PRODUCED wrrH COAL-BED METHANE 2

availableat http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-0156-00/fs-0156-00.pdf.
26.

Id.

27.

Id.

28.

Id.

(2000),
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Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah, sponsored an initiative to encourage
the development of best management practices ("BMPs") in the CBM
industry." After extensive consultation amongst stakeholders including landowners, environmental groups, industry, and government, 3°
the project culminated with the identification of BMPs in April 2004.
The western United States definition of a BMP is a "proven way of conducting CBM operations, which eliminates or minimizes adverse impacts from CBM development to public health and the environment,
landowners, and natural resources; enhances the value of natural and
landowner resources; and reduces conflict."32 BMPs are voluntary industry practices endorsed by the Western Governors that do not replace the regulatory requirements. 3 The Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers ("CAPP") recently published a set of best management practices for the emerging Canadian CBM industry.3
American BMPs relevant to produced water focus on water management planning, protecting water quality, and the beneficial use of
produced water. Members of the Coal Bed Methane Advisory Committee for the Western Governors' Association included regulators from
the United States Environmental Protection Agency, the Bureau of
Land Management, United States Department of Agriculture, the
United States Forest Service, individual states, oil companies, environmental groups, and other stakeholders.' Three BMPs focus on water
management planning. The first provides for the preparation of a water management plan by the CBM developer.3 6 As part of the plan,
developers should "consult with surface owner(s) (as well as affected
water-users) early in the planning process and throughout the development of [the plan] .
The second water management planning
BMP prompts developers to consider the following twelve factors in
evaluating CBM produced water management options:
0 Landowner preference and concerns

29. W. GOvERNoRs' ASS'N, CoAL BED METHANE BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES: A
HANDBOOK 2 (2006), available at http://www.westgov.org/wga/initiatives/coalbed/
CoalBedMethane.pdf, [hereinafter BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES HANDBOOK].
30. See id. at 24-25.
31. W. GOvERNORs' ASS'N, PoLIcY RESOLUTION 05-24, COAL BED METHANE
DEVELOPMENT 1 (June 2005), available at http://www.westgov.org/wga/policy/05/
CBM.pdf.
32. BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTIcES HANDBOOK,supra note 29, at 4.
33. Id. at 3.
34.
See CAN. ASS'N OF PETROLEUM PRODUCERS, BEST MANAGEMENT
PRAcTIcEs: NATURAL GAS IN COAL (NGC)/COALBED METHANE (CBM) (2006), available at

http://www.capp.ca/raw.asp?x=l &dt=NTV&dn=103407.
35. BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES HANDBOOK, supranote 29, at 24-25.
36. Id. at 7.
37.

Id.
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Quantity and quality of water to be discharged

" Quality of the receiving water standards
* Environmental/ecological impacts from surface discharge
* Downstream concerns
" Economic feasibility/cost effectiveness
* Beneficial use possibilities
" Proximity to streams/ponds/reservoirs/wetlands/lakes
* Proximity to clinker/scoria and gravel deposits
* Proximity to springs
* Long-term impacts to the environment
* Protection of groundwater"8
The third BMP provides that a CBM developer will "ensure that the
capacity of the receiving aquifer is adequate to handle the anticipated
volume of water to be injected" if the developer chooses to inject produced water for disposal3 9
The western United States adopted the following four BMPs to
protect and maintain the quality of water resources: (1) "establish a
baseline for ground- and surface-water quality in the area where development will occur..."; (2) "provide assistance to landowners who want
monitoring data, either by providing the data, or directing them to the
appropriate source, such as a regulatory agency..."; (3) "understand
the hydrology of the basin to determine a sufficient distance for well
placement to avoid contamination of water wells and methane seepage..."; and (4) "[d]iscontinue the use of diesel fuel in hydraulic fracturing fluids injected directly into formations that contain underground sources of drinking water.,4o
A review of the current regulatory framework in Alberta and British Columbia indicates that western Canada adopted all of the above
BMPs, which are voluntary practices in the western United States, as
regulatory requirements. For example, Alberta prohibits the injection

38.
39.
40.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id.at 10.
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of diesel fuel into formations that contain drinking water under the
Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act."
Alberta's regulatory framework has not addressed the beneficial
use of produced water on a comprehensive basis. The United States'
BMP provides that "[w] hen the landowner is interested in possibly using CBM produced water, [the developer should] provide information
about options for beneficial-use and about potential problems and liability., 42 One potential problem observed in semi-arid areas of the
western United States, arises from creating dependency on a new
source of water. After farmers and ranchers have become reliant on
produced water, at the end of the productive life of the well and the
availability of produced water, they can no longer sustain their operations.
To date the only governments in Canada to consider CBM development in some detail are the governments of Alberta, British Columbia, and Nova Scotia. The next section reviews the existing provincial
regulatory frameworks to evaluate the extent to which they incorporate
the BMPs that the western United States has already established.
V. REGUIATION OF PRODUCED WATER IN ALBERTA
Before developing their respective regulatory frameworks, the Alberta and British Columbia governments sent delegations to the western United States to investigate reported problems attributed to CBM
development. Provincial regulators met with their American counterparts to discuss these problems. The Alberta Government considers
CBM to be another form of natural gas and has modified legislation
and regulations developed for conventional natural gas wells to regulate CBM operations. Informational Letter 91-11 indicates all statutes
and regulations that apply to conventional natural gas wells will also
apply to CBM wells. 43 The EUB and the Department of Alberta Envi-

ronmental Protection ("Alberta Environment") are the two main agencies that regulate water produced from CBM wells. The EUB, as the
main regulator of energy projects, relies on the Oil & Gas Conservation
Act, 44 and Energy Resources Conservation Act,4" to monitor oil and gas
well drilling. Pursuant to the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act ("EPEA") 46 and the Water Act ("WA"), 47 the mandate of
41.

Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, R.SA., ch. E-12, § 148(a)

(2000).
42. BEST MANAGEMENT PRAcTrcES HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 9.
43.

ALTA. ENERGY & UTIL BD., INFORMATIONAL LETrER IL 91-11, COALBED METHANE

REGULATION 1 (1991), available at http://www.eub.ca/docs/ils/ils/pdf/il91-11 .pdf.
44. Oil and Gas Conservation Act, R.S.A., ch. 0-6, §§ 1-110 (2000).
45. Energy Resources Conservation Act, R.S.A., ch. E-10 (2000).
46. Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, R.SA., ch. E-12 (2000).
47. Water Act, R.S.A., ch. W-3 (2000).
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Alberta Environment is "to ensure the water resources of [Alberta] and
* ,,48
the environment are sustained for current and future generations.
Individual CBM wells may require authorizations from the EUB and
Alberta Environment. 49 Ownership of all water lies with the Crown in
Alberta,5 0 requiring licenses to use, dispose, and divert all water in the
province.51 If there is the potential for a CBM well to produce nonsaline water, the WA requires a license. Alberta Environment focuses
on the regulation of produced non-saline water. Saline water contains
more then 4000 milligrams per litre of total dissolved solids (mg/L
TDS). In light of its experience in regulating saline water from conventional wells, the EUB has the primary responsibility to regulate subsurface injection of saline water.
54

VI. NON-SALINE WATER
Alberta Environment, through the WA and EPEA, regulates the
production, diversion, and disposal of non-saline surface and groundwater.55 CBM developers must follow the application procedures specified in Alberta Environment's Guidelines for Groundwater Diversion
for Coalbed Methane/Natural Gas in Coal Development, adopted in
2004.6 The WA broadly defines diversion of water to include "the impoundment, storage, consumption, taking or removal of water for any
purpose.. .and.. .any other thing defined as a diversion in the regulations....
To obtain approval for a proposed activity, an applicant
must provide evidence to substantiate that the diversion will not damage a source aquifer or other aquifers, and will not have an immediate
or long-term impact on nearby water supplies. 58 CBM developers must
apply for a permit if they anticipate encountering non-saline water in a
proposed well.5 9 The developer must complete and submit a preliminary groundwater assessment ("PGA") to Alberta Environment."° The
purpose of the PGA is to collect local baseline data and identify issues
48. ALTA. ENV'T, GUIDELINES FOR GROUNDWATER DIVERSION FOR COALBED
METHANE/NATURAL GAS IN COAL DEVELOPMENT 1 (2004), availableat http://www3.gov.
ab.ca/env/water/Legislation/Guidelines/groundwaterdiversionguidelinesmethgasnatgasincoal.pdf [hereinafter ALTA ENV'T, GUIDELINES FOR GROUNDWATER
DIVERSION].

49.

Id. at 2.

50.

Water Act, R.S.A., ch. W-3, § 3(2).

51.

See id. §§ 1(1)(b), 36(2).

52.

ALTA ENV'T, GUIDELINES FOR GROUNDWATER DIVERSION, supra note

48, at 2.

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1-3.
56. Id. at 1.
57. Water Act, R.S.A., ch. W-3, § 1(1)(m) (2000).
58.

ALTA ENV'T, GUIDELINES FOR GROUNDWATER DIVERSION, supranote

59.
60.

Id.
Id.

48, at 2.
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of interest to regulators and the public.6' As of May 1, 2006, the EUB
requires all CBM developers to offer to conduct baseline well testing
before issuing a new well license application to drill or re-complete
The design of
CBM wells above the base for groundwater protection.
the new well testing program establishes a water quality determination
and baseline before drilling proceeds. CBM developers encourage
landowners to agree to test their wells; if the landowner agrees to baseline testing, CBM developers test all active water wells within a minimum 600 meter radius of the proposed drilling or re-completion site."
If there are no wells within 600 meters, the developer must offer to
provide testing for at least one well up to 800 meters away. 64 The developer collects baseline information on the well water production capability and water quality, including bacteria, and the presence or absence of gas, including methane.65 CBM developers must pay for the
well water testing and provide the landowner and Alberta Environment
with the results. 66 Mandatory testing of water wells before CBM drilling
proceeds is consistent with the "Water For Life" strategy adopted by
Alberta Environment; increased baseline data will improve regulator
knowledge of provincial water resources and should assist in protecting
the quality of water wells. 67 The developer files the sample results with
Alberta Environment as part of the new water well testing information
database. 68 Alberta Environment will use the database to evaluate the
baseline testing initiative after six months and again after twelve
months. 69 The results of the baseline testing should provide information to assist Alberta Environment with investigations when there are
complaints about water contamination from CBM exploration or production activities. 0
Developers collect baseline data to help identify any groundwater
changes that may occur from CBM development over time. The PGA
must contain extensive technical data, including the proposed loca-

61.

Id. at 5.

62.

ALTA. ENERGY & UTIL. BD., DiREcrIvE 035, BASELINE WATER WELL TESTING

REQUIREMENT

FOR

COALBED

METHANE

GROUNDWATER PROTECTION 1-3

(2006),

WELLS

COMPLETED

ABOVE

THE

BASE

OF

available at http://www.eub.ca/docs/docu-

ments/directives/directive035.pdf.
63. Id. at 1.
64. Id.
65. WATER FOR LIFE, ALTA. ENV'T, BASELINE WATER WELL TESTING STANDARD 3, available at http://www.waterforlife.gov.ab.ca/coal/docs/baseline factsheet.pdf [hereinafter WATER FOR LIFE, BASELINE WATER WELL TESTING STANDARD].

66. Id.
67.

WATER

FOR LIFE,

ALTA.

ENV'T,

GROUNDWATER

PROTECTION

AND

COALBED

METHANE DEVELOPMENT 5, available at http://www.waterforlife.gov.ab.ca/coal/docs/
display handout.pdf [hereinafter WATER FOR LIFE, GROUNDWATER PROTECTION].
68. WATER FOR LIFE, BASELINE WATER WELL TESTING STANDARD, supra note 65, at 4.

69.

Id at 2.

70.

WATER FOR LIFE, GROUNDWATER PROTECTION, supranote 67, at 5.
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tions of "test holes, test wells and exploratory wells, any surface water
bodies, drainage courses, roads and infrastructure... [and] results of []
field-verified survey[s] of water wells, springs, and dugouts ... ,,7' The
report must identify potential users and receptors of produced water,
as well as identify and record the concerns of well or property owners
about the proposed CBM project.72 As part of the PGA, the developer
must prepare a technical report that covers all aspects of the water diversion/disposal program and how it will affect the environment and
stakeholders. 3 The report must include: a description of the geologic
and hydro-geological conditions in the project area verified by a field
survey; a description of the drilling program, including test hole and
observation well locations, and drilling methods; aquifer parameters;
water sample test results; gas sample test results; selected aquifer water
quality sample results; an operational water management plan; consideration of cumulative impacts; a description of the water monitoring
program; and a mitigation program to address environmental impacts.

7

VII. PUBLIC NOTIFICATION
Once a developer submits an application to Alberta Environment,
the CBM operator must notify the public about the project concerning
the proposed diversion or disposal of produced water, which provides
the public with some awareness of the proposed diversion/disposal
program and the opportunity to raise concerns or submit questions.75
If the public expresses any concerns or questions, the CBM operator is
required to respond in writing to those parties directly affected by the
proposed diversion/disposal program, and m-ust file copies of all correspondence between the affected parties.76
If Alberta Environment approves an application, the CBM operator
begins the de-watering phase for the project. The CBM operator must
divert or dispose of all produced water in a manner approved by Alberta Environment-which usually grants authorization with conditions including requirements for monitoring production volumes, performing on-going water quality analyses, and monitoring water levels
over time. 77 Alberta Environment may also require the operator to drill
dedicated observation wells into the targeted coal zone to monitor the
effects of groundwater production. 78 Thus, flexibility in the require71.

ALTA ENV'T, GUIDELINES FOR GROUNDWATER DIvERSION, supranote 48, at 5.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.at 6.
See id.at 2.
Id.at 5-9.
Idat 3.
Id.
Id. at 3, 8.
Id.at 3.
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ments for CBM development exists within the regulatory framework

through exemptions from certain requirements.
VIII. SURFACE DISCHARGE
The CBM operator must apply to the EUB and Alberta Environment for permission to dispose of non-saline water onto the ground
surface or into a suitable shallow subsurface aquifer. 79 Historically, Alberta does not allow the disposal of produced water above the base of
groundwater protection ("BGWP") or on the surface.80 However, if the
information collected and presented to the EUB and Alberta Environment from the PGA indicates no damage to the environment or
subsurface aquifers, the EUB and Alberta Environment may consider
these disposal methods."' Currently, there are no guidelines for the
approval of surface or shallow aquifer disposal-the EUB and Alberta
Environment consider these disposal methods on a case-by-case basis.82
Saline water diversion 3 technically falls under the WA 4 but is exempt from Alberta Environment jurisdiction under the Water (Ministerial) Regulation, 5 because the EUB has the responsibility to regulate
saline water. 8 In respect to co-mingling groundwater of different salinities, the EUB applies standards developed by Alberta Environment,
and CBM operators must follow EUB requirements. The EUB requires
developers return all saline water to the zone of origin if below the
BGWP, or if not below the BGWP, to a zone deeper than the BGWP. 7
79. Id.
80. See Letter from Mary Griffiths, Senior Policy Analyst, Pembina Inst., to Commingling Review Res. Application Group, Alta. Energy & Util. Bd. 2 (June 12, 2006),
available at
http: //www.pembina.org/pdf/publications/commingling pembina
response.pdf (noting that "regulators in both the EUB and Alberta Environment must

make every effort to ensure that... commingling [of poor quality saline and high quality
non-saline water in the BGWP] is not allowed....").

81.

ALTA ENV'T, GUIDELINES FOR GROUNDWATER DIVERSION, supra note 48, at 3.
82. ALTA. ENV'T, SURFACE WATER QuALITy GUIDELINES FOR USE IN ALBERTA 2 (1999),
availableat http://environment.gov.ab.ca/info/library/5713.pdf.
83. Water (Ministerial) Regulation, C.R.A. 205/98, § 1(1)(z) (defining saline
groundwater as that water having "total dissolved solids [TDS] exceeding 4000 milligrams per lit[er] [mg/L]").
84. Water Act, R.S.A., ch. W-3, § 1 (1)(m)(ii) (2000) (noting that diversion of water

includes "any other thing defined as a diversion in the regulations for the purposes of
this Act").
85. Water (Ministerial) Regulation, C.R.A. 205/98, sched. 3(1)(e).
86. Oil and Gas Conservation Act, R.S.A., ch. 0-6, § 37(b) (2000).
87. ALTA. ENERGY & UTIL. BD., NATURAL GAS IN COAL 11-12, available at http://www.
energy.gov.ab.ca/docs/naturalgas/pdfs/cbm/GAM AppB3 Backgrounder.pdf Devel-

opers must follow EUB Directives 051 and 065 for deep well injection of saline water.
ENERGY & UTIL. BD., DIRECTIVE 065, RESOURCES APPLICATIONS FOR
CONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAs RESERVOIRS (2006), available at http://www.eub.ca/docs/
See ALTA.

documents/directives/directive065.pdf;

ALTA. ENERGY & UTIL. BD., DIRECIVE 051,
INJECTION AND DISPOSAL WELLS: WELL CLASSIFICATIONS -COMPLETION, LOGGING, AND
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Finally, the CBM operator must track, monitor, and report information
on the disposal of produced water to the EUB.
This review of the regulatory framework indicates that Alberta incorporated the United States BMPs for water management planning
and water quality into its regime as regulatory requirements. The CBM
developer must prepare a water management plan and Alberta Environment and EUB consider the twelve factors outlined in the United
States BMPs before approving the drilling. With respect to BMPs providing for baseline data, Alberta regulations strongly encourage well
testing before drilling approval. The Alberta regime incorporates
BMPs designed to protect and maintain water quality by requiring
monitoring CBM development impacts on water resources. The Alberta regime prompts developers to understand basin hydrology before authorities will approve CBM projects. To address the United
States BMP aimed at discontinuing the use of diesel fuel in fracturing
fluids, the EPEA prohibits the injection of deleterious substances such
as diesel fuel into the environment. With respect to subsurface injection of produced water, the provincial regulatory approval framework
requires an understanding of aquifer capacity. 9 Provincial regulators
must consult with landowners, surface occupants, and other stakeholders concerning proposed projects prior to CBM project approval.
IX. REGULATION OF PRODUCED WATER IN BRITISH
COLUMBIA
British Columbia has not seen significant commercial CBM production yet; however, wet coal zones contain CBM reserves. 90 CBM test
wells drilled to date indicate that produced water may be non-saline or
saline, but limited data exists as most of the wet coal projects are experimental.9 ' As in Alberta, multiple regulatory bodies regulate produced water.
The British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission
(1994), available at http://www.eub.ca/docs/documents/ directives/directive051 .pdf.
88. ALTA ENV'T, GUIDELINES FOR GROUNDWATER DIVERSION, supra note 48, at 8. For
outlines of regulatory monitoring requirements, see Oil and Gas Conservation Regulations, C.R.A. 151/71, § 12.010; ALTA. ENERGY & UTIL. BD., DIRECTIVE 059, WELL
DRILLING AND COMPLETION DATA FILING REQUIREMENTS (2004), availableat http://www.
eub.ca/docs/documents/directives/Directive059.pdf, ALTA. ENERGY & UTIL. BD.,
DIRECTIVE 007, PRODUCTION ACCOUNTING HANDBOOK (2001), available at http://www.
eub.ca/docs/documents/directives/directive007.pdf.
89. ALTA ENV'T, GUIDELINES FOR GROUNDWATER DIVERSION, supra note 48, at 3.
90. ALTA. ENERGY & UTIL. BD., ST98-2006, supra note 8, at 4-2. TDS concentrations
in this zone are approximately 40,000 mg/L. COALBED METHANE/NATURAL GAS IN
TESTING REQUIREMENTS

COAL WATER WORKING GROUP, ALTA. ENV'T, FINAL REPORT TO MULTI-STAKEHOLDER
ADVISORY COMMITTEE 7 (2005),
available at http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca/docs/

natralgas/pdfs/cbm/PF-WaterPaper.pdf.
91. Karen Campbell, Editorial, Coming to Your Backyard: Coalbed Methane, W. COAST
ENVrL. LAW, Nov. 1, 2004, at 3, available at http://www.wcel.orr/4976/30/30-02.pdf.
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("BCOGC') is the main regulator for CBM operations, with functions
analogous to the EUB. The Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection, like Alberta Environment, administers permits for water production under the Environmental Management Act ("EMA").9' While the
regulatory authorities are similar, the British Columbia government,
unlike the Alberta government, created legislation and a Code of Practice specific to CBM. In British Columbia, the Ministry of Environment
("ME") and the BCOGC regulate the disposal of produced water. The
ME oversees the application of the EMA as it is the provincial agency
responsible for environmental protection.93 The BCOGC regulates the
drilling of oil, gas, and CBM wells.94 Although the ME and OGC both
regulate produced water, the BCOGC is the main regulator, administering the application review and approval process.95 The BCOGC employs a three-phase approach for CBM development, including evaluation, feasibility, and production. Each phase requires an application to
the BCOGC outlining the plans for each phase with the following purposes:
(1)Evaluation Phase - determine the technical feasibility of a proposed CBM project through test drilling and the collection of produced water;
(2)Feasibility Phase - ascertain the commercial viability of a project
through the operation of twenty to forty wells; and
(3) Production Phase - establish a full-scale commercial recovery of
CBM reserves. 96

British Columbia created a Code of Practice for the Discharge of
Produced Water from Coalbed Gas Operations ("COP")97 that came
into effect on July 1, 2005. 9" The legislature designed the COP to ensure that when CBM drilling produces water, the drilling companies
protect the surrounding environment including surface and ground-

92. Environmental Management Act, C.S.B.C., ch. 53, § 14(1) (2006).
93. Id. § 5.
94. Oil and Gas Commission Act, C.S.B.C., ch. 39, § 3 (2006).
95. Id. § 3(b).
96. Information Letter, B.C. Oil & Gas Comm'n, OGC 04-27, Coalbed Gas Development Stages (Oct. 7, 2004), available at http://www.ogc.gov.bc.ca/documents/
informationletters/OGC%2004-27%20CBG%2ODevelopment%2OStages.pdf.
97. See Code of Practice for the Discharge of Produced Water from Coalbed Gas
Operations, C.R.B.C. 156/2005 (2006) [hereinafter Code of Practice].
98. B.C. Ministry of Energy, Mines & Petroleum Res., Questions and Answers: Coalbed Gas 7, http://www.em.gov.bc.ca/subwebs/coalbedgas/FAOs/CBG-FAQs.pdf (last
visited Nov. 20, 2006) [hereinafter B.C. Ministry of Energy, Questions and Answers].
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water from contamination." During the dewatering phase, companies
must determine both the water quality and quantity prior to commercial production, because these factors weigh heavily in the determination of how to appropriately dispose of or use the produced water."° If
a company proposes to discharge produced water, it must complete
baseline monitoring similar to the PGA required by Alberta Environment. °1 British Columbia restricts surface discharge under the COP to
perennial streams, seasonal streams, or the ground by percolation. 2
The COP contemplates several disposal options, including beneficial
use of produced water.'03 Even though re-injecting water into the formation from which it originated is the most commonly used method,
other alternatives, such as surface discharge, treating the water to meet
the standards set by the Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection
and then disposing of it, and beneficial use of non-saline water for irrigation, habitat, livestock, or recreation purposes are possible. 4
The first step in the application process requires a preliminary water analysis test and the development of a receiving environment baseline monitoring program, designed and conducted by a qualified and
licensed professional. 0 5 Results of the preliminary water analysis test
must satisfy the numerical standards set out in the COP, for the following parameters: total dissolved solids ("TDS"); total suspended solids
("TSS"); dissolved chloride; temperature; dissolved oxygen; boron con-6
tent (seasonal only), toxicity to fish; and toxicity to invertebrates.'
The standards vary depending on whether the discharge is into a perennial or seasonal stream. With respect to surface discharge, the COP
requires use of a ground disposal facility, the total dissolved solids in
the produced water be less than or equal to two times the underlying
ground water values, and the total suspended
solids be less than or
07
liter.
per
milligrams
twenty-five
equal to
99. Id. (noting that, "[i]f the water quality and the receiving environment are suitable, the [COP] .. .allows for discharge to surface streams or to the ground via infiltration"). The COP defines produced water as:

water extracted from a coal seam or a formation contiguous to a coal seam
that (a) originates from within the coal seam or contiguous formations, (b) is

pumped out in advance of and in aid of the release of gas from the coal
seam, and (c) is produced in the course of a coalbed gas exploration and
production industry operation...
Code of Practice, C.R.B.C. 156/2005, § 1 (1).
100. Id. § 11.
101.
Compare id., with supratext accompanying notes 60-70.
102. Code of Practice, C.R.B.C. 156/2005, § 2.

103.

Id.§3(1).

104.

See B.C.

6.
105.
106.
107.

MINISTRY OF ENERGY & MINES, ENERGY FOR OUR FUTURE,

Code of Practice, C.R.B.C., 156/2005, § 11.

Id. scheds. 1-2.
Id. § 6.

supra note 23, at
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The developer must conduct a baseline environmental monitoring
program at least once a year before the initial discharge. 1 08 If the discharge is into a stream, the program must include a survey of the current water quality, the aquatic biota and riparian vegetation community, and the current flow of the stream.' °9 If the discharge is into the
ground, the program must include a survey of the current quality of
the groundwater."0 A company proposing surface discharge under the
COP must register and provide well information pursuant to section 4
of the Waste Discharge Regulation ("WDR") for exemption from the
WDR."' After completing the application for surface discharge to the
BCOGC and satisfing the COP, applicants must also submit information to the BCOGC for either a permit for discharge or approval without the need for a permit under the EMA." 2 Section 100 of the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act ("PNGA") may require additional approval,

including approval to proceed with a scheme to gather, store, and dispose of produced water." 3 Additionally the BCOGC requires approval
under section 94 of the Drilling and Production Regulation ("DPR") if
the company does not re-inject the produced water into a subsurface
disposal well."' An applicant need not submit multiple separate applications, but rather submit a single application satisfying all the regulatory requirements to the OGC. Applicants for surface disposal authorization should also be aware of the BCOGC requirements with respect to public consultation outlined in the Guideline for Approval to
Dispose of Produced Water ("GADPW") 5
The COP addresses other issues, such as: the location of points of
discharge relative to sensitive-stream habitat features; erosion effects;
distance from existing drinking water and irrigation withdrawal points;
the required flow rate of the streams; the maximum amount of produced water that may discharged from a well (1850 cubic meters per
day ("mt /day")); and discharge proximity to drinking or irrigation water sources.
The COP outlines monitoring, record-keeping, and reporting of water discharge requirements the applicant must complete
on an ongoing basis."' These include the development of programs to
measure the quantity of water flow on a weekly basis and the development of ongoing environmental monitoring and assessment reports for
108.

Id. § 11(2)(a).

109. Id. § 11(2) (a) (i).
110. Id. § 11 (2) (a) (ii).
111. Waste Discharge Regulation, C.R.B.C., 320/2004, § 4 (2006).
112. Environmental Management Act, C.S.B.C., ch. 53, § 15 (2006).
113. Petroleum and Natural Gas Act, C.S.B.C., ch. 361, § 100 (2006).
114. Drilling and Production Regulation, C.R.B.C., 362/98, § 94 (2006.).
115. B.C. Oil & Gas Comm'n, Guideline for Approval to Dispose of Produced Water,
http://www.ogc.gov.bc.ca/arb/arb print.asp?aoid=49 (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
116. Code of Practice, C.R.B.C., 156/2005, §§ 4-5, 8, 13 (2006.).
117. Id. § 10.
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each year of discharge."' Approved applicants must retain monitoring
and assessment data gathered for periods ranging from a minimum of
five years to the entire life of the project. " 9
CBM developers should be aware that a CBM project in British Columbia might fall under the authority of the Environmental Assessment Act, either because of the length of time and rate at which the
project produces water from the ground, or because of significant
pipeline construction. 20° In both scenarios the Ministry of Environment could classify the CBM project as reviewable, thus requiring the
company to obtain an environmental assessment certificate before
proceeding with the development. 2'
There are similar provisions in Alberta. Like conventional wells,
small projects involving multiple CBM wells do not require a comprehensive and costly environmental assessment ("EA") under Alberta's
EPEA. Conversely, under the EPEA, an EA may be required for larger
scale projects if the CBM development is of sufficient2 2 magnitude, or
the Minister of Environment believes one is warranted.
Pursuant to the EMA, the British Columbia government may grant
exemptions from specific COP requirements. 23 Additionally, the EMA
allows the government to grant variance orders for specific relief from
permits or restrictions on a temporary basis. 1 4 When the quality or
volume of produced water does not satisfy the COP standards, companies must apply for approval to inject water into subsurface formations. 25 The applicant must identify the targeted formation and structure in the injection program to prevent any release of produced water
into the environment. 126 The GADPW developed by the BCOGC speciof information required for an application for subsurface
fies the type
27
disposal.'

British Columbia legislation, guidelines, and the COP incorporate
the American BMPs. CBM developers in British Columbia must evaluate how to manage produced water by considering factors such as the
anticipated water quality and quantity, the cost of water treatment, the
118.

Id.§ 12.

119.

Id. § 14(1).

120.

Environmental Assessment Act, C.S.B.C., ch. 43, § 5 (2002).

121.

Id. § 6.

122.
123.
124.

Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, R.S.A., ch. E-12, § 44 (2000).
Environmental Management Act, C.S.B.C., ch. 53, § 138(2) (s) (2006).
Id.§ 9(1)(b).

B.C. OIL & GAS COMM'N, GUIDELINES FOR COALBED METHANE PROJECTS IN BRITISH
125.
COLUMBIA 13 (2002), available at http://www.ogc.gov.bc.ca/documents/guidelines/

Coalbed%20Methane%20Guidelines.pdf.
126. The regulatory authority for subsurface injection rests with the BCOGC under
section 100 of the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act and section 94 of the Drilling and
Production Regulation. See Petroleum and Natural Gas Act, S.B.C., ch. 361, § 100
(2006); Drilling and Production Regulation, C.R.B.C., 362/98, § 94 (2003).
127. B.C. Oil & Gas Comm'n, supra note 115.
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landscape of the receiving environment, the potential for beneficial
uses such as irrigation, and existing infrastructure. In addition, the
regulatory framework in British Columbia more thoroughly addresses
the issue of beneficial use of produced water than does the Alberta
framework. The legislature intended the COP to be a work in progress
and changes are contemplated. The COP provides a well-coordinated
framework to protect water quality and address the potential impact of
CBM development on aquifers. In light of the success of the COP in
providing a more streamlined approval process than currently exists in
Alberta, it is interesting to note that the Alberta CBM/NGC MultiStakeholder Advisory Committee ("MAC") included in its recommendations, released in January 2006, that the Alberta Government adopt a
21 to improve the coordination
"decision tree approach" and a "code"0
of the regulatory approval process.
X. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As the CBM industry is in its infancy in both Alberta and British Columbia, and each geological environment has unique characteristics,
there is considerable uncertainty about the environmental impacts
from CBM development on provincial water resources. The fact that
the existing Alberta and British Columbia regulatory schemes incorporate American best management practices is encouraging and suggests
the provincial governments have created frameworks to address some
of the problems reported in the western United States. However, in
light of the importance of sustaining provincial water resources for
future generations, the current framework can improve by addressing
the following unresolved water management issues:
1. The baseline data on provincial groundwater resources is currently
inadequate;

2. It is unclear what the CBM development impacts will be on provincial aquifers, and what the scientifically-based volume of produced

water should be from a single CBM well or multiple wells in a specific
area;
3. It is unclear what the level of drawdown should be from aquifers;
4. Standard procedures and reporting requirements for sampling,
analysis, and monitoring of produced water and water wells potentially affected by CBM development have not been incorporated into
the regulatory framework;

128. CBM/NGC MULTI-STAKEHOLDER ADVISORY COMM., COALBED METHANE/NATURAL
GAS IN COAL: FINAL REPORT 5, 7 (2006), available at http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca/docs/
naturalgas/pdfs/cbm/THE FINAL REPORT.pdf.
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5. It is unclear whether the current regulations governing drilling
fluids, casing fracturing, and completion practices developed for the
conventional gas industry are adequate to prevent groundwater contamination;
6. It is unclear whether the current practice of using untreated river
water or dugout water in CBM drilling fluids negatively impacts aquifer water quality;
7. The current regulatory framework in Alberta does address the issue of beneficial use of non-saline produced water; and
8. There is uncertainty about the extent to which methane migration
may be a potential problem in Alberta.'9
Regarding the first issue, MAC recommended Alberta Environment
"complete- its inventory of groundwater in the province, beginning in
areas that could experience intense CBM/NGC development", and the
"EUB and Alberta Geological Survey [] should complete the Base of
Groundwater Protection mapping project...."" To better protect aquifers and water supplies, MAC recommended Alberta Environment
determine a "scientifically-based threshold volume for produced nonsaline water below which a simplified approval under a Code of Practice for production or use of the water would apply"13' The volume
determination and adoption of a Code should increase the consistency
in the standards Alberta applies and streamline the regulatory approval
process. In respect to the third issue of aquifer drawdown, MAC recommended Alberta Environment clarify the existing rules concerning
aquifer drawdown. 132 The fourth issue pertains to the lack of standard
procedures for water sampling, testing, monitoring and reporting.
MAC's recommendation to develop quality assurance and control
measures should provide increased protection for provincial water resources. 3 3 In light of the fifth issue, MAC prudently recommended the
EUB and Alberta Environment review existing regulations in the context of the emerging CBM industry to address the adequacy of regulations concerning drilling, fracturing, and completion practices designed for the conventional gas industry.3 4 In respect to the sixth issue-aquifer contamination from bacteria in untreated river water or
dugout water used in drilling fluids-MAC recommended EUB and

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See id. at 7-10.
Id. at 7.
Id.
See id. at 8.
See id.
See id.at 9.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 10

Alberta Environment research such environmental impact to provide
increased protection for water resources.135
As commercial production from wet coals in Alberta has been
minimal, the beneficial use of produced water is not an issue on which
regulators have focused. Alberta has not defined an appropriate beneficial use of produced water; however, suggestions include irrigation,
impoundments-for example, wildlife watering, recharge, or evaporation ponds-industrial use, or public and domestic use.1 36 As ownership of water vests in the Crown under the WA, produced water arguably also belongs to the Crown. Wet coals have the potential to produce
a significant volume of CBM; therefore, increased production from wet
coals is probable. The Alberta government, in conjunction with the
regulatory bodies responsible for oil and gas development, should provide CBM developers with guidance as to whether produced water can
be used and, if so, under what conditions. With pending CBM projects
in wet coals and the economic and environmental implications, the
best policy and regulatory approach to the use of water is an important
issue that Alberta must address.
Currently, the objectives listed in the WA suggest that, to give effect to the provisions within that Act, the Director must consider the
water's useful purpose. 7 The Director must consider whether to grant
or withhold a license for a particular water use, disposal, or diversion
because of the intended use. This issue tends to arise in the context of
when a company applies to divert non-saline water for an industrial
purpose, as in the Capstone case.' 8 Requests from CBM producers for
licenses are distinguishable because those companies are applying to
divert groundwater absorbed to coal that is usually saline. The Director may only need to balance the interests of multiple users in these
types of diversions if dewatering a CBM formation is going to cause
adverse changes to the quality or quantity of groundwater in the vicinity of the well. It would appear both the EUB and Alberta Environment are concerned about the mitigation of environmental impacts;
therefore, if companies comply with the existing regulations, companies are open to propose any and all ideas with respect to how they will
beneficially use produced water. This raises a number of questions.

135.
136.

See id. at 27-28.
See, e.g., H. William Hochheiser, Manager, Oil & Gas Envtl. Research Office of

Fossil Energy, Presentation to U.S. - Russia Energy Working Group on U.S. Department of Energy Environmental Activities Related to Coal Bed Methane Produced Water (Apr. 8, 2003), http://www.pi.energy.gov/pdf/usrussaewg/hochheiser cbm.pdf
(last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
137. Water Act, R.S.A., ch. W-3, § 2 (2000).
138. Mountain View Reg'l Water Servs. Comm'n v. Dir., Cent. Region, Reg'l Servs.,

Alta. Env't re Capstone Energy, Nos. 03-116 & 03-118-121-R, slip op. at 1 (A.E.A.B. Apr.
26, 2004), available at http://www.eab.gov.ab.ca/dec/03-116 118-121-R.pdf.
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One issue is whether the provincial government itself should have
authority over dictating a possible hierarchy of water uses, or if this
type of policy-making should be left to regulatory bodies such as the
EUB, or even the Environmental Appeal Board. In Capstone, the Director balanced which license-holders should receive priority, necessitating a consideration of the intended use of the proposed diverted
water. 3 9 Capstone's application to divert water from the Red Deer
River for oilfield injection purposes were balanced against the interests
of other license-holders, such as domestic or recreational uses. "' The
question remains whether the court should decide these issues on a
case-by-case basis, or if the legislature should develop a more formal
policy.
Another issue is whether the existing regime is sufficient to regulate companies that may eventually find ways to treat saline water economically. If the companies produce large quantities of treated water,
then the Crown, as owner of all water in Alberta, is open to charge royalties for the use of the water if that company is able to sell this treated
water to other users.
The Alberta government should carefully consider the MAC recommendation that Alberta Environment and the EUB develop criteria
and guidelines. In light of the potential water scarcity in southern Alberta, provincial regulators should also reflect on the western United
States experience in semi-arid areas.4 This experience suggests that
beneficial use of water for ranching and irrigation may not be appropriate in some cases due to the lack of a sustainable water supply.
Methane migration has created water and soil contamination
problems in the western United States; therefore, as MAC recommended, Alberta Environment and the EUB should investigate this
issue to understand the potential for future problems.
On May 11, 2006, the Alberta Government issued a press release in
which it accepted the MAC recommendations on water, and indicated
that the MAC Final Report provides a blueprint for responsible coalbed methane development. 42 Provincial government progress in the
implementation of MAC's recommendations should provide a higher
level of confidence amongst residents that the regulations will protect
provincial water resources for future generations.

139. Id. at 2.
140. Id. at 3-4.
141. BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTIcEs HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 9-10 (stating "longterm reliance on produced water should not be encouraged").
142. News Release, Alta. Gov't, Report Provides Blueprint for Responsible Coalbed
Methane Development (May
11, 2006), http://www.gov.ab.ca/acn/200605/
1986224903061-BAA7-A9D2-840E8D7FBFCE213C.html (quoting the Alberta Environment Minister as stating "'[a] safe, secure drinking water supply is a priority for this
government'").
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s, Congress dramatically overhauled the laws governing
the management of public lands, establishing the monitoring and conservation of natural resources as primary goals.' It was this fundament Univ. of Colorado School of Law (J.D., May 2006); Production Editor, Colorado
Law Review (2005-2006).
1. The National Forest Management Act of 1976 ("NFMA") and the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 ("FLPMA") were enacted in 1976, setting revolutionary management goals for the governing agencies, expanding federal management
considerations to include wildlife, water, and environmental concerns. See National
Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (2000) (requiring the National Forest Service to create a program for managing renewable resources coming from the national
forests); Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000) ("[I]t is
the policy of the United States that... the public lands be managed in a manner that
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tal change in management policy that formed the basis of the federal
"non-reserved" water right. 2 Simply stated, non-reserved rights are water rights asserted by the federal government or a federal agency that
do not have to be associated with the withdrawal or reservation of federal land, and that the federal government may assert irrespective of
state substantive or procedural water law.3 The federal non-reserved
water right would serve as a means of securing water for programs implemented under the new federal land management scheme.4 Avoiding the demands of state substantive water law simplifies the federal
government's implementation of federal programs involving public
lands. 5
As expected, many states were opposed to the federal non-reserved
right from its inception.6 It quickly became apparent that the nonreserved right was likely too controversial to be an effective means of
securing water, and the concept quietly vanished. Many commentators
assumed that the non-reserved right was inherently flawed and had
disappeared for good.7 However, in recent years non-reserved rights
have reemerged. Some commentators have again identified nonreserved rights as a viable means for federal government acquisition of
water rights for federal projects, arguing that Congress sanctioned the
will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air
and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values.").
2. Most scholars recognize the 1979 Opinion issued by Department of the Interior
Solicitor Leo Krulitz as the basis of the non-reserved rights doctrine. See Federal Water
Rights of the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation
and the Bureau of Land Management, 86 Interior Dec. 553, 574 (1979) [hereinafter
Krulitz Opinion]. See, e.g., John D. Leshy, Water Rights for New FederalLand Conservation
Programs:A Turn-of-the-Century Evaluation, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 271, 287 (2001);
Wendy Weiss, The Federal Government's Pursuit of Instream Flow Water Rights, 1 U. DENV.
WATERL. REv. 151, 171-72 (1998).
3. Krulitz Opinion, supranote 2, at 571, 574-75.
4. Id. at 614-16.
5. One reason the federal government would not want to follow the substance of
state water law is that western state appropriation systems do not recognize federallycreated instream flow rights. Many western states, including Colorado, do not permit
private individuals to hold instream flow rights. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3)
(2006) (granting the Colorado Water Conservation Board the exclusive authority to
make instream flow appropriations).
6. See Leshy, supra note 2, at 287; Frank J. Trelease, Uneasy Federalism--State Water
Laws and National Water Uses, 55 WAsii. L. REv. 751, 758 (1980) (discussing the opposition of the western states to the doctrine of non-reserved water rights).
7. See Michael C. Blumm, Unconventional Waters: The Quiet Revolution in Federal and
Tribal Minimum Streamfiows, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 445, 462 (1992) (recognizing that the
non-reserved right maintained a precarious position due to the Reagan Administration's hostility towards the concept); Sandra Dunn, Cooperative Federalism in the Acquisition of Water Rights: A FederalPractitioner'sPoint of View, 19 PAC. L.J. 1323, 1323-25 (1988)
(noting that the federal government had repudiated the concept of the non-reserved
right); Trelease, supra note 6, at 774 ("I think it very likely that the federal nonreserved right to appropriate instream flows on the public domain without regard to
state law will have a short life.").
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first non-reserved water right when it created the Great Sand Dunes
National Park and Preserve in Colorado.8 This article provides an
overview of the doctrine of federal non-reserved rights, discusses the
validity of the doctrine, and addresses the feasibility of asserting such
rights today.
Part I of this paper introduces the non-reserved right, defining it in
terms of the historical development of water law. Part II outlines the
general arguments for and against the existence of non-reserved rights.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a number of key officials in the federal government weighed in on the question of whether non-reserved
rights were valid as a matter of law. Part II analyzes the opinions released by those individuals and suggests that non-reserved rights are
valid under the U.S Constitution and under federal statutes. Part III
advances a number of additional justifications for recognizing nonreserved rights, and discusses the potential impact that federal nonreserved rights could have on the current water laws of the individual
states. Part LV introduces the Great Sand Dunes National Park and
Preserve Act as the first official statutory authorization of non-reserved
rights, and analyzes the specific language of the Act according to the
definitions and concepts laid out in Parts I through III. As a final
thought, this article discusses the future of the non-reserved right and
suggests that, because of the increasing strain on water resources in the
West, the federal non-reserved water right will become essential to securing water for future federal programs.
II. DEFINING NON-RESERVED RIGHTS
Because the non-reserved rights doctrine deals with the federal government's ability to claim and use the water found on public lands, it is
useful to summarize the history of the federal government's treatment
of water on public lands. This summary includes not only the federal
statutes addressing water on public lands, but also judicial decisions
interpreting and applying those statutes. Applying this foundation, it is
easier to fully define non-reserved rights and describe how they differ
from the closely-related federal "reserved" rights.
A. FEDERAL LAW AND WATER ON PUBLIC LANDS

The United States acquired much of the land west of the Mississippi River through the Louisiana Purchase, the Treaty of Guadalupe

8. See Leshy, supra note 2, at 285-87 (stating that legislation creating the Great
Sand Dunes National Park "did not conform to the traditional dichotomy between
state water rights and federal reserved water rights," but rather created "a new breed of
federal water right-a federal non-reserved right").

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 10

Hidalgo, and through transactions with various Indian tribes. 9 Upon
acquisition, Congress gained the power under the Constitution to dispose of the land and any resources thereon, including water, however
it saw fit.' ° Through the early part of the 1800s, the United States government largely ignored these newly acquired lands, and allowed pioneers, miners, and farmers to use this "public domain" freely." It was
only after the Civil War that Congress turned its attention to the public
domain, and that was primarily to approve of the development and
settlement that had already occurred thereon. 2 In 1866, Congress
passed an Act that formally recognized water rights secured under state
or local appropriation systems located on the public domain. 3 An
1870 amendment to that Act stated that all future mineral patentees
and homesteaders must also conform to the laws and requirements of
local governments and courts when appropriating water on the public
domain. 4 Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Desert Land Act of
1877, which opened up the public domain to purchase and provided
that "the right to use of water.. .shall depend upon bona fide prior appropriation.... "'5The Act further provided that "the water of all [nonnavigable] lakes, rivers, and other sources of water supply upon the
public lands.. .shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and
Today, these three acts remain valid law.
use of the public....
Although these acts do not explicitly sever water from the public
domain or confer the administration of water to the respective states,
the United States Supreme Court held that the acts implicitly facilitate

9.

See PAUL W.

GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIc LAND LAw DEVELOPMENT 75-85

(1968)

CHARLES F. WILKINSON,
CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 34 (1992)

(describing all major land acquisitions of the United States);

(describing land acquisitions made by the United States).
10. The Property Clause of the United States Constitution grants Congress the
power to "dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States..." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
11. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146 (1855) (upholding the local system for mineral
and water disposition and acknowledging that "the free and unrestrained occupation
of the mineral region has been tacitly assented to by the [United States] government,
and heartily encouraged by the expressed legislative policy of the [California state
government]"); WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 40-41 (describing the spate of federal
legislation regarding mining on the public lands before 1850).
12. Professor Wilkinson describes the Mining Law of 1866, which validated former
trespassers' claims to land, as follows: "[T] he 1866 act may have been a federal statute,
but it was in large part an empty vessel to be filled by state law and local custom...."
WILKINSON, supra note 10, at 43. This statement embodies the common perception of

most of the early laws relating to the public lands-that federal law was simply a codification or approval of existing state systems.
13.

43 U.S.C. § 661 (2000).

14.

Id.

15.

Desert Land Acts, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (2000).

16.

Id.
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such a severance and conferral.' 7 The Court addressed the meanings
of the three acts-Act of 1866, Amendment of 1870, and the Desert
Land Act of 187 7-in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., in which the Court held that the Act of 1866 and its 1870
amendment "approve and confirm the policy of appropriation for a
beneficial use, as recognized by local rules and customs, and the legislation and judicial decisions of the arid-land states, as the test and
measure of private rights in and to the non-navigable waters on the
public domain."' 8 The Court also held that after passage of the Desert
Land Act in 1877, "if not before, all non-navigable waters then a part of
the public domain became .

.

. subject to the plenary control of the

designated states...." " Thus, the Court recognized that Congress essentially severed nonnavigable waters from the public domain, allowing
the states to administer the appropriation of those waters, citing numerous other federal laws as verification of this severance. 20
To summarize, a combination of federal statutes and judicial decisions confirm that the laws of the various states govern the appropriation of water on public lands. However, this power to administer water
found on public lands is not absolute, as shown by the "reserved rights
doctrine." If the power granted to states to administer water on public
lands is indeed limited, how broad are those limitations? What power
has the federal government retained over water on public lands?
These questions lie at the heart of the non-reserved rights doctrine.
Before turning to the non-reserved right, it is important to introduce
the closely related "federal reserved water right" and discuss how federal reserved water rights limit state control over water on public lands.
B. FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS

Although the statutes and judicial decisions discussed above shifted
the administration of water rights to the states, the federal government
did not completely forfeit its power over the water on public lands.
This fact became evident in the 1899 United States Supreme Court
ruling in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co. 2 ' The Court

identified two ways in which the federal government retained power
over water on public lands. First, the Court noted that a state "cannot
by its legislation destroy the right of the United States, as the owner of
17.

See Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 162

(1935).
18. Id. at 155.
19. Id. at 163-64.
20. Id. at 164 n.2 (identifying the Reclamation Act of 1902 and the Indian Appropriation Act of 1909 as two pieces of legislation that verify congressional recognition of
the supremacy of state law with respect to the acquisition of water located on public
lands).
21. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
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the lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters; so
far, at least, as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property."" Second, the Court held that the federal government
maintained control over nonnavigable rivers to the extent that continued flow was necessary to preserve the navigability of downstream waterways.23 The first point, that the United States reserved a right to the
continued flow of water, was dicta as it was not essential to the holding
of the case. Less than ten years later, however, the Court reinforced
the idea that the federal government has a proprietary interest in waters flowing across federal lands.
In Winters v. United States, the Court held that the federal government implicitly "reserved" a quantity of unappropriated water when it
created the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana. 4 The 1888
statute creating the Indian Reservation did not contain any provisions
explicitly reserving or appropriating water for the Reservation. 2' However, the Court reasoned that one of the main purposes of the Indian
Reservation was to facilitate agricultural production by the Indians liv26
ing thereon-a goal that would be impossible to meet without water.
Thus, the federal government impliedly reserved the amount of water
needed to fulfill the purpose of establishing tribal agriculture.2' This
practice of implied water rights reservation became known as the "reserved rights doctrine. 2, 8

The implied reservation of water carried a

priority date of the statute creating the Indian reservation.' Central to
the thesis of this article is the Court's confirmation that "[t] he power
of the government to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be.""0
Thus, the federal government has the power to impliedly reserve water
rights appurtenant to federal reservations of land.
Several cases arising after Winters have altered the scope of federal
reserved water rights. For many years, people assumed that the Winters
doctrine applied exclusively to Indian reservations. The United States
Supreme Court held otherwise in Arizona v. Calfornia,stating that the
doctrine of reserved rights applied to all federal reservations of land,

22.

Id. at 703.

23.

Id. (The Court ultimately decided the case on the federal government's right to

preserve the navigability of waterways).
24.

Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).

25.

Id. at 575-76.

26.

Id. at 575-77.

27. Id. at 577.
28. "[F]ederal reserved rights are a species of water right owned by the federal
government, created by the federal government to authorize and protect water uses by
the federal government on and in connection with federal reserved lands." Trelease,
supranote 6, at 756.
29. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.

30.

Id.
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including national parks, forests, and wildlife refuges.3 ' The Court reduced the impact of this ruling, however, when the Court later clarified that the reserved water rights are limited to the water needed to
fulfill the explicit purposes of such federal land reservations. 32 The
government can only accomplish the secondary purposes of federal
land reservations by acquiring water rights through state appropriation
systems.33 It is important to note that the federal reserved right is limited to primary purposes of federal land reservations. As will be discussed later in this paper, the non-reserved right makes a similar distinction and has a similar limitation. 4
The reserved rights doctrine underwent modification in 1976 with
the passage of the McCarran Amendment, which gave official congressional consent to include the United States as a party in state general
adjudications of water rights.3 5 At such adjudications, state water adjudicators can require the federal government to quantify any water
rights held under the reserved rights doctrine. It is significant to note
that Congress, although impliedly approving the reserved rights doctrine, has partially limited the doctrine by requiring federal agencies to
participate in state general adjudications-a procedural component of
state law. This congressional deference to state procedural systems is
also evident in the non-reserved rights doctrine.
C.

NON-RESERVED RIGHTS

The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Rio Grande
Dam & Irrigation Co., identified two ways in which the federal government retains power over waters located on public lands: (1) to preserve
flows for navigation, and (2) to maintain continued flows for the beneficial use of the public lands.37 It was under this broad concept of "continued flows" for "beneficial use" that the Winters Court established the
31.
32.
States,
33.

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700 (1978); Cappaert v. United
426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702 ("Where water is only valuable for a secondary use

of the reservation ...

there arises the ...

inference that Congress intended, consistent

with its other views, that the United States would acquire water in the same manner as
any other public or private appropriator."). The New Mexico holding narrowed the
reserved rights doctrine considerably. Proponents of state administration rejoiced:
"This was a substantial victory for the water users of the West. The enemy was not defeated but he was thrown back, and substantial territory feared lost was recaptured."
Trelease, supra note 6, at 759.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 118-25 (noting that in those instances where
Congress has not explicitly outlined a specific use, the non-reserved right should not
be invoked, and the federal government should instead seek to establish water rights
under existing state systems).
35. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2000).
36. See infra Part IV. (A).
37. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
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concept of the federal reserved right.3 The natural question arising
after Rio Grande and Winters is whether the reserved rights doctrine
constitutes the sole power of the federal government under this
broader concept of continued flows for beneficial use on public lands.
Commentators have argued that the reserved rights doctrine is not exclusive-the closely related non-reserved rights doctrine accompanies
it. The non-reserved rights doctrine is that the federal government can
"appropriate water on its own property for congressionally authorized
9
uses, whether or not such uses are part of any 'reservation' of land."0
Similar to a reserved right, such appropriation may be made outside
any requirements imposed by state law.
As an example of non-reserved rights, consider again the Fort
Belknap Indian Reservation discussed in the Winters case. Suppose
Congress passed a law implementing a new program on the Indian
reservation that was very water intensive and that constituted a water
use forbidden under Montana water law. The United States could not
invoke the reserved rights doctrine because no reservation of land has
been made. Further, the federal government could not appropriate
water under the state system because of the restrictions of state law.
This is where the non-reserved right becomes essential: the nonreserved rights doctrine permits the federal government to simply appropriate water to itself irrespective of state law and notwithstanding
the lack of a reservation of land, allowing the federal government to
fulfill the purposes of its statutorily created program.
D. REGULATORY RIGHTS

In addition to reserved rights (and arguably non-reserved rights),
the federal government possesses another power over water found on
public lands: the power to regulate water users. This power, based on
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, permits the federal government to "preempt state water laws in order to carry out federal purposes and programs."40 This regulatory right has its foundation in a
United States Supreme Court ruling from 1946, First Iowa Hydro-Electric
41
Cooperative v. FederalPower Commission. In First Iowa, the Court considered whether the Federal Power Commission could issue a dam construction permit to an applicant, even though the applicant would not
qualify for an Iowa state license.42 The Court held that the State could
not require state licensing of applicants if such licensing would frusWinters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
Krulitz Opinion, supra note 2, at 574; see also Federal "Nonreserved" Rights, in 4
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 37-120 (Robert E. Beck, ed., LexisNexis repl. vol. 2004).
40. Federal Regulatory Rights, in 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 37-119 (Robert E.
Beck, ed., LexisNexis repl. vol. 2004).
41. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
42. See id. at 156-61.
38.
39.
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trate the intent of Congress to "make progress with the development of
the long idle water power resources of the Nation. ... ,A The Court further held that the Federal Power Act "leaves to the States their traditional jurisdiction subject to the admittedly superior right of the Federal Government." 44 Because denial of a state license would have
stopped the project and ultimately frustrated congressional intent, the
Court held that the Federal Power Act preempted the Iowa state licensing requirement.
It appears, initially, that regulatory rights and non-reserved rights
are the exact same thing. 5 After all, regulatory rights and non-reserved
rights both grant the federal government the power to implement federal projects irrespective of state substantive law. There is, however, an
important distinction between the two doctrines. Regulatory rights
apply to situations where there is a private third-party regulated by the
federal government.
The regulatory rights doctrine determines
whether federal or state regulations apply to a private party. Nonreserved rights on the other hand, only involve the federal government. The non-reserved rights doctrine is solely a question of whether
the federal government can, itself, appropriate water for a federal program. Although this article focuses almost exclusively on non-reserved
rights, it is worth noting that federal courts have upheld other doctrines (reserved rights and regulatory rights) as valid assertions of federal powers.
Now that the conceptual underpinnings of the non-reserved right
have been established, it is appropriate to address the legality of the
non-reserved right. As stated above, at its inception, the non-reserved
right was met with resistance and criticism. Opponents of the doctrine
questioned its constitutional and legal validity. A series of opinions
issued by various federal officials memorialize the debate surrounding
the doctrine's validity. What follows is a summary of the debate regarding the non-reserved rights doctrine from its inception in 1979 to its
disappearance in the early 1980s.

43.
44.
45.

Id. at 171.
Id.
One water law treatise notes the similarities:
Federal regulatory rights were first asserted as "nonreserved" rights in the
context of carrying out land management objectives established by federal
land management plans. Although these initial efforts might be classified as
"proprietary" rights, for purposes of convenience they are here classified as
federal regulatory rights, since they are required to carry out congressionallymandated policies and programs.
Federal Regulatory Rights, supra note 40, at 37-119.
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m. LEGAL/CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR NON-RESERVED
RIGHTS
In June, 1979, the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior, Leo
Krulitz, released a lengthy opinion discussing a wide variety of issues
related to water rights and federal lands.46 Part of the Krulitz Opinion
focused on the ways in which the federal government could obtain water rights to support the programs and goals set forth in the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA") .47 It was under this r-ubric that Krulitz introduced the concept of the federal "non-reserved"
water right. The Krulitz Opinion sparked an immediate debate over
the role of state law in federal water appropriation. The concept of
federal non-reserved rights was so controversial that two additional
solicitors for the Department of the Interior issued separate opinions
on the topic in the space of three years. 48 The final word on the subject
came in the form of an opinion issued by the head of the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, Theodore Olson. 9 After the
Olson Opinion, only a handful of legal commentators continued to
refer to the non-reserved right; federal agencies and federal officials
discontinued any reference to the non-reserved right-leaving many to
wonder whether the non-reserved right had been buried for good.
The following is a summary of the arguments made in the chain of
opinions drafted by federal officials.
A. KRULITZ OPINION

As stated, in 1979 Leo Krulitz, Solicitor for the Department of the
Interior, issued an opinion introducing the concept of the federal nonreserved water rightil Krulitz's Opinion encompassed much more
than non-reserved rights. Krulitz summarized the way in which the
largest agencies within the Department of the Interior were to handle
water issues. 5' Krulitz presented his opinion as being a "comprehensive
analysis" of both reserved rights and non-reserved rights.5
First, Krulitz outlined the legal concepts relating to water found on
public lands in the West. Krulitz argued that Congress has plenary
power under the Property Clause of the United States Constitution to
control the public lands and consequently the "disposition and use" of

46. Krulitz Opinion, supra note 2.
47. See id. at 615. Recall, FLPMA had been passed three years earlier.
48. See infra Parts III.B-C.
49. See Federal "Non-Reserved" Water Rights, 6 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 328
(1982) [hereinafter Olson Opinion].
50. Krulitz Opinion, supranote 2.
51. Id. at 562.
52. Id. Krulitz was correct to analyze the reserved right and the non-reserved right
together. See infra text accompanying note 104.
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the water thereon.53 States can only acquire an interest in property of
the United States, such as water found on the public lands, through an
express grant from Congress. 4 Further, "to the extent Congress has
not clearly granted authority to the states over [water on federal
lands], the Federal Government maintains its sovereign rights in such
waters and may put them to use irrespective of state law." 55 In addition
to the Property Clause, Krulitz pointed to the Supremacy Clause to
support the idea that the substantive aspects of state law do not bind
Congress and the Federal Government unless Congress submits to
such regulation.56
Second, Krulitz argued that Congress did not expressly grant states
power to administer the water rights of the federal government when
the federal government seeks to complete a federal program." To justify that argument, Krulitz identified and discounted the three Acts
traditionally cited to support the congressional grant of authority over
water to the states (Act of 1866, Act of 1870, and the Desert Land Act
of 1877).58 Krulitz argued that the acts in question only apply to private
party appropriations and not to federal government appropriations.
The Desert Lands Act "does not directly address federal rights to use
water for congressionally authorized purposes on the federal
lands. ... ,59 The Krulitz Opinion stated that "by these relatively narrow
Acts of 1866, 1870 and 1877, the United States did not divest itself of its
authority, as sovereign, to the unappropriatedwater on the public lands
for governmental purposes,"6° and that "neither the Desert Land Act
nor any other federal statute deals generally with how the United
States should acquire and maintain rights to use water on the public
domain .... ,61 The opinion concluded that "since the Federal Government has never granted away its right to make use of unappropriated waters on federal lands . . .the United States has retained its
power to vest in itself water rights in unappropriatedwaters and it may
exercise such power independent of substantive state law." 62 In support
of this proposition, Krulitz cited Cappaert v. United States, in which the
United States Supreme Court declared, "[f]ederal water rights are not
dependent upon state law or state procedures....,,r
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Krulitz Opinion, supra note 2, at 563.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 565-71.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 568, 576 (quoting Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 145 (1976)).
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Finally, after establishing that the federal government did not need
to comply with state substantive law when appropriating water on public lands, the Krulitz Opinion tackled the question of whether the federal government must comply with state procedural requirements.
Kurlitz stated his opinion that "while congressionally authorized programs may plainly be frustrated in certain states if the substance of
state law is binding on federal agencies, no equal danger is posed by
compliance with state procedures."'' The Krulitz Opinion did not address the question of whether the federal government can entirely
avoid state procedures because, according to the opinion, it is in the
best interest of all parties to follow state procedures. 65 For example,
"[i]t puts subsequent state appropriators on clear notice of federal
rights, reduces uncertainty, and allows better integration of state and
federal water rights."6
In summary, the Krulitz Opinion held that the Supremacy Clause
and Property Clause work together to give Congress full power over the
disposition and use of water on public lands. The only way Congress
could lose this power is by expressly granting it to other parties such as
the states. Congress granted power to the states to administer water
found on public lands, but only to the extent that this power pertained
to private parties. Congress had not expressly granted power to the
states to administer water on public lands when the federal government needed water for a federal program. Thus, the federal government retained the power to appropriate water on public lands as it desired and according to its own prerogatives. Further, the Krulitz Opinion controversially declared that federal agencies had the power under
FLPMA to assert non-reserved water rights. Because the federal government retained the inherent right to appropriate water for itself, it
could do so at any time and at any level, including at the agency level.
The Krulitz Opinion met with criticism. It became apparent that
the sticking point of the federal non-reserved right-and the sole purpose for needing a non-reserved right-were instream flows. The laws
of the western states concerning instream flows and ecological protection varied at the time.67 Some feared that the federal government,
able to assert their own instream flows, would disrupt state water programs:
All of the devices for reserving streams, establishing free flowing rivers, controlling appropriations, appropriating instream flows, setting
minimum flows-and even the lack of any of these-are choices made
by legislatures, officials, and agencies of the states. In each state these
64.

Id. at 577 (citation omitted).

65.
66.

Id.
Id. For a more detailed discussion about the advantages of adhering to state

procedural systems, see Part IV. (A). infra
67. See Trelease, supranote 6, at 771-72.
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decisions, processes, and results represent a balance between public
and private interests, between the wealth-producing and the amenitypreserving pressures faced by local politician.
...
In large areas of the West there will be no opportunity to balance
interests, compare uses, choose between uses, or choose alternative
uses. The development of a particular state could be controlled not
by what legislators, officials, and agencies feel is good for the state,
but by what federal regional officials think is good for the public
lands within the state. Where the state has struck a balance it may be
upset.B
Advocates of state control over instream flows demanded that Congress
officially reject the non-reserved rights doctrine completely and permanently. It was against this foment and rally for state control that
Solicitor Clyde 0. Martz released the next in the series of opinions.
B. MARTZ SUPPLEMENT

In January 1981, less than two years after the Krulitz issued his
Opinion, a different solicitor to the Department of the Interior, Clyde
0. Martz, issued a supplement to the Krulitz Opinion.69 The Carter
Administration was in its final month in office at the time Solicitor
Martz issued the supplement. Solicitor Martz was, quite possibly, attempting to mollify opponents of the controversial non-reserved rights
doctrine. The incoming Reagan Administration seemed likely to overturn many of the Carter Administration's policies, particularly in the
realm of public lands. The Martz Supplement may have been an attempt to fashion the non-reserved rights doctrine in a way as to preserve its existence-leaving it available as a tool for regional public
land managers. The Martz Supplement was short and concise and
primarily amended conceptual weaknesses of the Krulitz Opinion.
Martz began by identifying four ways in which the federal government could acquire water rights: (1) through the reserved rights doctrine, where the federal government impliedly reserves water when it
reserves a tract of land; (2) through historic consumptive use; (3)
through acquisition of water "expressly or impliedly mandated by [an]
Act of Congress"; or (4) through "purchase, exchange, condemnation
or gift."7°
Martz focused on the third component of the list-acquisition of
water expressly or impliedly mandated by Congress-the non-reserved
right. The Martz Supplement stated: "Federal agencies should, as a
68. Id. at 773.
69. Supplement to Solicitor Opinion No. M-36914, On Federal Water Rights of the
National Park Service, Fish & Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation and the Bureau
of Land Management, 88 Interior Dec. 253 (1981) [hereinafter Martz Supplement].
70. Id. at 255.
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matter of policy, acquire water rights in accordance with the substantive and procedural provisions of state law." 7' However, Martz identified two exceptions to the policy. First, the Federal government does
not need to conform to state procedural law to assert a fight over water
which federal agencies traditionally consumed and met the state definition of "beneficial use., 7'

This provision spoke to non-compliance

with state procedural laws, including statutorily required registration of
all water rights with the appropriate state body. Martz contended that
the federal government retained rights to water used for a number of
years, despite the fact that the federal government had not conformed
to state registration requirements.73
Second, the Martz Supplement held that the Federal government
does not need to conform to state substantive water law when "clearly
mandated by an Act of Congress" under the federal supremacy power. 74
Martz justified the two exceptions for the same reasons outlined by
Solicitor Krulitz. Martz maintained that the Property Clause and Supremacy Clause of the Constitution gave Congress the full power to
dictate the management and disposition of waters located on public
lands.75 Similarly, the Martz Supplement asserted that no act of Congress had ever relinquished the congressional power to "exercise future dominion over unappropriated water on public land" when such
was needed to facilitate a federal program. 76
Most importantly, the Martz Supplement declared that the FLPMA
was not a congressional mandate for agencies to appropriate water outside of state substantive water law.77 "FLPMA does not authorize or
otherwise mandate the Department [of the Interior] to appropriate or
otherwise utilize water outside state recognized beneficial use concepts
for the broad general purposes outlined as management objectives in
the Act., 78 Thus, the main reason for creating the non-reserved rightto provide water for federal programs under FLPMA- was outside of
the scope of the non-reserved rights doctrine. By arguing that the nonreserved right could not be invoked under FLPMA, Martz may have
been trying to calm the tide of opposition that was being raised against
the non-reserved rights doctrine. In any event, the Martz Supplement
reinforced the strongest arguments of the Krulitz Opinion and discounted its more controversial aspects.

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 256.

75.

Id.

76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. at 257.
Id.
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Solicitor Martz, an official in the Carter Administration, appears to
have tried to resolve the debate over non-reserved rights before President Carter left office. Martz released the Supplement on January 16,
1981, days before the newly-elected Reagan Administration entered the
White House. 9 If Martz hoped that issuing the Supplement would save
the doctrine of non-reserved rights, the new Solicitor to the Department of the Interior, William H. Coldiron, quickly dashed those
hopes. 0
On September 11, 1981, Coldiron released a Solicitor's Opinion in
complete opposition to the conclusions reached by Krulitz and Martz."'
Coldiron began his opinion by summarizing the arguments advanced
by Krulitz and Martz and acknowledging that the concept of the nonreserved right was the subject of "continuing debate and controversy. " 8
Coldiron also declared that non-reserved rights had "created a new
and unnecessary cloud of ambiguity over private water rights dependent on8 3water sources that are on, under, over or appurtenant to federal
lands.
Like Krulitz and Martz, Coldiron acknowledged that the combination of the Property Clause, Commerce Clause, and the Supremacy
Clause gave Congress full power over the management and disposition
of water found on public lands. 4 Coldiron further acknowledged that
"it is unlikely that state law could preclude reasonable water use by a
federal agency if Congress specifies a particular federal use. 88 Coldiron, however, argued that Congress had granted "exclusive sovereignty"
over water to the states; the water was "severed" from public lands by

79. Id. at 253.
80. Nonreserved Water Rights-United States Compliance with State Law, 88 Interior Dec. 1055 (1981) [hereinafter Coldiron Opinion]. As expected, the declaration
in FLPMA that the public lands were retained by the federal government and managed
in a way to protect among other things, the ecological value of the land, did not sit well
with many Westerners. In the early 1980s, dissatisfaction of individuals in the West
with policies of federal land managers led to what has been termed the "Sagebrush
Rebellion." The Sagebrush Rebels (western congressmen) led a movement to have
Congress repeal FLPMA and endorse state control of public lands, particularly grazing.
"The Sagebrush Rebels, though unable to convince Congress to sell off the federal
lands, had little trouble achieving a less radical objective: persuading the Interior Department of the 1980s that it ought to take a hands-off policy toward grazing."
WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 99. Although the Sagebrush Rebellion centered on grazing, it is easy to see how the Reagan Administration came to embrace the attitude of
hands-off federal management with regards to water found on public lands.
81. See Coldiron Opinion, supra note 80.
82. Id. at 1056-57
83. Id.

84.

Id. at 1057-58.

85.

Id.at 1058.
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the Desert Lands Act of 1877.86 Congress had not retained any power
over water on federal lands.
In fact, Coldiron noted that at least
thirty-seven statutes regarding western water had expressly or implicitly
deferred to state water law for administration of water found on public
lands. Thus, "there is neither a congressional nor judicial basis for
the exercise of a federal non-reserved water right."89 Coldiron maintained that in order for the United States to regain control over water
on the public lands, Congress would have to amend or repeal the 1866,
1870, and 1877 Acts. ° "If Congress wishes to abandon its historical
practice of deference it must explicitly exercise its power.""
The weakness of the Coldiron Opinion is clear-it did not make
any new arguments. The Opinion flatly denied the existence of a nonreserved right, but at the same time acknowledged that Congress has
full power to use water found on public lands-the very foundation of
the non-reserved rights doctrine." Coldiron even described the process that Congress must follow to gain water rights irrespective of state
substantive law. 93 It is difficult to understand how Coldiron did not
conclude that this constitutes a non-reserved right.
Similar concepts underlie both the Martz Supplement and the
Coldiron Opinion, yet, the Coldiron Opinion declared that the nonreserved right does not exist.94 The difference, however subtle, lies in

the identification of the current holder of the power. Martz concluded
that the federal government retains the power to appropriate water on
public lands outside of state water systems, and must simply be explicit
when doing so. 9 Thus, Martz argued that the power remained with the
federal government despite Acts delegating some control of water to
the states. Coldiron, on the other hand, indicated that Congress has
delegated all power to administer water on the public lands to the
states.9 Under this approach, if the federal government wishes to appropriate water outside of the state water systems, Congress must first
explicitly take back the power of administrationY

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 1059-60.
See id. at 1060.
Id.
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1063.
Id. at 1064.
Id.
Id. at 1063-64.
Id. at 1064.

95.

See Martz Supplement, supra note 69, at 257 (opining that FLPMA did not ex-

plicitly authorize appropriation outside of the substantive requirements of state law).
96.

Coldiron Opinion, supra note 80, at 1059-60.

97.

Id. at 1063-64.
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Once Solicitor Coldiron spoke on the matter, employees of the
Department of the Interior stopped pursuing any non-reserved rights.
However, some regional officers of the National Forest Service, an
agency within the Department of Agriculture, attempted to assert
rights under the non-reserved doctrine. The Department of the Agriculture asked the Department of Justice to weigh in on the nonreserved right question.9 As a result, Assistant Attorney General in the
Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice, Theodore B. Olson, issued an opinion on June 16, 1982.'0° The Olson Opinion stands
as the strongest legal authority on the matter and, fittingly, as the last
official word on the non-reserved right.
Much like the other commentators, Olson immediately got to the
Constitutional heart of the matter. Olson identified the Property
Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Supremacy Clause as the foundation for both the reserved right and the non-reserved right. 0 ' "It is
important to understand that any water rights that may be asserted by
the federal government outside of state law-whether called reserved,
non-reserved, or by some other name-rest on this same constitutional
basis.' ' 0 2 This is one of Olson's most important points, and one that is

essential to understanding the non-reserved right. Non-reserved rights
and reserved rights go hand in hand because both are an appropriations of water outside of state substantive law-non-reserved rights do
not comply to state in-stream flow laws, while reserved rights do not
comply with the state requirement that water be put to beneficial use
in a reasonable time. One doctrine cannot exist without the other,
03
because both are founded on the same Constitutional principles.
Olson established that Congress does have the power to administer water found on public lands, and then proceeded to address
whether
0 4
Congress granted some or all of this power to the states.
First, Olson dispelled the misconception that the debate is over
"ownership" of the water.'05 Defining the debate in terms of the actual
ownership of water leads to confusing and conflicting results. "[I]f
Congress, either by statehood acts or land management statutes, gave
98. Olson Opinion, supra note 49, at 329.
99. Id. at 329-30.
100. Id. at 329.
101. Id. at 362-63.
102. Id.
103. See generally id. at 330-31.
104. Id. at 362.
105. Id. at 366-67. In his criticism of the Krulitz Opinion, Trelease also discounted
the notion of federal ownership of natural waters: "I do not believe anyone owns the
water in the ocean, in a cloud, in the raindrops, or in a stream. It is res nullis, the
property of no one, a concept that has been with us since Roman times." Trelease,
supranote 6, at 763.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 10

the states ownership of all unappropriated waters on the public domain, on what basis can the federal government reserve some of that
water for a federal use, without compensation, by a withdrawal of land
made after ownership of the waters passed to the states?" 10 6 Olson declared that "[u] nappropriated water, much as wild animals, has been
viewed as res nullius-the property of no one-until it has been captured.",1 7 Thus, neither the state nor the federal government "owns"
the unappropriated water. "The important question is whether state or
federal rules of capture apply to the United States."'0 8
Second, Olson turned to the three crucial acts introduced at the
beginning of this article- the Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1877-to determine whether any of the powers of the federal government have
been passed to the states.'9 Olson analyzed the history and the language of the acts in conjunction with Supreme Court decisions and
concluded, "the Acts gave the states authority only to control and administer private rights to water on federally owned lands, and did not
grant away the federal government's power.., to use unappropriated
water on federal lands without regard to state law.""" Olson rejected
the idea that Congress partially repealed the Acts by implication every
time it reserves an area of federal land, stating that Congress simply
preempts inconsistent state control over the federal uses."'
Once Olson established that Congress does have the power to make
non-reserved water appropriations, he turned to the only issue remaining-how Congress should go about making such an appropriation.
Olson traced the history of congressional deference to state water law,
identifying the Acts of 1866 and 1870, the Desert Land Act of 1877, the
Reclamation Act of 1902, and the McCarran 2Amendment as representative of federal deference to state water law."
The effect of Congress' deference to state water law can best be understood as establishing a 'presumption' to be read into the language
and legislative history of federal statutes that authorize the management of federal lands-ise., that in the absence of evidence to the con-

106. Olson Opinion, supranote 49, at 365.
107. Id. at 366.
108. Id. at 367 (quoting Comment, FederalNonreserved Water Rights, 48 U. CHI. L. REv.
758, 772 (1981)).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 367-70. Olson identified two cases specifically-California Oregon Power
Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 349 U.S. 345 (1955), and Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 142(1935). See supra text accompanying notes 17-20 (discussing CaliforniaOregon Power Co..).
111. Id. at 370 (noting that implied repeals of federal statutes are "highly disfavored").
112. Id. at 377.
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intend to alter or aftrary, it will be presumed that Congress did11not
3
fect its policy of deference to state water law.
Olson argued the existence of a presumption that the federal government will comply with state substantive law unless there is convincing
evidence, such as explicit statutory language, that dictates otherwise." 4
Olson analogized the entire situation to a then-recent United
States Supreme Court decision.1 1 5 In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,
the Court "refused to fashion specific federal rules governing the relative priority of private liens" and instead chose to defer to state law on
the matter.1 6 Essentially, the Court held that, in some instances, federal law defers to state law on certain matters.1 7 The Court discussed
factors relevant in determining whether deference to state law would
be appropriate:
Undoubtedly, federal programs that "by their very nature are and
must be uniform in character throughout the Nation" necessitate
formulation of controlling federal rules. Conversely, when there is little need for a nationally uniform body of law, state law may be incorporated as the federal rule of decision. Apart from considerations of
uniformity, we must also determine whether application of state law
would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs. If so, we
must fashion special rules solicitous of those federal interests. Finally,
our choice-of-law inquiry must consider the extent to which application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law. 18
These factors appear to be met in the case of water rights and water
law. State water laws have governed huge federal programs, including
all projects under the Reclamation Act, Further, the federal government has played an almost insignificant role in water appropriation.
Finally, many existing appropriators fear that non-reserved rights will
lead to instability and insecurity of existing state water systems. Thus,
because typical water appropriations meet many of the Kimbell factors,
deference to state law prevails. Olson concluded that if Congress
wished to exercise its power to appropriate water irrespective of state

113. Id.
114. See id. at 377-78.
115. Id. at 378 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979)).
116. Id. (citing Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 740).
117. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 740.
118. Id. at 728-29 (citations omitted). In summary, the Court considered the following factors relevant to the state law deference question: (1) the extent to which federal
programs can be or have been adapted to state law; (2) the role of the federal government in the regulated field; (3) the significance of the federal interests at stake; (4) the
risk to federal goals and interests posed by application of state law; and (5) the extent
to which application of federal rules will disrupt private expectations.
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law, that power "must be clearly and specifically exercised, either expressly or by necessary implication."' 9
IV. ADVANTAGES OF THE NON-RESERVED RIGHT
The Olson Opinion is well-reasoned and likely the most correct of
all of the opinions described above. While Olson did a fine job addressing the legality of the non-reserved rights doctrine, there are additional non-legal justifications for acknowledging and using federal
non-reserved rights. First, even though the federal government would
not adhere to state substantive water law, it would adhere to the state
procedural laws, meaning that the laws of the various states would fully
protect senior water rights holders. Second, application of nonreserved rights may lead to less reliance by the federal government on
the reserved rights doctrine. This will avoid the many problems associated with the reserved rights doctrine. 2 0 Finally, the non-reserved right
may alleviate many of the problems associated with state-run instream
flow programs. States will have an incentive to develop and improve
their own instream flow programs.
A. STATE PROCEDURAL LAW

The chain of opinions described above only dealt tangentially with
the question of whether the federal government should comply with
state procedural law. The opinions gave little attention to this point,
probably because it was not very controversial. All of the opinionwriters agreed that the federal government should adhere to state procedural law in all circumstances. One could easily argue that, if the
federal government has the constitutional power to ignore state substantive law, the power must also extend to permit avoidance of state
procedural law. However, this argument is largely moot because of the
overwhelming advantages to following state procedural laws. Solicitor
Krulitz briefly addressed this subject: "I am unable to say that [compliance with state procedural law] is required as a matter of law, but because it may be required, the safer course is to follow state procedures
in perfecting non-reserved water rights."' 21 Krulitz also noted the ad119.

Olson Opinion, supra note 49, at 383.

REPORT NWC-L-71-014, LEGAL
117-33 (1971)
(noting the problems of the reserved rights doctrine to include uncertainty as to the
quantity reserved and uncertainty as to the time such rights will actually be asserted).
Trelease argued that the uncertainty has hurt the economy of areas located near large
federal reservations of land, such as Indian reservations or national forests, because
investors are scared of the future impacts of the reserved rights. See id. at 129 (noting
that "even federal agencies are unwilling to invest in projects whose water rights are
jeopardized by the federal reserved water rights doctrine").
121. Krulitz Opinion, supranote 2, at 577-78.
120.

See

FRANK J. TRELEASE, NAT'L WATER COMM'N,

STUDY NO. 5, FINAL REPORT: FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAw

FEDERAL NON-RESERVED RIGHTS

Issue I

vantages of doing so: "Complying with state procedural law has certain
advantages. It puts subsequent state appropriators on clear notice of
federal rights, reduces uncertainty,
and allows better integration of
' 22
state and federal water rights.'

It is apparent that, even if the federal government invokes nonreserved rights, it must develop those rights under state procedural
systems. This allows for complete protection of all private water appropriators. State governments will register, quantify, and assign priority dates to federal water rights asserted under the non-reserved rights
doctrine. In times of shortage, anyone holding a water right senior in
priority to the non-reserved right would be able to demand water from
the right. Of course, such a demand makes little sense in the context
of instream flows,

123

but it is still important to note that the priority of a

holder's water right protects all current water rights holders in state
systems.
It is also reasonable to argue that the existence of a non-reserved
right might actually benefit downstream juniors. Assume, for example,
that the federal government purchases a senior water right and converts it to an instream flow. The instream flow would not injury any
junior users to the non-reserved right because the federal government
would be limited to the amount of water the old senior user was actually "consuming."24 Upstream juniors would have little to complain
about-the old senior appropriator could have demanded water from
them at anytime anyway. It makes no difference that the water the
federal government will use its senior water right for an instream flow
instead of for irrigation. Further, the instream flow would open up the
downstream river for new appropriations. Because the instream flow is
non-consumptive, after it leaves the instream flow boundaries, the water would be free for downstream appropriation. In an era when unappropriated water is difficult to find, instream flows may be a means
of creating new water rights.

122. Id. at 577. The language of the Great Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve
Act, discussed below, shows that Congress continues to harbor the same intention
regarding adherence to state procedural law. The Act states, "[W]ater rights shall be
appropriated, adjudicated, changed, and administered pursuant to the procedural
requirements and priority system of the laws of the State of Colorado." Great Sand
Dunes National Park and Preserve Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-530, § 9(b) (2) (A), 114
Stat. 2527, 2533 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410hhh-7 (b) (2) (A) (2000)).
123. Instream flows are non-consumptive, meaning that they do not actually use the
water. Thus, a person holding a downstream water right, even a right senior to the
non-reserved right, would never have to demand water from the non-reserved right.
The non-reserved right is already delivering all of the water it gets to all downstream
users.
124. See generally JAMES N. CORBRIDGE, JR. & TERESA A. RICE, VRANESH'S COLORADO
WATER LAW 246 (rev. ed., University Press of Colorado 1999).
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B. CERTAINTY/ QUANTIFICATION
Another advantage of the non-reserved rights doctrine is that it has
the capability of completely replacing the reserved rights doctrine.
Commentators have long criticized the reserved rights doctrine."' Reserved water rights have priority dates correlating to the date of the
reservation of land regardless of the actual date of appropriation.
Some of these unexercised priorities date back to the 1800s.126 Further,
there is no requirement that the federal government quantify reserved
rights at their creation.12 7 Thus, private water rights holders have dealt
with much uncertainty. If Congress recognizes and uses non-reserved
rights, it may avoid the problems of the reserved rights. Instead of
leaving water rights to the mysterious realm of the reserved right, Congress, through express statutory provisions, can simply require government agencies to appropriate necessary water under the nonreserved rights doctrine. This would allow state procedural systems to
quantify federal water rights and grant them a priority date according
to when the federal government actually put the water to use.
C. IMPROVEMENT OF INSTREAM FLOW SYSTEMS
The federal government's assertion of non-reserved rights may result in vast changes in state substantive laws. One possibility is that
states will change their laws to allow the federal government to hold
instream water rights, thus alleviating most of the friction regarding
non-reserved rights. The more plausible outcome is that state agencies
charged with appropriating instream flows will take a more proactive
approach to instream flows. Many state water conservation boards currently take a minimalist approach to instream flows. If federal agencies
assert non-reserved water rights, state conservation boards may feel
pressured to make larger instream appropriations. After all, if the
states do an adequate job maintaining instream flows, the federal government will have no reason to assert a non-reserved right. By appropriating sufficient instream flows first, the states would essentially
eliminate the need for federal non-reserved rights and would retain
125. TRELEASE, supra note 120, at 130-31 (noting that, following the PeltonDam decision, "western Senators and Congressmen reacted to the fears of their constituents by
seeking legislative reversal of the reservation doctrine. Every Congress since 1956 has
seen the introduction of bills directed to that end").
126. See TRELEASE, supra note 120, at 125-26 (quoting CharlesJ. Meyers, Robert Emmet
Clark's Water and Water Rights-A Treatise on the Law of Waters and Allied Problems, 77 YALE
L.J. 1036, 1042 n.15 (1968) (book review)).
127. See id. at 124 (noting that the federal government's ability to reserve water

rights without quantification creates a problem for state officials "charged with the
administration of streams [that] have no records of [water rights'] existence, location,
amount and priority... .Water users may not know of the existence of upstream uses,

hence have no way of testing or determining their entitlement with legal certainty.").
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power over the water. Thus, the federal government's assertion of
non-reserved rights only stands to improve state instream flow systems.
V. APPLICATION OF NON-RESERVED RIGHTS
Following the Olson Opinion, federal officials remained silent on
the issue of the non-reserved right. The question that naturally arises
is whether the federal government, in spite of the silence of the last
twenty years, has ever asserted a non-reserved right under the parameters laid out in the Olson Opinion. According to the Olson Opinion,
before a federal agency can assert a non-reserved water right, Congress
must explicitly direct the agency, through statute, to do so. 28
Aside from the Great Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve Act
("GSDA") ,9 there do not appear to be any examples of a non-reserved
water right. A number of factors may play into the federal government's hesitancy to assert non-reserved rights. Because neither the
United States Supreme Court or a federal court of appeals ever settled
this issue, federal agencies can only rely on the Olson Opinion as
granting authority to act. This may not provide sufficient protection
for agency actors. Further, after the uproar surrounding the inception
of the non-reserved right, federal agencies may believe that it is better
to avoid the non-reserved right and the almost-certain litigation that
would accompany assertion of such rights.
In spite of the hesitancy of federal agencies, the tide may be turning. One recent enactment appears to invoke non-reserved rights.
The GSDA, signed into law in 2000, upgraded the status of the Great
Sand Dunes National Monument and added additional land to protect
the fragile ecosystem of the sand dunes. 30 Some scholars argue that
the GSDA represents the first official congressional application of the
non-reserved right.13 ' Before analyzing the language of the statute in
depth, it is important to examine the importance of water to the region.
The Great Sand Dunes are located just outside of the town of Alamosa in southern Colorado. Situated in an area surrounded by various
mountain ranges in the Rocky Mountain chain, the sand dunes are a
striking and unexpected geologic feature. Water is essential to maintaining the existence of the sand dunes. The website created by the
National Park Service to educate the public about the natural aspects
of the Park and Preserve describes the unique hydrology of the region:
128. See Olson Opinion, supra note 49, at 362.
129. 16 U.S.C. § 410hhh (2000).
130. Nat'l Park Serv., Great Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve - Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.nps.gov/grsa/faqs.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2006). The
Great Sand Dunes National Monument was created in 1932 by President Herbert Hoover. Id.
131. See Leshy, supranote 2, at 288.
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Without water, the dunes and the incredible diversity of life in and
around them would become the "Not-So-Great-Sand-Dunes": creeks
would no longer flow across the sand, the dunes and the sand deposit
around them would change, and wetlands and ponds that support life
132
would dry up.
What makes the Great Sand Dunes even more complex is the increasing water demand of the surrounding communities, like Alamosa.
The National Park Service recognized the increasing water usage taking place just outside of the park and speculated that such usage affects
the water tables inside Park boundaries:
It is possible that the water table has already dropped significantly
from historic and current use.... While some research indicates that
at least part of the cause may be a natural geological change or related to cyclical precipitation patterns, historical evidence suggests
significant alteration of the entire regional water system by human
use over the past century may be a contributing reason. By 1938, an
estimated 10,000 artesian wells had been drilled into the regional aquifer. Many San Luis Valley streams and rivers have been extensively
diverted for irrigation both toward and away from the dunes area.'"
Because of the unique hydrologic nature of the Great Sand Dunes
National Park and Preserve and the increasing demands on water resources in the region, the language Congress used to create the park
contained a number of references to water. The language of Section 9
of the GSDA is of particular importance:
(2) Water Rights for National Park and National Preserve. In carrying
out this subchapter, the Secretary shall obtain and exercise any water
rights required to fulfill the purposes of the national park and the national preserve in accordance with the following provisions:
(A) Such water rights shall be appropriated, adjudicated, changed,
and administered pursuant to the procedural requirements and priority system of the laws of the State of Colorado.
(B) The purposes and other substantive characteristics of such water
rights shall be established pursuant to State law, except that the Secretary is specifically authorized to appropriate water under this subchapter exclusively for the purpose of maintaining ground water levels, surface water levels, and stream flows on, across, and under the
national park and national preserve, in order to accomplish the pur-

132. Nat'l Park Serv., Great Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve, Mysterious
Waters of the Dunes, http://www.nps.gov/archive/grsa/resources/mysterious
waters.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
133. Id.
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poses of the national park and the national preserve and to protect
park resources and park uses.14

It is easy to see how the language of the GSDA is an assertion of a
non-reserved water right. The GSDA clearly states that the Secretary
may appropriate water to preserve "stream flows."" 5 As noted above,
Colorado law only allows the Colorado Water Conservation Board to
hold instream flow rights. 3 6 Because the Congress granted the Secretary the authority to establish a water right to an instream flow-in
clear contradiction to state substantive water law-the Act must have
authorized an assertion of a non-reserved water right.
Some may argue that the GSDA was nothing more than an invocation of the "reserved" rights doctrine because the Act's water rights
were declared in conjunction with a reservation of land. However, the
GSDA specifically denies any federal reserved rights associated with the
creation of the National Park. 37 The United States Supreme Court
made it clear in United States v. New Mexico that Congress must be sufficiently explicit regarding the purposes of the reservation to establish a
reserved right.'3" Therefore, when Congress wishes to reserve tracts of
land, it must take great care in noting the contemporaneous reservation or denial of water rights. It seems that Congress was seeking that
same clarity of purpose by implementing the "no reserved rights" provision of the GSDA.
Even if the GSDA does authorize a non-reserved right, the nonreserved right does not officially exist until the Secretary of the Interior
acts under the statutory language and asserts a water right outside of
Colorado substantive law. In December, 2004, the National Park Service ("NPS") asserted an absolute right to all unappropriated groundwater underlying the Great Sand Dunes pursuant to Section 9 of the
GSDA. 139 Although the Park encompasses most of the hydrologic watershed, the Department of the Interior is seeking to assert rights un-

134. 16 U.S.C. § 41Ohhh-7(b) (2) (2000).
135. Id. § 410hhh-7(b)(2)(B).
136. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2006) (stating that the "Colorado water conservation board hereby vested with the exclusive authority" to appropriate instream
flows) (emphasis added).
137. § 410hhh-7(b) (2) (D) ("[N]o Federal reservation of water may be claimed or
established for the national park or the national preserve."). This provision comports
to the earlier argument that the federal non-reserved right has the ability to completely
replace the federal reserved right. If the GSDA authorized non-reserved rights, it is
very significant that the GSDA concurrently denied all federal reserved rights associated with the National Park.
138. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700-02 (1978).
139. In re Application for Approval of Absolute Ground Water Right in Alamosa &
Saguache Counties, No. 2004CW35 (Colo. Water Court Div. 3, filedJan. 7, 2005).
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der the Act for all such groundwater. 40 Following submittal of the federal government's application for all unappropriated groundwater
rights, at least thirteen parties filed objections.14 ' The NPS's application is still pending before the Colorado Water Court for Water Division Three. It remains to be seen if the non-reserved rights claimed
under GDSA will survive challenges by opposing parties. Thus, at this
juncture, the GSDA remains important, if for no other reason than for
setting a precedent for Congress to follow when drafting future statutes
dealing with the administration of water on public lands.
VI. FUTURE OF THE NON-RESERVED RIGHT
After analyzing the legal and social controversies surrounding the
federal non-reserved water right, one can only speculate as to its future
use. Two possible futures exist for the non-reserved rights doctrine. In
one, the federal government will view the GSDA as a mere drafting
anomaly that was never supposed to result in an actual assertion of
non-reserved rights, in which case the doctrine will become an academic gem, but will serve no real purpose. In the alternative, the nonreserved right will not only become a viable means of asserting federal
water rights on public lands, but it will also become the primary means
of asserting federal water rights. The latter seems to be the likelier
possibility.
It is undisputed that water resources in the western states are becoming more scarce and at the same time more valuable. Because
much of the land owned by the federal government also lies in the
western states, it seems inevitable that the federal government and the
states will remain in conflict over water use. As long as the federal government continues to retain and manage federal lands, it will inevitably need water to meet conservation management goals.4 2 Because
federal conservation programs will often fall outside of the permissible
bounds of state water law, the federal government will find the nonreserved right as its sole means of obtaining water.

140.

Id. The NPS does not, however, claim any quantifiable amount of groundwater

because it seeks only to "maintain, as nearly as possible, natural water levels and flows.
In consequence, no volumetric measurement is necessary as the claim will encompass
whatever previously unappropriated water is present at any given time." Id.
141. U.S. Dep't of Interior, Nat'l Park Serv., Nature & Science, Water: 2005 Current
Issues, Great Sand Dunes National Park & Preserve, http://www.nature.nps.gov/water/Current Issues/archived2005.cfm (Mar. 2005).
142.

The federal public land management policy under FLPMA altered federal pub-

lic lands management is to retain possession of the lands and manage them "in a man-

ner that will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values...." 43 U.S.C. §
1701 (a) (8) (2000).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The non-reserved rights doctrine has been a substantial source of
debate and controversy. Many believe that the non-reserved right lacks
adequate foundation in law. A close analysis of the Olson Opinion,
however, shows that the non-reserved right is strongly rooted in law,
and is likely a valid exercise of federal power under the Constitution.
Not only is the non-reserved right constitutionally and legally
grounded, it is also logically grounded. The assertion of non-reserved
rights affords a number of benefits to both the federal government and
private water appropriators. As the federal government begins to assert non-reserved rights, these benefits will become more evident. The
GDSA appears to be the first authorization of non-reserved rights. It
marks the beginning of what may become the primary means of obtaining water for federal conservation projects. The non-reserved right
has returned, and this time it may be for good.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recreational In-Channel Diversions ("RICDs") are an area of Colorado water law that has developed only in recent years. This paper will
first examine the obstacles to decrees for instream flows for recreational use under traditional Colorado water law. Next, it will detail the
new statutory scheme that the legislature has put into place for the
decree of RICDs. Then, it will discuss subsequent case law and statutory changes. Finally, this paper will suggest changes to streamline the
RICD process and create useful guidelines for decree amounts.
H. TRADITIONAL COLORADO WATER LAW AND INSTREAM
FLOWS
Traditional Colorado water law contains two elements which, until
recently, made it impossible to obtain a decree without diverting water
out of the stream channel. To obtain a decree, the applicant must di/ Joshua Mack graduated from the University of Colorado School of Law in May
2006 and was admitted to the Colorado Bar in October 2006.
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vert water from the stream, and put it to a beneficial use. Both of these
issues are resolved to the extent that they no longer bar recreational
instream flow decrees. However, the exact meaning of beneficial use
in the RICD context remains the subject of debate and litigation.
Clarification of this requirement is necessary to fix the current system
A. THE DIVERSION REQUIREMENT

Traditionally, an applicant could only obtain a decree with a diversion, and water controlled in the stream did not qualify as a diversion.
"Until the legislature in 1969 specifically made diversion an essential
element of appropriation, diversion was a court-made element."' Colorado courts held that "the rule is elementary that the first essential of
an appropriation is the actual diversion of the water with intent to apply to a beneficial use., 2 "There is no support in the law of this state
for the proposition that a minimum flow of water may be 'appropriated' in a natural stream...without diversion of any portion of the water 'appropriated' from the natural course of the stream."3 When the
General Assembly defined "diversion" in the 1969 Act, however, it gave
the term a broader definition: "'Diversion' or 'divert' means removing
water from its natural course or location, or controlling water in its
natural course or location, by means of a ditch, canal, flume, reservoir,
by-pass, pipeline, conduit, well, pump, or other structure or device...." 4
The first sign of judicial abrogation of the diversion requirement
came in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Colorado Water Conservation Board. In 1979, the Colorado Supreme Court held that instream flow appropriations by the Colorado Water Conservation Board
are not constitutionally prohibited by the reference in the Colorado
Constitution to the right to appropriate by diverting water. 5 Additionally, the court held that the legislature specifically contemplated appropriations without diversion when it removed the diversion requirements from the definition of appropriation and revised the definition
of beneficial use to include a provision for use for flows "as are re'6
quired to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree.
While this case was an important step in the evolution of the term "diversion," it is important to note that the appropriator was the Colorado

1. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 594
P.2d 570, 572 (Colo. 1979).
2.

City & County of Denver v. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d 992, 998

(Colo. 1955).
3. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 406 P.2d
798, 800 (Colo. 1965).
4. S.B. 81, 47th Gen. Assem., Ist Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1969).
5. 594 P.2d at 573-74.

6.

Id. at 574.
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Water Conservation Board ("CWCB"), which is the only entity
7 in Colorado that is statutorily entitled to appropriate instream flows.

In City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, the court did away with the
final vestiges of the old diversion requirement.8 Here, the City of Fort
Collins applied for a decree of 55 cubic feet per second ("cfs") which
the city was diverting, or planning to divert, within the river channel by
means of two dams.9 One dam diverted the river back into its original
channel. 1" The other served as both a fish ladder and boat chute."
The water court held that the dam which served a fish ladder and boat
chute did not add any control to the river. The Colorado Supreme
Court reversed, holding that "[i]n general, boat chutes and fish ladders, when properly designed and constructed, are structures which
concentrate the flow of water to serve their intended purposes. A
chute or ladder therefore may qualify as a 'structure or device' which
controls water in its natural course or location under section 37-92103(7).' Thus, appropriators other than the CWCB still need to control the water in some way within the natural channel to obtain a decree, but the new definition of "diversion" allows for decrees which
would not be possible under the traditional diversion requirement.
B. BENEFICIAL USE

"Beneficial use of water is the most fundamental diversion requirement. "14 Like the definition of diversion, the concept of beneficial use has evolved over time. "In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, concepts of beneficial use focused on a limited category of activities associated with then-predominant uses of water such
as domestic uses, farming, stock raising, mining, milling, power production, and other fledgling manufacturing enterprises."' 5 "In general,
the common law interpretation of beneficial use under the prior appropriation doctrine compares wastefulness of a specific use of water to
other possible uses and to alternative means of achieving the purpose
for that particular use."' 6 In 1973, the passage of Senate Bill 97 replaced the common law definition of beneficial use, defining it as:

7. COLO.REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2006).
8. City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1992).
9. Id. at 919-20.
10. Id. at 920.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 932.
13. Id.
14. Rebecca Abeln, Instream Flows, Recreation as Beneficial Use, and the Public Interest in
Colorado Water Law, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 517, 522 (2004).
15. Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for
Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 927-28 (1998).
16. Abeln, supranote 14, at 522.
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[T] he use of that amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate
under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the
purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully made and, without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes the impoundment
of water for recreational purposes, including fishery or wildlife.... For
the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations, "beneficial use" shall also include the appropriation by the state of Colorado in the manner prescribed by law of such minimum flows between specific points or levels for and on natural streams and lakes as
are required to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable de17
gree.
This expanded definition of beneficial use made appropriations for
instream uses possible. This statute took the traditional view of beneficial use, including the "without waste" provision, and added specific
references to recreation, wildlife, and the natural environment.
However, Colorado statute also provided that the CWCB was the sole
appropriator for the newly included instream flow purposes.19
The CWCB has interpreted the term "minimum flows" quite literally. For instance, on Boulder Creek below the confluence with North
Boulder Creek, the CWCB appropriated 6 cfs from November 1 to
March 31, and 15 cfs from April 1 to October 31.20 The mean daily
streamflows over the last 88 years from November 1 to March 31 range
from a low of 23 cfs on January 1 to a high of 32 cfs on March 30.
The mean daily streamflows between April 1 and October 31 range
from a low of 24 cfs on October 23 to a high of 379 cfs on June 22.2
The minimum flow decrees obtained by the CWCB here are for
amounts well below the flows one would expect in the creek even with
existing diversions.' The CWCB makes calls on a small percentage of

17.
18.
19.

COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (2006).

20.

Colorado Water Conservation Board, Instream Flow Tabulation- Streams: Water

Id.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2006).

Division
1
(June
01,
2006),
lake/Database/Downloads/DivlIsfrab.pdf.

21.

http://cwcb.state.co.us/Streamand

US Geological Survey, USGS Surface-Water Daily Statistics for Colorado: USGS

06727000
Boulder
Creek
near
Orodell,
CO.,
http://waterdata.
usgs.gov/nwis/dvstat/?format=sites selection links&search site no=06727000&ampre
ferred module=sw (click checkbox and Submit) (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). This

gauge is quite close to the portion of the creek covered by the instream flow right.
Only a few very minor tributaries separate them.
22. Id.
23. Many of the water rights on Boulder Creek date from before this 88 year period. See Colorado Division of Water Resources, Colorado Decision Support System,
http://cdss.state.co.us/waterrights/WaterRights.aspx (click "source" tab, enter "Boulder Creek" then click Submit) (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
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the streams for which it has instream flow rights. In 2005, the CWCB
made nine calls with instream flow rights.

24

Thus, it would be hard to

argue that the amounts decreed to the CWCB for instream flows are
greater than the minimum flows required to preserve the natural environment.
C. THE GOLDEN DECREE

In 1998, the City of Golden filed an application for a decree for its
whitewater park.25 The city requested 1000 cfs for the months of May,
June, and July because 1000 cfs was the design capacity of the course
and a sufficient flow to attract world class boaters and elite competi-

tions. 26 The city also requested lower flows for other months. 27 The city
perfected a portion of these flows in 1999, but some of the claimed
flows remained conditional until the city could show that boaters actually used the flow rates.28 The water court addressed the issues of both
diversion and beneficial use. The Division 1 Water Court cited the Fort
Collins case for the proposition that "the structures in the Course control, concentrate and direct the flow of water through the Course in a
manner that constitutes a diversion under C.R.S. § 37-92-103(7).29
The court found that use of water for recreational boating is a beneficial use under C.R.S. § 37-92-103(4)." ° It also held that both the high
runoff flows and the lower flows claimed at other times of the year constituted beneficial use without waste:
[F] lows of 1,000 cfs and higher are also best for the elite competitions
such as the Eddie Bauer Classic and the U.S. Olympic trials that
Golden and others have held and plan to continue to hold on the
Course.... [T]he water diverted and controlled by the Course at these
lower flows is also beneficially used for recreational purposes. 31

24. Colorado Water Conservation Board, Stream & Lake Protection: Administrative
Calls (2006), http://cwcb.state.co.us/Streamandlake/administrativeCalls.htm.
The
CWCB made calls on Tarryall Creek, the Crystal River, the Eagle River, the Roaring
Fork River, and Willow Creek between January 1, 2005 and December 10, 2005. Id.
25. In re Application for Water Rights of Golden, No. 98CW448, 1 (Colo. Dist. Ct.,
Water Div. No. 1, 2001), available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/ supct/ watercourts/wat-divl/ordergolden.htm.
26. Id. at 3-5.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 4.
29. Id. at 4-5.
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id.
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The court also discussed the economic benefit that accrued to Golden
as a result of the park, including the correlation between higher flows
and greater economic benefit.32 This economic benefit was essential
to a finding that higher flows were not wasteful even though lower
flows still allowed use of the course.33
In July of 2000, the water court granted Golden a decree for its
whitewater park and proposed extension. The state engineer appealed
the decision, but the Colorado Supreme Court sitting en banc was
equally divided, effectively affirming the decree.3 4
This decision sparked considerable concern from traditional appropriators, especially those who had designs on future upstream
transfers, storage, and trans-mountain diversion projects.
Since Golden's filing, many water users.. .expressed concern that
these types of applications could: 1) hinder flexibility by limiting exchanges of water among water users; 2) limit Colorado's ability to use
water allocated under inter-state compacts; and 3) circumvent the
State's instream flow program by essentially authorizing private instream flow water rights. 35

These concerns arose because the Golden decree limited the option of
transferring water rights on Clear Creek from downstream of Golden
to upstream of Golden.
Clear Creek at Golden has peaked over 1000 cfs in 16 of the last 30
years. 6 Golden has a conditional decree for 1000 cfs during three
months: May, June, and July.

37

The mean streamflow in Clear Creek in

May is 321 cfs, the mean streamflow in June is 750 cfs, and the mean
streamflow in July is 442 cfs.m Unlike the very minimal instream flow
decrees obtained by the CWCB, the amount of this decree is quite
large in relation to average streamflow. Because there is wide variation
in streamflow from year to year and the flow peaks on different dates
32.

Id.

33. Id.
34. State Eng'rv. City of Golden, 69 P.3d 1027, 1028 (Colo. 2003).
35. Ted Kowalski, Colorado Faces New Challenges-RecreationalInstream Flows, INSTREAM
COLO.,Jan. 2001, http://cwcb.state.co.us/isf/Newsletter/instOlOl. pdf.
36. US Geological Survey, Peak Streamflow for Colorado: USGS 06719505 Clear
Creek
at
Golden,
CO.,
http://nwis.waterdata.usgs.gov/co/nwis/peak?
site no=06719505&agency cd=USGS&format=html (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
37. In re Application for Water Rights of Golden, No. 98CW448, 7 (Colo. Dist. Ct.,
Water
Div.
No.
1, 2001),
available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/
supct/watercourts/wat-divl/ordergolden.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
38. US Geological Survey, USGS Monthly Statistics for Colorado: USGS 06719505
Clear
Creek
at
Golden,
Colo.,
http://waterdata.usgs.gov/co/nwis/
monthly/?search site no=06719505&agency cd=USGS&referred module=sw&format
=sites selection links (click Checkbox and Submit) (last visited Sept. 9, 2006). Most
numbers are well below 1000cfs because even in the years that Clear Creek peaks over
1000cfs, it usually does so for only a brief time.
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from year to year, the conditional rights will gradually become perfected until the amount of the perfected right will exceed the flow in
the creek the vast majority of the time. Thus, depending on the scope
of junior protection, transfers of a senior right from downstream of
Golden to diversions upstream of Golden may be barred because of
this decree.
III. THE RICD SYSTEM
Senate Bill 216 developed the RJCD system. 9 This bill created an
entirely new process for obtaining an instream decree for a whitewater
park. The drafters of the bill, however, left many aspects of the process
unclear. Since the passage of the bill, there has been one Colorado
Supreme Court case interpreting the bill and a recent legislative
40 The RICD process is by no means settled. RICD law has
amendment.
evolved rapidly over the past several years and will continue to do so.
A. SENATE BILL 216

Senate Bill 216 created the framework that currently governs
RICDs.41 It was a reaction to the Golden Decree and the flood of instream flow applications expected to follow. 42

The hurried nature of

this process later became apparent when it came time to apply the
bill's mandates. First, the bill limited the class of appropriators who
may obtain a recreational in channel diversion to "any county, municipality, city and county, water district, water and sanitation district, water conservation district, or water conservancy district."4 3 More importanly, it created a procedure whereby the applicant submits the water
rights application to the CWCB for review.44 "Following a public hearing, if requested by any party, the board shall make findings of fact and
a final recommendation as to whether the application should be
granted, granted with conditions, or denied., 45 Under SB-216 the
CWCB was then to make recommendations based on the following
factors:

39. S.B. 01-216, 63rd Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2001).
40. Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy
Dist., 109 P.3d 585 (Colo. 2005); S.B. 06-037, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d. Reg. Sess. (Colo.
2006) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(6)).
41. S.B. 01-216, 63rd Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2001).
42. Taylor Hawes, Water Quality / Quantity Committee, NWCCOG COURIER (Nw. Colo.
Council of Gov'ts, Silverthorne, Colo.), Oct. 2001, at 7, available at
http://www.nwc.cog.co.us/newsletters/2001-10.pdf.
43. S.B. 01-216, 63rd Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2001).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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(I) Whether the adjudication and administration of the recreational
in-channel diversion would materially impair the ability of Colorado
to fully develop and place to consumptive beneficial use its compact
entitlements;
(II) The appropriate reach of stream required for the intended use;
(III) Whether there is access for recreational in-channel use;
(IV) Whether exercise of the recreational in-channel diversion would
cause material injury to instream flow water rights appropriated pursuant
to
subsections
(3)
and
(4)
of
this
section;
(V) Whether adjudication and administration of the recreational inchannel diversion would promote maximum utilization of waters of
the state as referenced in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section;
and
(VI) Such other factors as may be determined appropriate for evaluation of recreational in-channel diversions and set forth
in rules
46
adopted by the board, after public notice and comment.
The bill defined RICDs as "the minimum stream flow as it is diverted,
captured, controlled, and placed to beneficial use.. .for a reasonable
recreation experience in and on the water."47 The determinations of
the CWCB were to be incorporated into the traditional water court
framework. "The water court shall apply [these factors]. All findings
of fact contained in the recommendation of the Colorado water conservation board shall be presumptive as to such facts, subject to rebuttal by any party. " '
The legislative record on SB 216 reveals a contentious debate with
several arguments made by proponents from both sides. The Senate
Committee on Public Policy and Planning held hearings on April 12
and 18, 2001. 49 Supporters of the bill pointed to the Golden Decree as
a sign of things to come and a bar to future exchanges that will be necessary for future municipal supply. SB 216 specifically did not apply
retroactively to the Golden Decree.iO Senator Anderson noted that
there was already a rush to the courthouse to acquire decrees for
whitewater parks and that these decrees were for large amounts and, in
some cases, could constitute the entire flow of a stream.5 ' Chris Paulson of the Colorado Water Partnership discussed the problem on a
large scale and the urgent need for action:

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. LCS Bill Summaries & Votes for - SBO1-216, available at http://www.leg.
state.co.us/2001 /inetcbill.nsf/Frameset?ReadForm&viewname=2&resultformat=l
(Follow "SBO1-196 to SCR01-002" hyperlink, then find "SB01-216" and follow "Votes"
hyperlink) (last visited November 10, 2006).
50. S.B. 01-216, 63rd Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2001).
51. Hearing on S.B. 01-216 before the S. Comm. on Public Policy and Planning,63rd Gen.
Assem., 1st Reg. Sess.(Colo., April 18, 2001) (on file with Colorado State Archives).
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"[T] he current system is very broken.... The one thing we know is
that if we do nothing and you have an escalation of water wars along
both the Front Range and West Slope, having each succeeding community rush to get the next adjudication, pretty soon you will have de
facto removed the ability to exchange water.... We're looking at a
need for 300 thousand acre-feet in the next 20 years. We are looking
at the lead time of 20 years to build major water projects. And if we
destroy in one year by inaction the ability to exchange some of these
effluent systems or in some cases junior water52 rights for municipal
use, we will have missed a golden opportunity."
Another rationale for the bill was the possibility that unchecked
proliferation of instream decrees close to the edge of the state could
send water over the border when the state could otherwise utilize it
here under our interstate compacts. Hal Simpson, the state water engineer, noted that " [i] f a large recreational in-channel water right was
granted at a certain location it could very well prevent or limit our ability to develop our unused compact entitlements.. .I believe the Colorado Water Conservation Board can deal with this public policy issue
much better than the water court. 5 3 He also mentioned the possibility
that instream rights only be in effect during the daytime, so that water
could be held for storage or exchange upstream.54 He thought the
CWCB should administer this option because they are an administrative agency better suited for this kind of rulemaking.55
Finally, some SB 216 supporters argued that few in-channel diversion applications would actually be contentious. 56

Mark Phifer of the

Colorado Water Congress said, "[a]s a matter of fact most of these developments, if they are high in the headwaters, like Vail or Breckenridge, probably would have very little opposition in these administrative proceedings, and would be granted certainly in keeping with the
amount sought to be appropriated." 57 This later proved to be an inaccurate assumption about the nature of the CWCB proceedings.
The overriding theme throughout the case for SB 216 was that recreational use, while beneficial, is a different kind of use. The bill actually expressed that "water rights for recreational in-channel diversions... shall not constitute a use of water for domestic purposes. ,,58
This precludes any claim that recreational in-channel diversions should
benefit from the state's preference for municipal uses. Recreational
use is different because the standards for beneficial use without waste

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. April 12, 2001.
Id, April 18, 2001.
Id.
Id,
IdApril 12, 2001 (statements of Rod Kuharich).
Id.
S.B. 01-216, 63rd Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2001).
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are unclear and there is potential for a single action to tie up the entire
excess flow of a creek or iver. Thus, applications for recreational inchannel diversions should receive an extra level of scrutiny before they
receive the protections to which appropriators in Colorado are generally entitled. This extra level of scrutiny amounts to an inquiry not
only into whether the decree interferes with a currently existing water
in the future
right, but also an inquiry into whether it will interfere
59
with uses of water which will be in the public interest.
Bill opponents also made several arguments. First, opponents argued SB 216 was inconsistent with the fundamental principle of Colorado water law which gives the water courts the power to adjudicate
decrees: "The Water Conservation Board.. .has a forum now in which
its issues and concerns with these types of water rights may be addressed. And that forum is Water Court. Water Court is the place for
making determinations about disputed facts.... That's the way its been
for the last 100 plus years."' SB 216 supporters replied that the existing minimum instream flows held by the CWCB are not part of the
traditional system. 61 "These are a hybrid variant
62 of private diversion
rights, but they are constitutional and different."
A larger issue was opposition to adjudication by the CWCB. Opponents were concerned about adjudication by the CWCB for two reasons. First, some were opposed to CWCB adjudication because that
had not been its role in the past.
[T]he board members all own water rights or represent people who
own water rights and they are not and cannot be impartial in decision
making in a way that a water court judge who does not own water
rights can be. The Water Conservation Board is, and should be an
63
advocate, but not ajudge.

Second, many opponents of the bill openly questioned whether the
CWCB would be a fair arbiter of instream flow issues given the views
the board had expressed in the past. "[T]he CWCB has already indicated and voiced opposition to these kind of water right filings. So the
real concern and you've already heard it today, is that you're not going
to get a fair shake." 64 Given the broad language of the statute, this was
a cause of concern.

COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (b)-(c) (2006).
60. Hearingon S.B. 01-216 before the S. Comm. on Public Policy and Planning,63rd Gen.
Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo., April 12, 2001) (on file with Colorado State Archives).
61. Id.
62. Id, April 18, 2001 (statements of Senator Anderson).
63. Id. (statements of Melanie Mills).
64. Id. April 12, 2001 (statements of Steve Bushong).
59.
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[W]ith all due respect to the CWCB, we really do view this as a power
grab. What I mean by that is this bill lets the CWCB tell the appropriator how much water they get, if any, [and] what kind of whitewater course they can build.... [T] here's also a provision of this bill that
says the CWCB may consider... 'such other factors as may be determined appropriate." That is not a legal standard, that's carte
blanche, and that's one of the big concerns.65
Finally, an issue the hearings only touched on briefly but which
probably held the greatest legal significance is that, assuming there was
a problem to begin with, the bill delegated the problem rather than
solving it.66 The bill did not give a workable definition of the amount
of water beneficially used in the RICD context. It asked the CWCB to
make findings of fact and then directed them to determine whether
the requested amount is reasonable without specifying any guidelines
for what is reasonable. Thus, the bill added another layer of bureaucracy, but the central question of what constitutes "beneficial use without waste" remained as unclear as ever. Despite the objections to the
bill that surfaced during the hearings, the bill passed both the House
and Senate in May and the governor signed it into law on June 5,
2001 .67
B. THE GUNNISONCASE
SB 216 left many questions about the nature of the new RICD
process, including whether the CWCB's determinations should be
strictly factual and whether the CWCB's recommendations bind the
water court. The first RICD application the CWCB heard was for a
whitewater park on the Gunnison River. In March 2002, the Upper
Gunnison River Water Conservancy District filed for a RICD for its
proposed whitewater park on the Gunnison River near Gunnison. 8
The applicant asked for69a decree for the following schedule of flows
from May to September:
May
1-15
570

May
16-31
1190

June
1-15
1460

June
16-30
1500

July
1-15
1100

July
16-31
530

Aug.
1-15
460

Aug.
16-31
390

Sept.
1-15
300

Sept.
16-31
270

65. Id
66. Id. (statements of Senator Matsunaka).
67. Summarized History for Bill Number SBO1-216 (2001), available at
http://www.leg.state.co.us/2001/inetcbill.nsf/Frameset?ReadForm&viewname=2&res
ultformat=1 (Follow SBO1-196 to SCR01-002 hyperlink, then find SBO1-216 and follow
History hyperlink).

68.

Colo. Water Conservation Bd. V. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy

Dist., 109 P.3d 585, 589 (Colo. 2005).

69.

Id.
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The CWCB entered a finding to the water court that recommended
approval of the application in the amount of 250 cfs from May through
September and 0 cfs for the rest of the year.0 The CWCB exercised
considerable discretion to reduce the amount of water under consideration from the schedule shown above (270-1500 cfs) to a constant
250 cfs. Because they reduced the amount to a level that they considered reasonable, the findings favor approval of the application. It is
likely that, had the CWCB made findings on the schedule of flows requested in the application, the findings would not have been in favor
of approval.
The applicant then proceeded to the water court, which addressed
"what it determined to be the 'primary issue'-'whether Applicant has
overcome the rebuttable presumption that 250 cfs for the entire rafting season is the appropriate quantity of water for its proposed whitewater park recreational use.'" 71 The applicant
met its burden of prov• 72
ing that a greater amount was appropriate. This created a big prob
lem: the CWCB did not make any factual findings on the statutory factors for the flows above 250 cfs. Thus, there were no presumptively
valid findings for the water court to use as a starting place, forcing the
water court to make its own determinations as if the CWCB hearing
had never happened. First, the water court determined "that the
amount sought in this instance does not reach the level of speculation
or waste. 7 3 Then, it proceeded to do its own analysis of the statutory
factors set forth in SB 216. The water court concluded that the requested flows were appropriate under the statutory factors, and
granted the applicant a decree for the amount in the application with
a priority date of October 20, 1998. 74 The CWCB appealed the decree,
claiming that SB 216 vested the CWCB with the discretion to determine the minimum flow for a reasonable recreational experience, that
the water court erred in not following the CWCB's recommendation in
the absence of clear and convincing evidence, and that the water court
erred in failing to limit the decreed amount to the minimum flow for a
reasonable recreational experience.75
The Colorado Supreme Court first found that SB 216 vested the
CWCB with the authority only to analyze the application as presented,
not to suggest an alternate flow amount that would satisfy the beneficial use requirements and the statutory factors. "[T]he General As70. Findings and Recommendations of the Colo. Water Conservation Board to the
Water Court, In re Application for Water Rights of Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., No. 02CW38 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 4, 2002).
71.
Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 109 P.3d at 589.
72. Id. at 590.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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sembly intended for the CWCB to function as a narrowly constrained
fact-finding and advisory body when it reviews RICD applications,
rather than in an unrestricted adjudicatory role."76 The court noted
that even the CWCB's own rules direct the board to make findings of
fact on the application as submitted.7
In practice, the CWCB suggesting alternate flows would circumvent
their participation in the process. After the CWCB hearing, the applicant would proceed to the water court with its original application. If
the CWCB has only made findings of fact on different amounts, those
findings will be meaningless to the water court's efforts to evaluate the
entire application. Because the CWCB made findings on only 250 cfs,
the water court had to approach the application without the guidance
that the legislature intended. Thus, "the CWCB's limitation of Applicant's claimed RICD to 250 cfs was in clear violation of the plain language of SB 216, which requires the Board to review the application
strictly as submitted by the applicant, make the requisite statutory 78findings of fact, and formulate a recommendation to the water court.
Next, the court addressed the presumptive effect of the CWCB's
findings. The CWCB argued for a higher burden of proof than a preponderance of the evidence to rebut its findings' presumptive effect.
The board argued that the applicant should have to rebut the board's
findings of fact with clear and convincing evidence. 79 The court firmly
rejected this argument: "Nothing in SB 216 elevates this default burden of proof." 80 "By urging a higher standard such as clear and convincing evidence or arbitrary and capricious review, the CWCB is fashioning for itself the role of an administrative adjudicatory agency or a
quasi-judicial body-a role which, as discussed above, was specifically
rejected by the General Assembly."8 ' Thus, the court held that the water court "properly determined that any party disagreeing with the
CWCB's findings had a burden of going forward with evidence to rebut
or meet the presumption. This burden of production, it should be
noted, does not shift the overall burden of proof which remains on the
8
applicant throughout adjudication. 1
Finally, the court agreed with the CWCB that the water court
should limit the amount decreed to the minimum amount necessary
for a reasonable recreational experience. The court noted the difficulty of defining "minimum stream flow" and "for a reasonable recreational experience in and on the water," especially the term "reasonable
76.

Id. at 593.

77.

Id. at 594.

78.
79.

Id. at 596.
Id. at 597.

80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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The court recognized this term "has no

plain meaning and is reasonably susceptible to multiple meanings,"
therefore it explored the legislative history of SB 216 to define the
term. 4 The court discussed the legislative record at length, and concluded the following guideline is appropriate:
Once the water court has determined whether a RICD application is
for an objectively reasonable recreation experience in and on the
stream in question, then it must determine the minimum amount of
stream flow necessary to accomplish that intended recreation experience. Hence, the water court may be required to weigh conflicting
expert testimony given by course designers or other interested parties,
and make a finding as to the least necessary stream flow to achieve an
applicant's objectively reasonable recreation experience.
In any event, it is clear from the plain language of the statutory definition of a RICD, as well as SB 216's legislative history, that the water
court may not take the appropriator's suggestion, as set forth in the
application, of what a reasonable recreation experience is for the
stream involved at face value, nor should the water court accept without scrutiny the applicant's analysis of what stream flow is necessary to
achieve that objective. s5
This guidance does not entirely resolve the dispute over what actually
is the minimum stream flow for a reasonable recreational experience.
C. CWCB FINDINGS AFTER THE GUNNISON CASE
After the Colorado Supreme Court's scathing review of the CWCB

in the Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District case, the CWCB
had to dramatically change the findings it made on RICD applications.
The CWCB was forbidden from recommending the flows it thought
were appropriate, and required to make findings on the flows requested in the application. The first application heard by the CWCB
after the Gunnison decision was submitted by Chaffee County, which
claimed a RICD for the whitewater parks in Salida and Buena Vista
(the County sought one RICD for both parks). The amounts initially
sought were: 86

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id at 598-99.
Id. at 599.
Id at 602-03.
Application for Surface Water Rights, In re Application of Chaffee County, No.

04CW129

(Colo.

Dist.

Ct.,

Water

Div.

No.

http://cwcb.state.co.us/WaterSupply/RICDPendApps.htm
Chaffee County" hyperlink).

2,

2004),

available

at

(follow "Application of
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In its recommended findings of fact and recommendations, the
CWCB made a concerted effort to comply with the Gunnison decision.
Soon after the hearing, the CWCB Staff issued its Recommended Findings of Fact and Recommendations:
(a) impair the ability of Colorado to fully utilize its compact entitlements because there was potential for upstream diversion for beneficial use that would be foreclosed by a RICD;
(b) that the RICD encompassed 25 miles of stream and was an inappropriate stream reach;
(c) there was not adequate access to the proposed parks (although
there were free public parking lots at both proposed locations);
(d) that there were no CWCB in-stream flow rights that would be impaired by the RICD and;
(e) that the RICD would impair the maximum utilization of Colorado
water resources because of the potential for upstream junior appropriations that would be foreclosed by the senior RICD. 7
Although discussed separately, the draft Finding came to these same
conclusions for each of the three requested flow amounts.m The only
factor enumerated by the legislature that did not pose a problem was
interference with existing minimum instream flow rights.89
After the hearing and the draft Finding, Chafee County requested
extra time to meet with the objectors and discuss a settlement.9 0 Chaffee County settled with all objectors except the CWCB and the State
Engineer. 91 In order to reach a settlement, Chaffee County made significant changes to their RICD application.
As you may recall, the application initially requested 1800 cfs from
May 15 to June 30. The final application requested a variable amount
87. CWCB, Staff's Recommended Findings of Fact and Recommendation,
http://cwcb.state.co.us/WaterSupply/RICDPendApps.htm
(follow "Application of
Chaffee County" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 2, 2006).

88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Memorandum from Ted Kowalski, RICD program manager to the CWCB, at

http://cwcb.state.co.us/Board/Agendas/2OO6/March
2007).

91.

Id.

06/19.pdf (last visited Jan. 9,
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of water for this time period.92 It provided that on or before April 1 of
each year, the County shall inform the division engineer of eight
"event days" during June where the water right under the RICD will be
1800 cfs. 93 In addition, on or before May 10 of each year, the County
must notify the Division Engineer of up to 30 consecutive days within
the high flow period when the amount of the water right for the RICD
will be 1400 cfs. 94 The eight event days must be within this 30 day period.95 The water right for the remainder of the high flow period is 700
cfs. 96 Once designated, the 30 day period cannot be changed. 97 In addition, the final application included provisions for reduced calls in
some years ("Recovery Years")" if needed to refill depleted reservoirs. "'
Finally, in the final application, Chaffee County agreed to implement a
reduced RICD call in order to allow "Limited Future Exchanges."99
The Final Findings of Fact and Recommendations that the CWCB
filed with the water court (which contained findings on the final application described above) recommended that the application be granted
based on the following findings:
(a) that with mitigating terms and conditions the RICD will not impair the ability of Colorado to fully develop its compact entitlements;
(b) the stream reach is appropriate if the RICD is administered by
measurement at one gauge to avoid the issues created by the 25 miles
of stream reach between the proposed parks;
(c) the applicant had demonstrated adequate access;
(d) that there were no in-stream flow rights that would be impacted
by the RICD, and;

92. See Finding of Fact and Recommendations of the Colorado Water Conservation
Board to the Water Court, In re Application of Chaffee County, No. 04CW129 (Colo.
Dist.
Ct.,
Water
Div.
No.
2,
2004),
available at
http://cwcb.
state.co.us/WaterSupply/RICDPendApps.htm (follow "Application of Chaffee County"
hyperlink).
93. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of the Court, Application of
Chaffee County, No. 04CW129 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 2, 2004), at 4 [hereinafter
Chaffee
County
decree],
available
at
http://cwcb.
state.co.us/WaterSupply/RICD/Chaffeefinaldecree.PDF.
94. Id, at 4-5.
95. Id at 5.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id, at 5-6. For a more detailed explanation of "Recovery Years", see id,at Ex. C,
Memorandum of Understanding for Settlement of 04CW129, Water Division 2, at 3.
99. For a list of "Limited Future Exchanges" included in the final application, see id,

Ex. C, at 4-6.
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(e) with mitigating terms and circumstances the RICD would not infringe on the ability of Colorado to make maximum utilization of its
water resources.100
The final Finding of Fact and Recommendations suggested that the
decree be limited to mostly daytime use, and that flow be measured at
one gauge above the entire proposed project so that it did not encumber a 25 mile stretch of stream, and that the RICD only be callable
when such a call would result in a specified flow.'0 ' Not surprisingly,
the Final Findings of Fact and Recommendations on the substantially
watered down final application are completely different from the
original draft Finding. On May 24, 2006 the Division 2 Water Court
approved the final application.
D. THE CWCB's STANCE ON RICDs
One fact that is very important to the RICD process, but that is not
stated in any statute or caselaw, is that the CWCB has historically been
hostile towards instream flows for recreational purposes. The mission
of the CWCB is to conserve, develop, protect and manage water for
present and future generations. 0 3 The dual objectives of development
and conservation have frequently conflicted, leading many to question
whether one entity should be responsible for both. Throughout the
CWCB's history, it has heavily favored development and consumptive
uses over conservation and instream uses. The CWCB has been sued in
the past for declining to make a call to enforce its own instream flow
decrees. 10 4 In addition, the CWCB (along with the state engineer) appealed the Golden decree to the Colorado Supreme Court after all
other objectors had been satisfied by concessions from the applicants. 10 5 During the senate hearings, some opponents of SB 216
pointed out this bias of the CWCB against significant instream flows as
a flaw in the proposed process.106

100. Finding of Fact and Recommendations of the Colorado Water Conservation
Board to the Water Court, In re Application of Chaffee County, No. 04CW129 (Colo.
available
at
http://cwcb.
No.
2,
2004),
Ct.,
Water
Div.
Dist.
state.co.us/WaterSupply/RICDPendApps.htm (follow "Application of Chaffee County"
hyperlink).
101.
Id.
102. Chaffee County decree, supra note 94.
103. Colorado Water Conservation Board, Mission and Strategic Plan, available at
http://cwcb.state.co.us/missionandstrategic.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
104.
See Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d
1251, 1253 (Colo. 1995).
105.
See State Eng'r v. City of Golden, 69 P.3d 1027 (Colo. 2003).
106. Hearingon S.B. 01-216 before the S. Comm. on Public Policy and Planning,63rd Gen.
Assem., 1st Reg. Sess.(Colo., April 12, 2001) (statements of Steve Bushong) (on file with
Colorado State Archives).
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The CWCB has not been shy about showing its collective disdain
for RICDs. In the ironically tided publication "In Stream Colorado,"
the CWCB staff attorney noted that the Golden decree and others like
it could be "potentially devastating."1' ' 7 More importantly, the CWCB's
findings for the RICD applications that it has evaluated have been
overwhelmingly negative. In the Gunnison case, the CWCB recommended a flow for the entire appropriation period that was lower than
any of the flows requested, and that was one-sixth of the largest flow
amount requested.108 The Chaffee County RICD, however, represents a
first for the CWCB-a recommendation that the water court grant a
decree for an RICD. This may signal a softer stance whereby the Board
will recommend granting an application after settlement with all objectors, including those objectors who are just contemplating future exchanges.
E. PROPOSED SENATE BILL 62
Even before the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District, the General Assembly noticed the
uncertainty that characterized the RICD process. The water court in
Gunnison had ignored the CWCB's findings and had issued a decree
for the full amount requested in the application. The Gunnison case
was being appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court, which would decide what authority the CWCB actually had and what was the effect was
of a CWCB recommendation.
Senate Bill 62 was an attempt to limit the amounts decreed for
RICDs. The relevant section of this bill stated "[w] ater diverted for a
Recreational In-Channel Diversion in excess of three-hundred fifty
cubic feet per second shall conclusively be deemed to be wasted and
not placed to beneficial use."' °9 The General Assembly had tried unsuccessfully in SB 216 to limit the size of in-channel diversions to a reasonable amount by delegating fact-finding authority to the CWCB. An
alternate way to proceed is to limit in-channel decrees to one amount
that is specifically enumerated in the statute and not subject to alternate interpretation. SB 62's authors adopted this strategy. While SB
62 would have succeeded in limiting the size of in-channel decrees, it
would not limit them to a reasonable amount unless the reasonable
flow for a given whitewater park coincidentally happened to be 350 cfs.
107.
ColoradoFaces New Challenges - RecreationalInstream Flows, IN STREAM COLORADO
(Colo. Water Colorado's Stream and Lake Protection Program, Denver, CO), January,
2001.
108. Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy
Dist., 109 P.3d 585, 589 (Colo. 2005).
109. S.B. 05-062, 65th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2005) available at
http: //www.leg.state.co.us/Clics2005a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/057E1AFD107CBA587256F
5D00809BA7?Open&file=062 eng.pdf.
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Whitewater Park engineers build whitewater parks to the scale of the
stream, and design them for amounts of water that are frequently in
the stream during the summer months. Assuming a design is successful, these are the amounts that are beneficially used. The amounts vary
widely and are usually more than 350 cfs. While 350 cfs may make
some whitewater parks usable, but is only a trickle in others. Thus, it
ignores reality to artificially cap the amount that can be beneficially
used on all streams. SB 62 passed the Senate but was voted down in
the House on March 30, 2005. " 0
F. SENATE BILL 37

The General Assembly's most recent attempt to tackle the RICD issue was Senate Bill 37."' The governor signed this bill into law on May

11, 2006."' The bill made substantial changes to SB 216 but left the
process essentially intact. The statute still directs CWCB to make factual findings on the factors listed in C.R.S. section 37-92-102(6) (b).
However, the bill deleted three of the factors the CWCB was required
to consider under SB 216: (1) the appropriate stream reach required
for the intended use, (2) whether there is access for the recreational
in-channel1 3use, and (3) such other factors as may be determined appropriate.

The General Assembly never properly defined term "appropriate
stream reach." The term could mean whether the RICD actually covered the reach of the stream with the whitewater park. The CWCB's
expertise is not needed for this determination. "Appropriate stream
reach" could also mean whether the RICD was in a location which
would result in more water exiting the state before it could be consumptively used, but the CWCB addresses this issue in the "utilization
of compact entitlements" factor. Thus, this factor was more confusing
than useful. Additionally, the issue of access is usually simple and need
not be the subject of an administrative proceeding. Finally, the General Assembly deleted the catchall factor which was not consistent with
the CWCB's fact-finding role.
The bill added de minimis provisions for whether the RICD would
impair maximum utilization, and for whether new diversions would
110. Summarized History for S.B. 05-062, 65th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo.
2005),
available
at
http://www.leg.state.co.us/Clics2005a/csl.nsf/BilFoldersSenate?openFrameset.
111. S.B. 06-037, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (codified at COLO,
REv. STAT.

§§ 37-92-103(10.3),-305(13)).

112. Summarized History for S.B. 06-037, 65th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo.
2006),
available
at
http://www.leg.state.co.us/Clics2006a/csl.nsf/BillFoldersSenate?OpenFrameSet.
113. S.B. 06-037, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (codified at § 37-92102(6) (b)).
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injure the RICD holder. 1 4 Additionally, when evaluating the application, the statute now directs the water courts to examine each of the
factors in C.R.S. section 37-92-102(6)(b) including the stream reach
and access factors which had been removed from that section." 5 In
addition, the water court may not issue a decree which would impair
the ability of the
state to utilize and place to beneficial use its compact
6
entitlements.1

Most importantly, the bill contained two futile call provisions. The
first stated that the water court must determine a flow below which
water cannot be beneficially used in the whitewater park." 7 Presumably, the state engineer may not administer a call by the RICD holder if
the streamflow is below this level.
The second futile call provision stated that for any RICD where the
sum total of the amount of water appropriated exceeds fifty percent of
the historical average streamflow, the state engineer will not administer
a call if less than eighty-five percent of the decreed rate of flow for any
time period is present in the stream."" This is an attempt to make
RICD appropriators apply for realistic amounts. Since the appropriator can only call when there is between eighty-five and one hundred
percent of the amount decreed, the theory is that the appropriator will
appropriate only the amount likely to be present. For instance, under
the Golden decree, where the city appropriated much more than fifty
percent of the historical average streamflow, the town has a decree for
1000 cfs in May." 9 Under this futile call provision, Golden would not
be able to call unless 850 cfs or more was present in Clear Creek. Clear
Creek rarely has a stream flow of 850 cfs in May. 2 0 Under Senate Bill
37, Golden would have had an incentive to get a decree for a smaller
amount.
Senate Bill 37 is also notable for what it does not do. It does not
give the CWCB findings a greater presumptive weight than they were
given by the Colorado Supreme Court in the Gunnison case. "The water court shall consider all findings of fact made by the Colorado Water
114. Id. §§1-2 (codified at §§ 37-92-102(6) (b) (I), -103(10.3) (2006)).
115. Id. §3 (codified at § 37-92-305(13) (a)).
116. Id. (codified at § 37-92-305(13) (c)).
117. Id. (codified at § 37-92-305(13) (d)).
118. Id. (codified at § 37-92-305(13)(f)).
119. In re Application for Water Rights of Golden, No. 98CW448, 7 (Colo. Dist. Ct.,
Water Div. No.
1, 2001),
available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/
supct/watercourts/wat-divl /ordergolden.htm. This example presumes that the conditional amount in the decree will become absolute during some high-water year in the
future.
120. US Geological Survey, USGS Surface- Water Monthly Statistics for Colorado:
USGS 06719505 Clear Creek at Golden, Colo., http://waterdata.usgs.
gov/co/nwis/monthly/?search site no=06719505&agency cd=USGS&referred modul
e=sw&format=sites selection links (click Checkbox and Submit) (last visited Sept. 9,
2006).
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which findings shall be presumptive as to such facts, subject to rebuttal
by any party. In addition, the water court shall consider evidence and
make affirmative findings..."1

2

'

Thus, the CWCB findings still carry

only the weight of a rebuttable presumption in the water court.
IV. THE EFFECT OF RICDS-THE CENTRAL C/TYDECISION
Much of the debate surrounding RICDs centers on two assumptions: appropriators will exercise their right to call once they receive a
RICD, and RICDs will block future exchanges. All RICDs will have very
junior priority dates. In a state as over-appropriated as Colorado, this
means that these rights will almost never be in priority. Thus, there
will be very few calls from RICD holders.
The more important reason to get a RICD is the right to object to
other decrees, specifically exchanges to points of diversion further upstream. However, the scope of this right is unclear. It is possible that a
senior right could be exchanged to an upstream diversion with an earlier priority date than the RICD. Because the upstream diversion
would be senior to the RICD, it is not clear the RICD holder would be
entitled to protection. In Colorado Water Conservation Board v. City of
addressed this issue in the conCentral, the Colorado Supreme Court
22
text of CWCB-held instream flows.

The Central City case arose out of an attempted plan for augmentation on Clear Creek.12 3 Central City submitted an augmentation plan
that involved an exchange of water from senior downstream agricultural rights to diversions far upstream in the North Fork Clear Creek
("NFCC") drainage. 24 The CWCB holds an instream flow right on the
NFCC for 1.5 cfs.1 25

The augmentation plan included out-of-priority

diversions at three upstream points of diversion with earlier priority
dates than the CWCB-held instream flow.

2

6

The CWCB requested that

the augmentation plan include a provision forbidding the upstream
diversion through these diversions if 1.5 cfs was not available for the
instream flow right in the NFCC.127 The water court determined that
the CWCB was not entitled to these protective terms. 2 The CWCB
appealed, arguing the water court should require Central City to replace any out-of-priority diversions which injure its instream flow right.
121. S.B. 06-037, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (codified at §37-92305(13) (a)).
122.

Colorado Water Conservation Bd. v. City of Central, 125 P.3d 424 (Colo. 2005).

123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 428.
Id.
Id. at 429.
Id.

127.

Id. at 430.

128.

Id. at 433.
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To begin its analysis, the Colorado Supreme Court first noted: "a
junior appropriator of water to a beneficial use has a vested right, as
against his senior, in a continuation of the conditions on the stream as
they existed at the time he made his appropriation."'2 The court then
discussed plans for augmentation: "In the case of plansfor augmentation
includingexchange, the supplier may take an equivalent amount of water
at his point of diversion or storage if such water is available without
impairing the rights of others."3 0 Next, the court addressed the rights
associated with instream flows:
[I] nstream flow or lake level rights are no different in concept from
other appropriative rights. They must be decreed to be administered;
are given a fixed priority date, a specified flow rate or volumetric
quantity, time and place of use; and are administered
like any other
3
water right, but no means of diversion is required. 1
Most importantly, however, the court discussed in detail the legislative
intent behind the instream flow statute. It concluded the legislature
envisioned a program which would actually achieve the goal of preserving the natural environment to a reasonable degree. "[T]he legislature.. .envisioned the primary value of an instream flow right to derive
from a basic tenet of water law: its ability to preserve the stream conditions existing at the time of its appropriation. " l13

"Thus, a junior in-

stream flow right may resist all proposed changes in time, place, or use
of water from a source which in any way materially injures or adversely
affects the decreed minimum flow in the absence of adequate protective conditions in the change of water right or augmentation decree."'3 3
The Central City case did not involve RICDs, nor did it mention
them. The Supreme Court's treatment of instream flow rights, however, is very encouraging for RICD holders who intend to assert the noinjury rule. A broad reading of Central City would support the proposition that all decrees come with the same rights, regardless of who holds
the decree or the use to which the water will be put. Thus, RICDs
would be entitled to the same junior protection as any other water
right. It is important, however, to note the weight the court placed on
legislative intent. RICDs arise out of an entirely different statutory
provision. The RICD legislation was an attempt to limit instream decrees rather than an attempt to achieve environmental protection, as is
the case for the instream flow statute. Thus, the legislative intent argument would not be as strong for the no-injury rule for RICDs.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

434.
437.
437-38.
439
440.
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V. CONCLUSION
In the last five years, the law of RICDs has grown from non-existent
to voluminous. The old obstacles to RICDs-the diversion requirement and beneficial use-have vanished but new ones have taken their
place. Senate Bill 216 added another layer to the process in the hopes
of avoiding unwise RICDs. Senate Bill 37 makes significant changes to
the process created in Senate Bill 216, but the primary flaws remain.
First, the CWCB's involvement in the process seems unnecessary.
While it appears that the Board has softened its stance somewhat and is
now more open to negotiated settlements, their findings still only carry
the weight of a rebuttable presumption. The negotiations in the Chaffee County case would have probably taken place with or without the
CWCB. The concessions made by the applicant were made to reach a
settlement with the many objectors. 3 4 The CWCB's blessing is nice for
the applicant, but given the weight of their findings, it is hardly necessary. It would be faster, easier, and cheaper to remove the CWCB from
the process and place the burden for each factor on the applicant in
the water court.
Second, neither the legislature nor the courts have defined beneficial use in the RICD context in any meaningful way. Most attempts to
do so have focused on the level of boater that the whitewater park caters to. This approach is flawed. Whitewater parks are easy and safe
places to paddle. Any boater with even basic skills prefers a high water
level. Whitewater parks are like many other recreational activities in
that substitutes are available. At the peak of runoff, many rivers have
good flows, so a whitewater park will have to have a very good water
level to attract boaters. Toward the end of the runoff season, there are
fewer other options, so a marginal water level may still be good enough
to attract boaters. The primary purpose of these parks is to attract
people. Thus the amount of water that can be put to beneficial use
should be the flow needed at any given time of year to attract boaters.
Finally, it is unclear whether a RICD carries with it the junior protection rights generally associated with a decree in Colorado. Senate
Bill 37 attempts, through its two futile call provisions, to limit the
amounts decreed by limiting when a call can be made. This ignores
the reality that the ability to call is not the primary reason for a RICD.
Colorado is an over-appropriated state. The primary reason for an
RICD is protection from future upstream diversions and exchanges. In
fact, Senate Bill 37 specifically contemplates RICD holders objecting to

134. See Memorandum, supra note 91.
135. These are personal observations which were made based on the author's 10
years of kayaking experience.
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future appropriations and changes." One can read Central City to extend junior protection to all instream decrees. However, the scope of
junior protection for RICDs will not be completely clear until the
Colorado Supreme Court specifically addresses the issue.

136.

S.B. 06-037, 65th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (codified at COLO.

REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(10.3)). The reference to future injury appears in the de minimis
provision for injury from future appropriations.
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ECOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
The EPA should embrace ecological diversity in its administration of
national water quality pollutant criteria and standards established
under the Clean Water Act in an effort to promote ecologically
appropriate and scientifically supported state water quality standards.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Water quality standards are the basis for nearly all Clean Water Act
("CWA")' programs ranging from National Point Discharge Elimination Source ("NPDES") 2 permits to Total Maximum Daily Loads

t

The author is pursuing herJuris Doctor at St. Thomas University Law School in

Miami, Florida. Ms. O'Connor holds a Masters of Science in Environmental Science
from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland with a Bachelors of Arts in
Marine Science Affairs from the University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida. Prior to
law school, Ms. O'Connor worked for the State of Hawaii Department of Health's Environmental Planning Office where she participated in the Department's efforts to
implement programs under the CWA. During her tenure she assisted in coordinating
the public participation for the State's revisions to its water quality standards and
TMDL program respectively.
1. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387(2000)).
2. The EPA website explains:

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 10

("TMDLs") . While these programs include active public involvement
in execution and implementation, the core basis of these programs are
water quality standards, which are critical in determination of when
discharge constitutes a pollution problem or a health impact. 4 While
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") gives the impression
that it is the final determiner of water quality standards, and is not subject to review or challenges by the stakeholder community, this simply
cannot be the case.5
This paper, in part II, examines the background of the CWA and
introduces the problems states face in formulating water quality standards given the growth of scientific understanding in environmental
interactions. Next, Part III examines several ways entities may challenge the EPA including: (1) the use of public comment and participation period during rulemaking; (2) the use of the Constitution to
challenge the EPA's authority to establish nationwide standards; (3)
the role of federalism and states as social laboratories; and (4) the use
of stare decisis to challenge the EPA attempts to implement nationwide
water quality standards. Finally, Part IV of this paper will conclude by
encouraging stakeholders to participate in the rulemaking process
[T]he [NPDES] permit program controls water pollution by regulating point
sources that discharge pollutants into waters of the United States. Point
sources are discrete conveyances such as pipes or man-made ditches. Individual homes that are connected to a municipal system, use a septic system, or
do not have a surface discharge do not need an NPDES permit; however, industrial, municipal, and other facilities must obtain permits if their discharges
go directly to surface waters. In most cases, the NPDES permit program is
administered by authorized states. Since its introduction in 1972, the NPDES
permit program is responsible for significant improvements to our Nation's
water quality.
U.S. EPA, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), http://cfpub.
epa. gov/npdes/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 15, 2006).
3. The EPA website defines TMDL as:
[A] calculation of the maximum amount of a pollutant that a waterbody can
receive and still meet water quality standards, and an allocation of that
amount to the pollutant's sources.
Water quality standards are set by States, Territories, and Tribes. They identify the uses for each waterbody, for example, drinking water supply, contact
recreation (swimming), and aquatic life support (fishing), and the scientific
criteria to support that use.
A TMDL is the sum of the allowable loads of a single pollutant from all contributing point and nonpoint sources. The calculation must include a margin
of safety to ensure that the waterbody can be used for the purposes the State
has designated. The calculation must also account for seasonal variation in
water quality.
The Clean Water Act, section 303, establishes the water quality standards and
TMDL programs.
U.S. EPA, Introduction to TMDLs, http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/intro.html (last
visited Nov. 15, 2006).
4. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.2 (2005).
5. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.4-131.7.
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even though the EPA is not bound to make any of the stakeholders'
recommended changes. Despite the fact that courts will likely find
such agency inaction constitutionally appropriate under the Commerce Clause,6 case law indicates that EPA's authority under the CWA
is limited to a non-rulemaking role, with Congress giving the states the
authority to adopt water quality criteria and standards.7
II. BACKGROUND
In 1972, Congress passed amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, a precursor to the Clean Water Act, to "restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters."8 In an effort to achieve the lofty "national goal" of eliminating
the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters of the United
States by 1985, 9 Congress provided that "the [EPA] Administrator, in
cooperation with the States, shall develop and publish regulations
6. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
7. This body of case law has not addressed the larger constitutional issues and
arguments. Rather it involved direct challenges to specific EPA decisions regarding
the approval or disapproval of a water quality standard. See City of Albuquerque v.
Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 425 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
EPA, 16 F.3d 1395, 1399, 1401 (4th Cir. 1993)).
8. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387).
The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. In order to achieve this objective it is hereby declared that, consistent with the provisions of this chapter(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable
waters be eliminated by 1985;
(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal of water
quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish,
and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by
July 1, 1983;
(3) it isthe national policy that the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic
amounts be prohibited;
(4) it is the national policy that Federal financial assistance be provided to
construct publicly owned waste treatment works;
(5) it is the national policy that areawide waste treatment management planning processes be developed and implemented to assure adequate control of
sources of pollutants in each State;
(6) it is the national policy that a major research and demonstration effort be
made to develop technology necessary to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters, waters of the contiguous zone, and the oceans;
and
(7) it is the national policy that programs for the control of nonpoint sources
of pollution be developed and implemented in an expeditious manner so as
to enable the goals of this chapter to be met through the control of both
point and nonpoint sources of pollution.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
9. Id. § 1251 (a)(1).
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specifying minimum guidelines for public participation in such processes."' 0 Generally speaking, state water quality standards are composed of three elements:
(1) the classification system for state surface waters, which assigns different protected uses to different water classes [also known as desig-

nated or beneficial uses]; (2) the specific numeric or narrative water
quality criteria needed to achieve that use; and (3) a general antidegradation policy, which maintains and protects water quality for the
uses defined for a class."

The EPA, in a draft guidance document, analogized water quality
standards to a three-legged stool with each element comprising a necessary leg to support the standard.1 2 It described designated or beneficial uses as "descriptions of water quality expectations or water quality
goals.' 3 The document further stated: "A designated use is a legally
recognized description of a desired use of the waterbody, such as
aquatic life support, body contact recreation, [or] fish consumption, . .
. that the state. . .wants the waterbody to be healthy enough to fully
support." 4 The antidegradation requirements are comprised of a
tiered structure to protect "waters threatened by human activities that
might cause a lowering of water quality. 1 5 Water quality criteria:
[D]efine minimum conditions, pollutant limits, goals, and other requirements that the waterbody must attain or maintain to support its
designated use(s). Criteria describe physical, chemical, and biological attributes or conditions as measurable (e.g., parts per million of a
certain chemical) or 6narrative (e.g., no objectionable odors) water
quality components.'

The EPA further explained that states generally "must adopt the
minimum federal criteria for uses such as aquatic life support, human
10.

Id.§1251(e).

11.
HAWAII STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, HAWAII'S WATER QUALITY STANDARDS: A
PUBLIC GUIDE, 2 (2001), availableat http://www.state.hi.us/health/environmental/env-

planning/wqm/wqsbrochure.pdf.
Ms. Katina D. Henderson, of the Department's
Environmental Planning Office, prepared this water quality standards pamphlet as a
public outreach and education tool to explain the purpose of Hawaii's water quality
standards and how Hawaii uses its standards to protect the environment. See also U.S.
EPA, OFFICE OF WATER, NONPOINT SOURCE CONTROL BRANCH, HANDBOOK FOR
DEVELOPING WATERSHED

PLANS TO RESTORE & PROTECT OUR WATERS- DRAFT

(2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/nps/watershed

handbook/

2-13

pdf/handbook.

pdf.
12.

U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF WATER, NONPOINT SOURCE CONTROL BRANCH, supra note 11,

at 2-13.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.

15.
16.

Id. at 2-15.
Id. at 2-14.
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health, and contact recreation unless they can demonstrate that sitespecific, time-sensitive, or other criteria are appropriate to reflect the
unique conditions or uses of a waterbody."N The EPA stated that
"[n]umeric criteria for protecting aquatic life are often expressed as a
concentration minimum or maximum for certain parameters and include an averaging period and frequency or recurrence interval" while
at the same time stating that "narrative criteria are nonnumeric descriptions of desirable or undesirable water quality conditions."'8 Often, EPA uses the terms water quality criteria and water quality standard interchangeably causing confusion. This is because water quality
"[c]riteria for protecting human health are derived from epidemiological studies and laboratory studies of pollutant exposure involving
species like rats and mice."' 9 As a result, one may see these criteria as
the scientific backbone of the water quality standards, which set a goal
for a particular waterbody based on the designated use(s) and supported by the antidegradation policy. Each water body may have a different water quality standard based on its designated uses and the water quality criteria set to protect those uses.20
Pursuant to the CWA, the EPA has established a national scheme
for water quality protection by establishing a procedure to approve
water quality standards proposed by states, replacing them with EPA
standards when necessary. 2' It is EPA's policy to "apply these standards
equally to every state without regard to differences in environment of
the various states., 22 Research done in Hawaii, the only state with a
tropical climate, has produced two lines of evidence showing microbial
populations behave differently in tropical environments than they do
in temperate environments. 23 As a result, scientists in Hawaii have determined that EPA water quality criteria for indicator bacteria, developed from data obtained from temperate climate, are not reliable for
use in Hawaii's tropical climate.24 Dr. Fujioka argued:

17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.

21.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1313-15 (2000).

22. Roger S. Fujioka, Ph.D. et al, Pacific Research Center for Marine Biomedicine,
Research Project 2: MicrobialPathogens in Tropical Coastal Waters: An Ecosystem Approach to
Determine Risk and Prevent Water-Borne Diseases, http://www.prcmb.hawaii.edu/p2.asp
(last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
23. Id.
24. See id.; see also Stephanie N. Stotts, Virulence and Antibiotic Resistance Gene
Combinations among Staphylococcus aureus Isolatesfrom CoastalWaters of Oahu, Hawaii,J.
YOUNG INvESTIGATORS, http://www.jyi.org/articletools/print.php?id=148 (last visited
Oct. 3, 2006) (discussing the correlation between seawater exposure and S. aureus
infection rates and routinely finding S. aureus in the waters surrounding the island of
Oahu).
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The first line of evidence is that all streams in Hawaii contain
concentrations of EPA-approved fecal indicator bacteria (fecal coliform, E. coli, enterococci) that exceed EPA recreational water quality
standards. EPA water quality guidelines assume that fecal matter is
the only significant source of these fecal indicator bacteria and when
water quality standards are exceeded, that body of water is significantly contaminated with sewage and the risk for transmission of sewage borne pathogens is unacceptable. However, the tropical soil environment in Hawaii and other tropical locations (Guam, Puerto Rico,
south Florida), support the growth of EPA-approved fecal indicator
bacteria and they become established in soil as a significant environmental and non-fecal source of these bacteria. Rainfall washes these
soil-bound fecal bacteria into streams at high concentrations, which
no longer indicate degree of fecal contamination. Thus, one identified problem is the need to develop appropriate water quality standards for tropical climates. The second line of evidence that tropical
climates can affect microbial populations in environmental waters is
greater prevalence of three non-enteric pathogens (Leptospira sp,
Staphylococcus aureus, Vibrio spp) in tropical waters, which cause higher

incidences of water borne diseases in Hawaii than in the rest of the
states. Significantly, water borne transmissions of these three pathogens are not recognized as high risk in temperate climate of continental USA and EPA has not established water quality guidelines or
methods for these pathogens. As a result, the second identified problem is the need to develop methods to establish water quality guidelines for water borne transmission of these three non-enteric pathogens that occur more frequently in tropical climates. 5
In summary, Dr. Fujioka asserted:
[T]he two identified water quality problems in Hawaii (appropriate
fecal microbial water quality standards, increased incidence of some
non-enteric water borne diseases) are directly attributable to changes
in microbial populations in tropical climates, and EPA policies, [direct] all states to adopt the same water quality management strategy
without regard to environmental differences in different climates.
While EPA has been slow to recognize the shortcoming in its current
practice for measuring beach water quality, pressure from the scientific
community has caused EPA to begin considering new technology and
indicators that will provide rapid measurement of beach waters.27
25.

Fujioka et al., supra note 22. Dr. Fujioka is a Professor of Public Health and

Researcher at the University of Hawaii, Manoa's Pacific Research Center for Marine
Biomedicine. See Pacific Research Center for Marine Biomedicine, Administration,
http://www.prcmb.hawaii.edu/participants.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
26. Fujioka et al., supra note 22.
27. Alfred P. Dufour, Ph.D., Pacific Research Center for Marine Biomedicine
Seminar Series, Water Quality and Swimming-Associated Health Effects, http://www.prcmb.
hawaii.edu/DufourSeminar.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
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III. CHALLENGING EPA WATER QUALITY STANDARDS
A. USE OF PUBLIC COMMENT AND PARTICIPATION TO CHALLENGE THE
AGENCY

At issue in this article is the fact that the EPA determines what water quality standards apply in assessing the quality of the nation's waters. The EPA dictates the type of bacteria, compound, or element that
states should monitor. It is important to note that once the EPA establishes numeric or narrative water quality standards for selected criteria,
they are not set in stone. Rather, they are subject to a review and revision process every three years. 8 Section 1313(c)(2) (A) of the CWA
establishes that revisions or new water quality standards shall:
[C]onsist of the designated uses of the navigable waters involved and
the water quality criteria for such waters based upon such uses. Such
standards shall be such as to protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality of water and serve the purposes of this chapter... taking into consideration their use and value for public water
supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and

agricultural, industrial, and other purposes, and also taking into consideration their use and value for navigation. 9

Furthermore, section 1313(c)(2)(B) provides that whenever a state
reviews, revises, or adopts new water quality standards pursuant to sec-

tion 1313(c) (1), it shall adopt specific numerical criteria for all toxic
pollutants, and where such numerical criteria are not available, the
state shall adopt criteria based on biological monitoring or assessment
methods.30
Since the revision process provides for public participation in the
form of public hearings, the CWA falls under a form of rulemaking
known as "notice-and-comment" rulemaking. "Notice-and-comment"
rulemaking "requires the agency to notify the public of the proposed
rule," as indicated in the requirement of public hearings, "and to consider written comments submitted by the public prior to adopting the

28.

Id.
29.
30.

33 U.S.C. § 1313 (c)(1) (2000).
The Governor of a State or the State water pollution control agency of such
State shall from time to time (but at least once each three year period beginning with October 18, 1972) hold public hearings for the purpose of reviewing applicable water quality standards and, as appropriate, modifying and
adopting standards. Results of such review shall be made available to the
[EPA] Administrator.
Id. § 1313 (c)(2)(A).
Id. §1313(c)(2)(B).

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 10

rule."'" The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), enacted in 1946,
governs the process of "notice-and-comment" rulemaking applicable to
federal agencies. 2 The APA states that a "[g] eneral notice of proposed
rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless persons
subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise
have actual notice thereof in accordance with law."3 It further provides that:
The notice shall include(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making
proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed;
and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection
does not apply(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefore in the rules issued) that
notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary,
or contrary to the public interest.4
Like the S•CWA,
the APA outlines a procedure and timeline for public
•
35
participation.

31.

BRADLEY BOBERTZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE,

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN

3 (1991), available at http://www.elistore.org/Data/

products/d2-03.pdf.
32. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596 (2000)).

33.

5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(2000).

34.

Id.

35.

See id. §§ 553(c)-(e).
After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons
an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall
incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis
and purpose. When rules are required by statute to be made on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection.
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In light of the scientific findings in Hawaii that have determined
that EPA water quality criteria standards for bacteria, developed from
data obtained from temperate climate, are not reliable in tropical climates, one may wonder who this "public" that participates in the rulemaking process actually is; moreover, in light of the seemingly technical or scientific requirements framed by the statute, what, if any, sub36
process?
stantive input does such limited participation have on the

The CWA and APA seek to include several types of people and groups
in the decision making process including: (1) common everyday citizens, some who may participate as individuals and others who organize
together around some common interest3' forming grassroots community groups; (2) the regulated community, which may consist of industry, agriculture, or any other person or organization whose activities
would require a permit under the CWA; and (3) the scientific community and members of institutes of higher education, who have an interest in the standard from a technical perspective as well as any personal
convictions they may hold regarding the impact of such governmental
rule.-"8

Due to varying interests and perspectives, government regulators
composing and/or revising standards can easily become overwhelmed
and quickly disregard the public comments as static or noise from
"lobbyists" seeking to interfere with agency statutory directives to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation's waters39 and protect public health and welfare. 40 This is
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made
not less than 30 days before its effective date, except(1) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a
restriction;
statements
of
policy;
or
(2)
interpretative
rules
and
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published

with

the

rule.

(e) Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the

issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
Id.
36. See Wendy E. Wagner, RestoringPolluted Waters with Public Values, 25 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 429, 450-55 (2000) (arguing citizen participation is discouraged

by the water quality march due to the increasing the cost of participation by miring
water quality programs in technical equations while artificially reducing the perceived
benefits of participation, discouraging all but the most sophisticated or well-financed
individual or groups from becoming involved). However, Ms. Wagner notes the growing wealth of community grassroots organizations, facilitating information exchange is
leveling the technical playing field. Id. at 455-57. Examples of these types of organiza-

tions include the Clean Water Network and the River Network. See Clean Water Network, Home Page, http://www.cwn.org/cwn (last visited Nov. 19, 2006); River Network, Home Page, http://www.rivernetwork.org (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
37. These common interests may include environmental protection, government

accountability, and/or public health concerns.
38. See 40 C.F.R. § 25.3 (2005).
39.

See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (2000).
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particularly easy to do when technocratic government officials, many of
whom are scientists and engineers, assume they are in a better position
to make important decisions due to their expertise and access to data.
As a result, some states-like Hawaii-have found it is easier to ensure
productive community involvement by creating an advisory group for
the sole purpose of providing public input and comment into the
process of water quality standard revision. 4' For example, Hawaii created an advisory group composed of a variety of players reflective of
the industrial, agricultural, environmental conservation, cultural, and
scientific communities, as well as other state and federal agencies impacted by state standards.42 Such organizations act like a minirepresentative government, but instead of being comprised of elected
officials, they are composed of self-appointed community representatives who43 have the time and desire to participate in the rulemaking
process. While this may not be completely an accurate reflection of
the community's interest, nor provide for the "best interest," of the
community, in general it is reflective of the interested community."
The use of the public comment period is an effective tool to challenge the EPA during the rulemaking process, but it may not lead to
the actual change or result sought because the EPA is only legally obligated to hear the public's comment on its regulations and acknowledge receipt of those comments. 45 It is not obligated to implement any
of the public's suggestions, regardless of how scientifically sound or
reasonable they may be. As a result, the likelihood of the public successfully using comment and participation to challenge the EPA's selection of water quality criteria or standards appears bleak and prone
to the political ebb and flow of the Administration. Nonetheless, it is
important for stakeholders to use this opportunity to begin a dialog
with the EPA for the following reasons: (1) it is the cheapest, most
40. See Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative
Rulemaking, 63 U. Prrr. L. REV. 589, 596-97 (2002). Often one can find state regulations and programs implementing the CWA under public health codes or within the
state's department of health, although this varies state to state. For example, in Hawaii
the Department of Health implements the CWA and promulgates Hawaii's administrative rules. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 174C-66, -67, -68 (1993 & Supp. 2005). However, in
Florida, the Department of Environmental Protection implements the CWA and
promulgates Surface Water Quality Standards. SeeFLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.021(10)-(11),
403.031(2), 403.067(3) (West 2002 & Supp. 2006).
41.
See HAwAII DEPT. OF HEALTH, OvERvIEw HAWAI'I ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
PROGRAMS STRATEGIC PLAN 5, 11 (1999), http://www.hawaii.gov/health/environmental/env-planning/goals/overview.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2006). The state of
Hawaii Department of Health formed a Water Quality Standards Technical Advisory
Group to help in its CWA mandated tri-annual review and revision process of the State
standards. Id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 10-11, 18.
44. See BOBERTZ, supra note 31, at 20.
45. See5 U.S.C. § 553(c)-(e) (2000).
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direct means to challenge the EPA and if successful, the easiest way to
facilitate change; and (2) even if the EPA resists or ignores the comments, the stakeholder has established a record that it can use to challenge the EPA in court. Litigation is costly, time consuming, and the
least amicable means to facilitate change, but it is an option. If a court
hears the case, it will review the rulemaking process, and likely pay special attention to the dialog of the parties during the comment and response-to-comment periods.
B. USING THE CONSTITUTION TO CHALLENGE THE AGENCY
In her book The Clean Water Act and the Constitution, Robin Craig
explained that "[w]hile Congress' constitutional authority to impose
minimum federal requirements on water quality regulation is broad, it

47
is not unlimited."46 She notes constitutional federalism is one limit.

Constitutional federalism "describes the balance of power created in
the U.S. Constitution between centralized but limited federal government and the relatively unfettered but dispersed state governments,
who have jurisdiction
over, respectively, national issues and those of
4 8
local import."

In 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act ("SMCRA")
of 1977 against allegations by a Virginia mining association that
claimed the Act intruded upon state regulatory authority and was
therefore unconstitutional. 49 In holding the Act was a constitutional
exercise in "cooperative federalism," the Court stated, "the power conferred [on Congress] by the Commerce Clause [is] broad enough to
permit congressional regulation of activities causing air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects on more
than one State., 50 The Court further stated that in order to succeed, a
claim that congressional commerce power legislation is invalid under
the Tenth Amendment must satisfy each of the following three re46. ROBIN KuNDIS CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CONsTITUTION: LEGAL
STRUCTURE AND THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 93 (2004).
47.

Id. (noting that "[t]he Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment under-

gird much federalism litigation and have interacted frequently with federal environmental law, including the Clean Water Act."). For discussions of the Commerce Clause
and the Tenth Amendment and their relation to environmental law see generally, Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVrL. L. REv. 1 (2003);
Jamie Y.Tanabe, Comment, The Commerce Clause Pendulum: Will Federal Environmental
Law Survive in the Post-SWANCC Epoch of "New Federalism"?, 31 ENvTL. L. 1051 (2001);
Lydia B. Hoover, The Commerce Clause, Federalism, and Environmentalism: At Odds After

Olin?, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REv. 735 (1997).
48. CRAIG, supra note 46, at 93.
49. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 268
(1981).
50. Id. at 282.
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quirements: (1) there must be a showing that the challenged statute
regulates "states as states"; (2) the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably "attributes of state sovereignty"; and (3) it
must be apparent that states' compliance with the federal law would
directly impair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional functions."5' Additionally, Congress does not invade areas
reserved to states by the Tenth Amendment "simply because it exercises its authority under the Commerce Clause in
a manner that dis52
places the States' exercise of their police powers.,
In 1984, the Court established a policy of administrative deference
in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council by holding that "EPA's
decision to allow States to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices
within the same industrial grouping as though they were encased
within a single 'bubble"' was a reasonable construction of the term
"stationary source" under the Clean Air Act. 53 The Court founded the

doctrine of administrative deference upon these theoretical principles:
(1) "federal agencies often have an 'intense familiarity with the history
and purposes of the legislation at issue"'; (2) under separation of powers the "democratically accountable officials of the executive branch
have the power to set policy, not judges"; and (3) most importantly
"lii]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation.'4
The Court later distinguished "environmental regulation" from
"land use planning" in CaliforniaCoastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co.
holding, "[l]and use planning in essence chooses particular uses for
the land," which is a local function, thus presumptively a state prerogative, while "environmental regulation, at its core, does not mandate
particular uses of the land but requires only that, however the land is
used, damage to the environment is kept within prescribed limits,"
which could be the subject of federal statute.55
As a result, the prospect of constitutional challenges to the CWA
looked bleak. Then, in 1995, a gun law case entered upon the constitutional law front and brought hope to those wishing to challenge the
CWA. In United States v. Lopez, the Court, for the first time in nearly six
decades, used the Commerce Clause as grounds to invalidate a congressional action- the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990.56 In Lopez,
the defendant was convicted of possessing a firearm in a school zone in
51.
52.

Id. at 287-88.
Id. at 291.

53.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).

54.

Tanabe, supranote 47, at 1059 (citing Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Remark: Current

Trends in JudicialReview of EnvironmentalAgency Action, 27 ENVrL. L. 1, 4 (1997); Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843-44).
55. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 587 (1987).
56. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1995).
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violation of the federal Gun Free School Zones Act which made it a
federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a
place that the individual knew or had reasonable cause to believe was a
school zone.57 The late ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted in the opinion of
the court that possession of a gun in a local school zone was not an
economic activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. 8 At
the heart of the opinion were concerns of federalism, and the Court
pointed to its decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel to emphasize
that
the scope of the interstate commerce power "must be considered in
the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended
so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and
remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would
effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national
and
59
what is local and create a completely centralized government."
In its ruling, the Lopez Court identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power: (1) "the use
of the channels of interstate commerce"; (2) "instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons and things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities"; and (3)
60
"those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce."
The holding in Lopez renewed hope for challenging the constitutionality of many federal environmental statutes such as the Clean Water Act,
but any excitement was short lived.6'
States seeking to prevent the EPA from forcing them to adopt a national water quality standard that they find inappropriate for their ecosystems may initially find hope in Lopez on the grounds that, like the
Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 invalidated by the Lopez Court, federal water quality standards do not pertain to commerce or economics.
Additionally, federal water quality standards "impinge upon traditional

57.
58.

Id. at 551-52.
Id. at 561.

59. Id. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937)).

60.

Id. at 558-59.

61.
See Stephen M. Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A Misstep, but Hardly Epochalfor
FederalEnvironmentalRegulation, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 41 (1996); Lori J. Warner, The

PotentialImpact of United States v. Lopez on EnvironmentalRegulation, 7

DUKE ENVTL. L.

& POL'Y F. 321, 341 (1997);J. Blanding Holman, IV, Note, After United States v. Lopez:
Can the Clean Water Act and the EndangeredSpecies Act Survive Commerce Clause Attack ?, 15
VA. ENVL. L.J. 139, 139 (1995); Peter Arey Gilbert, Note, The Migratory Bird Rule After
Lopez: Questioning the Value of State Sovereignty in the Context of Wetland Regulation, 39
WM. & MARY L. Rxv. 1695, 1697 (1998); Lisa Wilson, Comment, SubstantialEffect Under
Lopez: Using a Cumulative Impact Analysis for Environmental Regulations, 11 TUL. ENVrL.
L.J. 479, 487 (1998).
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state functions-regulation of land and water use. ''62 The Court struck
down the statute involved in Lopez largely because it interfered with
states rights by attempting to regulate criminal activity, an area that
states have traditionally regulated.6 3 By requiring federal permits for
development, the CWA usurps local land use development discretion.6
Congress enacted the water quality standards portion of the CWA to
protect public health and the environment, not to regulate economic
activity. 5 Furthermore, as outlined by the statute, it is Congressional
policy to "recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities
and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan
the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and
enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with
66 the
Administrator in the exercise of his authority under this chapter."
However, under the CWA the federal government regulates "waters
of the United States" to protect the navigability of these waters in addition to regulating interstate commerce throughout the nation's waters. 67 Under the Lopez categories of interstate commerce, regulation
of water quality affects the channels of interstate commerce and substantially affects interstate commerce by ensuring the nation's waters
are fishable and swimmable. 6' In other words, the CWA set the national goal "that wherever attainable, an interim goal of water quality
which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish,
and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water be
achieved by July 1, 1983. "69 One could characterize both fishing and
swimming as economic in nature and as having an impact on interstate
commerce-from the basic sale of fish for consumption to tourism
related to recreational activities. By its nature, pollution often flows
interstate and, as a result, "tt]he general problem
of environmental
70
harm is often not susceptible of a local solution."
Furthermore, when Courts evaluate federal water quality standards
under the Chevron doctrine of administrative deference, the provisions
again are well within the bounds of the Constitution. A court applying
Chevron must first determine whether the statute is ambiguous.71 If the
court finds Congress's intent is clear, it must give effect to that intent.7"
62. Tanabe, supranote 47, at 1071 (citing U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
63. Id. at 1071-72.
64. Id. at 1072.
65. Id.
66. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000).
67. Id. § 1362(7).
68. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
69. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2).
70. Johnson, supra note 61, at 44 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S.
1, 20 (1989)).
71. Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
72. Id.
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If the court finds the statute is ambiguous, then it must determine
"whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute. 7 3 It is clear by the direct language of the CWA that Congress intended to preempt the state's exercise of police power over
water quality in an effort to protect the nation's waters.74
Several Supreme Court decisions that have upheld environmental
laws under Commerce Clause attack support the conclusion that the
CWA is immune from Commerce Clause challenges.75 In these opinions, the Court provided necessary "guidance regarding the nature and
extent of Congress's power to regulate pollution that has interstate
effects." 76 When the Court held that Congress, under the Commerce
Clause, could prohibit surface coal miners from mining private land
except with a permit and in accordance with the reclamation standards
established under the SMCRA, the Court specifically stated that "the
power conferred [on Congress] by the Commerce Clause [is] broad
enough to permit congressional regulation of activities causing air or
water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects
in more than one State. 77 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association suggests that Congress has the authority to regulate water quality in an effort to prohibit pollution in the nation's navigable
waters because "water pollution creates environmental and health
threats that are not confined to the discharging state, and because
such discharges interfere with the channels of commerce." 78 The Hodel
court cited United States v. Ashland Oil & TransportationCo., a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals case, which upheld the CWA's prohibition of
discharges of pollutants into navigable waters:
[W] ater pollution is a health threat to the water supply of the nation.
It endangers our agriculture by rendering water unfit for irrigation.
It can end the public use and enjoyment of our magnificent rivers
and lakes for fishing, for boating, and for swimming. These health
and welfare concerns are, of course, proper subjects for Congres-

sional attention because
of their many impacts upon interstate com79
merce generally.

The Supreme Court, in another line of cases, provided important
"guidance regarding Congress's authority to regulate transportation

73. Id. at 843.
74. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (2000).
75. See, e.g. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989); New York v. U.S., 505
U.S. 144 (1992); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264

(1981).
76.
77.
78.
79.

Johnson, supra note 61, at 60.
Hode 452 U.S. at 282.
Johnson, supra note 61, at 62-63.
U.S. v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1325 (6th Cir. 1974).
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and disposal of solid, hazardous, and radioactive waste. " s° For example, in City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, the Court held that solid waste is
an article of commerce, and that a state law prohibiting the disposal of
most solid or liquid waste generated or collected outside of the state
discriminated against interstate commerce and violated the Commerce
Clause.81 In light of the Hodel, and the Philadelphialine of cases, it is
unlikely that Lopez will have any effect on the constitutionality of the
federal water quality standards established under the CWA. 2 As a result, it seems that a constitutional challenge to section 303 of the CWA
using the Commerce Clause would likely be unsuccessful.
C. FEDERALISM AND STATES AS SOCIAL LABORATORIES
Despite the existence of constitutional authority, Congress making
the EPA the sole determiner of what the national water quality standard shall be creates issues. Environmentalism, the catchall term for
man's uses and impacts upon the natural world, "possesses a duality in
itself when the public is told to 'think globally and act locally' and
when there are both state and federal laws aimed at regulating how
individuals may act in relation to particular areas of the environment.""3 The nature of ecosystem protection makes water quality standards vulnerable to the jurisdictional complications of federalism. Dan
Tarlock, in his article Biodiversity Federalism, outlined three reasons why
federalism principles are likely to frustrate biodiversity protection 4
Tarlock stated that federalism is "premised on the search for the optimum exclusive regulatory balance, and this can often frustrate necessary intergovernmental cooperation" for biodiversity protection.5 He
then explained that the national government must rely on state powers
for biodiversity protection, primarily land use controls and water-rights
administration, which are "traditionally and firmly lodged within the
state and local governments."8 6 Tarlock further stated that, "the maintenance of national protection floors supplemented by states is unworkable because in contrast to air and water pollution control, there
are no uniform standards that one can realistically apply
to biodiversity
7
in states as different as Alaska, Arizona and Florida."
While Tarlock clearly hits upon some very persuasive and important points in his assessment of federalism's failures in the protection
of biodiversity, he is unclear as to why these same issues do not impact
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Johnson, supra note 61, at 63.
City of Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-23, 628 (1978).
Johnson, supra note 61, at 65.
Hoover, supra note 47 at 746.
A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism,54 MD. L. REv. 1315, 1318 (1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the use of federalism to control water pollution. The national goal of
the CWA is to maintain fishable and swimmable waters."" As such, the
CWA could be described as a watershed protection act. Inherent in
this goal is the protection of biodiversity as well as the general health of
the nation's waters. In implementing TMDLs unique for each individually listed water body under the CWA, riparian uses are curtailed
and altered in an effort to control the amount of pollution entering
the impaired water body. 9 This is because the program recognizes that
no two water bodies are the same; they do not have the same flow rates,
pollution sources, biota, or uses. 9° However, the EPA apparently fails to
recognize these differences, as it uniformly applies water quality criteria across the nation. Few people, if any, would dispute that the nature
of watersheds differ in states such as Alaska, Arizona and Florida, just
as Tarlock correctly asserts that biodiversity does. As a result, there is a
valid argument that the principles of federalism can just as easily frustrate the intergovernmental cooperation necessary for maintaining
fishable and swimmable waters and interfere with traditionally and
firmly lodged regulatory responsibilities of states and local governments in the area of water quality assessment and preservation. The
establishment and implementation of TMDLs to reduce nonpoint
sources of pollution is a testament to these frustrations. Under the
CWA there are no mechanisms to force the reduction of nonpoint
sources of water pollution. 9' The only way such reductions can occur is
with inter-agency and community/industry cooperation. The EPA's
attempt to use its federal power to mandate creation of TMDL implementation plans only serves to undermine their purpose and frustrate
the parties who, under more amicable non-threatening conditions,
may be willing to make concessions in their business practices and
community operations which would result in the reduction of pollution entering the impaired water body.
While commentators have scoffed at the notion that state and local
governments can serve as meaningful and effective social laboratories
in the arena of wetland protection, 92 such criticism is misplaced. While
arguably the states have acted slowly in the area of water quality improvement, historically the states have been the first line of defense in
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2) (2000).
89. See generally U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF WATER, NONPOINT SOURCE CONTROL BRANCH,
supra note 11.
90. See U.S. EPA, Introduction to TMDLs, supranote 3.
91. Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 94 F. Supp 2d 1150, 1160-61 (D. Colo. 2000).
92. See Gilbert, supra note 61, at 1734-35 (alleging states and local governments
have historically missed their opportunity to experiment and failed to effectively address wetland preservation thereby raising into question their expertise in the field.
The author further states that state level experimentation lacks merit because states
tend to craft remedies which suit their own interests at the expense of outsiders' inter-

ests).
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water quality protection in the context of protecting public health.
The understanding of the greater ecosystem impact of impaired water
quality has resulted in a new awareness that has only recently received
greater public attention and importance. Since each state has a
unique political mode of operation, historical social composition, and
hydrological and aquatic ecosystem, each state's operation as a social
laboratory would be unique and different. Take for instance two states
that both have tropical ecosystems: Hawaii and Florida. Hawaii established its Department of Health as the governmental agency charged
with protecting water quality in addition to implementing the traditional public health programs.93 Florida, on the other hand, has a Department of Environmental Protection, which is charged with water
quality protection separate from its Department of Health which implements traditional public health programs.94 As a result, each state
faces different intergovernmental hurdles in implementing both its
water quality and public health programs in a seamless manner.
Perhaps most important is the difference in the historical social
composition of each state. Hawaii, the fiftieth state of the Union, has
deep roots in its native understanding of water management system of
95 or local watershed, while Florida faces its own
the ahupua'a
unique
history of the draining and management of the Everglades. As a result,
each State has approached water quality protection differently. Florida
has put tremendous effort into its Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan in an effort to correct the water quantity and flow issues
which it hopes will ultimately improve water quality. 96 Conversely, Ha93.
94.

See HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 174C-31, -68 (1993 & Supp. 2005).
FtLA. STAT. §§ 381.0011, 403.031(2), 403.061 (2002).

95. Ahupua'a is a native Hawaiian word defined in the Hawaiian Dictionary as a
"[l]and division usually extending from the uplands to the sea, so called because the
boundary was marked by a heap (ahu) of stones surmounted by an impage of a pig
(pua'a) or because a pig or other tribute was laid on the altar as a tax to the chief."
HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY: HAWAIIAN-ENGLISH, ENGLISH-HAWAIIAN 9 (Mary Kawena Pukui &
Samuel H. Elbert eds., 1986).
Ancient Hawaiian life was based around the ahupua'a system of land management, which evolved to protect the upland water resources that sustained
human life. A typical ahupua'a,or land division, was wedge-shaped and ex-

tended from the mountains to the sea. As water flowed from the upland forest, down through the ahupua'a,it passed from the wao akua, the realm of the
gods, to the wao kanaka, the realm of man, where it sustained agriculture,
aqua culture and other human uses. Water was a gift from the gods, and all
Hawaiians took an active part in its use and conservation.
East Maui Watershed Partnership Website, http://eastmauiwatershed.org/Watersheds/Ahupuaa.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2006).

96. The official website of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Program
explains why the Florida Everglades should be restored by noting:
Water quality throughout south Florida has deteriorated over the past 50
years. More than one-half of the wetlands that act as natural filters and retention areas are gone. Some untreated urban and agricultural storm water is
sent directly to natural areas and estuaries. Too much, or too little, water is
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waii has worked to re-embrace the native ahupua'aconcept in its water
quality restoration efforts under the CWA. While there is a persuasive
policy argument in favor of supporting states as social laboratories
against the use of federal power by the Agency in setting nation-wide
criteria, such an argument is simply an academic exercise lacking the
legal teeth necessary to initiate change. There is more legal strength
in challenging the Agency directly with arguments that use stare decisis
as a basis.
D. USING STARE DECISIS TO CHALLENGE THE AGENCY DIRECTLY
The EPA's role in formulating water quality standards is purported
to be limited and it is the states that are primarily responsible for establishing water quality standards under section 303 of the CWA9 7 When
states enact water quality standards, they must also submit them to the
EPA's Regional Administrator to determine whether the new standard
is consistent with the CWA.9 Thus, "EPA's sole function, in this respect, is to review those standards for approval," as "Congress clearly
intended the EPA to have a limited, non-rulemaking role in the establishment of water quality standards by states."99 If the EPA determines
that the standard is inconsistent with the CWA, it will disapprove the
standard and notify the state of any changes necessary to gain the
Agency's approval.'0° For example, Hawaii, in its rulemaking process,
has sought to use C. pefringens as an indicator bacteria in assessing the
water quality of the states' waters in light of Dr. Fuijoka's findings.0 1
EPA Region IX resisted the use of these indicator bacteria." 2 The EPA,
asserting its federal power, gave cues to Hawaii that it had approved
the preferred the indicator bacteria of coliform, E. coli, enterococci to
be used as part of Hawaii's water quality standard criterion, and even
though Hawaii could additionally measure 0for
C. perfringens, it could
13
only supplement EPA's established criterion.
often sent to estuaries. Too many nutrients are entering the Everglades, with
an over abundance of cattails a visible sign of the results.
Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Program, Why Restore the Everglades- Part 4:
Ecosystem Problems Center on Water, http://www.evergladesplan.org/about/why
restore pt 04.cfm (last visited Nov. 26, 2006).
97. 33 U.S.C. §1313 (2000).
98. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2) (A).
99. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 425 (10th Cir. 1996).
100. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (3).
101. See Fujioka, supra note 22 (discussing the need for site-specific indicator bacteria); see also Roger Fujioka & Muruleedhara Byappanahalli, Addressing the Needs of the
Water Agencies in Hawaii, Guam, Puerto Rico, and South Florida, at 66-68, available at
http://www.wrrc.hawaii.edu/tropicalind/Adndmdvdr61.pdf (discussing Hawaii's request to the EPA to monitor tropical water using alternative indicators such as C. perfringens).
102. See Fujioka, supranote 22.
103. See Fujioka & Byappanahalli, supra note 101, at 68.
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Agency approval is very important to states because of its link to
federal funding.1 0 4 States, such as Hawaii and Florida, which have an
abundant amount of recreational and navigational waters to monitor
and regulate for public health and welfare, are dependant upon federal dollars to run their programs. While one might think that, since
the states are in control of setting the numerical criteria for the indicator bacteria required by EPA, it is a no brainer-the state needs simply
to set the standards such that all background bacteria found ambient
in the environment would not result in a violation. Unfortunately, that
is easier said than done. In years before scientific findings such as Dr.
Fujioka's were published and accepted, Hawaii adopted a numerical
standard for enterococci which was seemingly too stringent in light of
more recent findings of the amount of ambient background enterococci in the natural system.'0 5 In other words, some waters in Hawaii
would always be in "violation" of the enterococci standard without any
input from a wastewater treatment discharge point or other identifiable source of bacteria pollution. With the anti-backsliding policy of
the CWA, states are not allowed to revise their standards to be less
stringent.' ° Consequently, Hawaii is unable to modify its pre-existing
enterococci numerical standard to reflect new science. Instead, Hawaii
has sought to replace enterococci with a different indicator bacteria
species to trigger a violation of the CWA10 7 As will later be discussed in
more detail, Mississippi tried something similar in 1980, when it promulgated standards for dissolved oxygen.' °8 The EPA found Mississippi's
standards unacceptable, and its reasoning unpersuasive, and therefore
usurped Mississippi's discretion, forcing the state to accept EPApromulgated water quality standards in place of its own.l9
While the CWA does not require states to regulate nonpoint
sources of water pollution entering into its waterbodies, it does require
104. See, e.g., Alfred R. Light, He Who Pays the Piper Should Call the Tune: Dual Sovereignty in U.S. Environmental Law, 4 ENVTL. LAWYER 779, 808 (1998) (outlining the case

law maintaining "the legitimacy of the congressional incentives to state action," ...
.such as requiring state implementation as a condition of federal spending or threatening unilateral federal action in that area.") The incentives to state regulation often

used in environmental statues include offers of federal funding and technical assistance and the threat of direct federal regulation within a state. Id. at 804-05. As a result
environmental statues "rarely rely on one incentive, but usually combine several into a
cumulative statutory system. Whether a particular combination of individually legiti-

mate incentives can combine to cross the threshold into unconstitutional coercion
remains to be seen." Id. at 808.
105.

See generallyFujioka, supra note 22 (identifying the need to develop a new meas-

urement standard in light of enterococci's natural presence in the region).
106.

See 33 U.S.C. §1342(o) (2000).

107. MELISSA O'CONNOR-FARNAS, HAWAII DEP'T OF HEALTH, HAWAIIAN COASTAL
RECREATION WATER QUALITrY MONITORING & PUBLIC NOTIFICATION PROGRAM 51 (2002).
108.
See Miss. Comm'n on Natural Res. v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1271 (5th Cir.

1980).
109. Id. at 1273-74.
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states to designate water quality standards and identify waterbodies that
fail to meet these standards.1 ° As a result, it seems Hawaii need not
concern itself with violations of bacteria counts that are clearly linked
to nonpoint sources of pollution where a regulated discharge point is
nowhere near the violation. This sweeping assessment, however, ignores the big picture. Violations of bacteria counts result in beach
closures, which result in public outcry and large economic impacts,
especially in the tourism driven economies of many of the nation's
beach communities. Furthermore, states cannot easily ignore waters
listed as impaired due to high bacteria counts, regardless of the fact
that the CWA does not mandate states to address the problem because
it is nonpoint source in nature. Bacteria polluted waters will result in
public outcry and bad press regardless of whether a legitimate health
threat exists. Clearly, if the situation in Hawaii and other tropical environments is as presented, the EPA needs to provide for variances from
an idealized and uniform national water quality standard scheme.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that provisions for variances are appropriate for regulatory processes, particularly for those
regulations "having presumptive application throughout the nation. '
In Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, the court found in favor of power
companies that challenged the EPA's attempt to regulate heat in water,
holding invalid the EPA's thermal backfit requirements in regulations
establishing limitations on discharge of heat from electric plants into
navigable waters." 2 The court reasoned that the Agency relied upon
figures that did not indicate whether regulations would result in reasonable further progress toward eliminating water pollution.' 1 3 The
court stipulated that if, on remand, the EPA could not show a benefit
with certainty, the EPA must state the expected benefits for the various
alternatives it considered according to whatever scientific opinion it
relied on, or if the EPA could not state any expected benefits, it must
state why, and cite the scientific opinion that supported such conclusion.1 4 The court set aside sections 423.13(1), 423.15(1), and
423.25(1) of the Code of Federal Regulations and instructed the EPA
to "fully evaluate the total environmental impact of any subsequent
regulations which it may issue, particularly with reference to water usage and its effect on the more arid regions of the Nation" in recognition of the concept that different regions of the Nation require different rules when it comes to water."' The power companies also complained about the adequacy of the variance clause of the EPA provi110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 94 F. Supp 2d 1150, 1161 (D. Colo. 2000).
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1358-59 (4th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1363.
Id.
Id. at 1365.

115.

Id. at 1370.
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sion, alleging it was too restrictive because a variance application would
only consider technical and engineering factors and excluded of economic impact and non water quality environmental impacts." 6 The
court reasoned: "Certainly the adverse non-water quality environmental impact which may result from the strict application of the
as the
agency's effluent limitations to a particular plant is as significant
17
encountered."
be
may
which
difficulties
technological
The power companies further alleged that the use of mandated
cooling towers would result in a dramatic increase in water consumption, a concern that the EPA acknowledged but dismissed during the
rulemaking process "on the ground that 'much of the evaporated water would precipitate [again] through the natural water cycle."'" 8 The
court reasoned that this answer was not sufficient, and demonstrated a
serious lack of concern for a balanced consideration of the total environmental impact of the regulations because "[1]ittle, if any, of the
water which evaporates in [states such as Arizona and New Mexico]
returns in the form of rain. Thus, any new use of water in these areas
results in a net reduction in the water supply remaining available for
other uses. ' m9 The Fourth Circuit recognized regional differences in
the area of water sciences and reasoned that the EPA should consider
these differences in its regulatory rulemaking process. 2 ° Arguably, the
EPA should also recognize differences in ecosystems in the arena of
bacteria and water quality criteria and standards.
While the Appalachian Power holding seems promising, it applies
only in the permitting arena. As alluded to earlier, if a state and the
EPA do not see eye to eye on a water quality standard establishment
issue, the state will have an uphill battle persuading the EPA to approve its standard, and it will likely loose the battle if it chooses to litigate the issue. Take for example, the Mississippi Commission on Natural Resources, which in 1980 sought a preliminary and permanent injunction against the enforcement of the EPA's water quality standard
on the grounds that the EPA's rejection of the state standard and
promulgation of a federal standard were arbitrary, capricious, and beyond EPA's authority.12 ' Mississippi set what it thought was an appropriate water quality standard for dissolved oxygen ("DO").Y The EPA
notified the state that it questioned the adequacy of its DO standard. 23
The state sent the EPA a reportjustifying its standard as requested, but

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 1358.
Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1369-70.
Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1369-70.
Miss. Comm'n on Natural Res. v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1271 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1273.
Id.
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the EPA found Mississippi's justification unpersuasive.

4

Mississippi

reconsidered its standard, decided the standard was in the public interest, and remained steadfast in its application. 2 5 EPA, finding this
action insufficient, promulgated a replacement standard. 126 The court
outlined the statutory framework and legislative history of the CWA,
beginning in 1965 when "Congress gave the states primary authority to
set water quality standards" because it was "[c]oncerned that federal
promulgation would discourage state plans for water quality and
'would place in the hands of a single Federal official the power to establish zoning measures over-to control the use of-land within watershed areas' throughout the nation....
Congress nonetheless
stipulated that states submit standards and plans to the Federal Administrator to ensure their consistency with the CWA's provisions, and if a
state did not adopt complying standards, the Administrator would
promulgate the water quality uses and criteria. 2 8 The focus of the
CWA at that time was on the "'tolerable effects rather than the preventable causes of water pollution." 2 9 In an effort to strengthen the
CWA's effectiveness in reaching the national goal of eliminating discharge of pollutants into water by 1985, Congress established the
NPDES program, making it illegal to discharge pollutants without a
CWA permit.2 0 The Senate version of the amendments in section 302
of the CWA utilized water quality standards as a way to measure the
NPDES permit program's effectiveness, while the House added section
303 to continue the use of state water quality standards.2 ' However,
"[t] he Conference Committee adopted section 302 of the Senate bill
after deleting all reference to state authority." 123 The court, describing
the procedure of the CWA as passed, noted: "states promulgate water
quality standards, which are submitted to EPA for approval. EPA can
promulgate standards if the state does not set standards consistent with
the [CWA] or whenever EPA determines that another 'standard is necessary to meet the requirements of [the Act]." 33 As a result, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's finding that: (1)
the EPA did not exceed its statutory authority in disapproving that state
water quality standard; (2) it was within the scope of the Administrator's authority to promulgate a substitute standard; and (3) the EPA
criteria was not a clear error in judgment and was not arbitrarily or
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 1274.
Id.
Id.

127.
128.

Id.at 1272.
Id.

129.

Id. (citing EPA v. Cal. Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202 (1976)).

130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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capriciously promulgated.3 4 In so holding, the court reasoned that
although Congress placed primary authority for establishing water
quality standards with the states, the states do not have "unreviewable
discretion to set water quality standards."315 Rather, EPA has the "final
voice on the standard's adequacy."" 6 The court rationalized its support
of the trampling of states' rights and the prospect of states as laboratories by noting:
Although the designation of uses and the setting of criteria are interrelating chores, the specification of a waterway as one for fishing,
swimming, or public water supply is closely tied to the zoning power
Congress wanted left with the states.137 The criteria set for a specific use
are more amendable to uniformity.
While the court may have had the best of intentions to ease the administration of such a large and cumbersome program in an effort to
meet the lofty and admirable goals of the CWA, it speaks of uniformity
as if the nation is a uniform body with uniform ecosystems and uniform waterways. Such talk does not allow for the reality that the ecosystems and waterways of this vast nation are diverse. As a result, the
court's interpretation of the CWA places the authority to decide what is
an appropriate water quality standard and criteria in the hands of one
federal administrator-the very thing that the original drafters of the
CWA feared.
More recently, in 1993 the city of Albuquerque challenged the
EPA's approval power over water quality standards. In City of Albuquerque v. Browner, the city brought action under the APA and the Declaratory Judgment Act.'3 The City challenged EPA's approval of water
quality standards set by Isleta Pueblo, an Indian tribe recognized as a
state under the CWA, on the grounds that (1) the EPA failed to follow
the required procedures of the APA, and misinterpreted two provisions
of the CWA in approving the standards, and that the approved standards were unconstitutional, (2) the EPA failed to provide a mechanism to resolve the unreasonable consequences arising when a state
and a tribe impose different water quality standards on the same body
of water, and (3) that the tribe's water quality criteria were without any
rational scientific basis and should not have been approved. 3 9 The
District Court held that under the APA: (1) the EPA was not required
to give public notice and provide for comment prior to approving water quality standards of the tribe; (2) the EPA properly implemented
134.

Id. at 1277-78.

135.
136.
137.

Id. at 1275.
Id.
Id. at 1276.

138.

City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D. N.M. 1993).

139.

Id..
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the CWA section authorizing the EPA to treat Indian tribes as states
when the EPA determined that the CWA's section preserving state's
rights to impose standards or limits more stringent than those imposed
by federal government applied to tribes as well as states; (3) EPA, in
recognizing ceremonial use standards in connection with the approval
of the tribe's water quality standards, did not violate the establishment
clause; and (4) EPA's approval of water quality standards set by the
tribe would be upheld, despite the City's claim that the standards were
unattainable.'o
The Court of Appeals affirmed this holding on de novo
4
review.1 '
The New Mexico District Court reasoned that "EPA provides states
with substantial guidance in drafting water quality standards," pointing
to section 304(a) of the CWA, which "requires EPA to develop criteria
for water quality that reflect the latest scientific knowledge, and to provide those criteria to the states as guidance.' ' 142

The court further as-

serted that "the states are free to draw upon EPA's recommended water quality criteria, but are equally free to use other criteria for which
they have sound scientific support.'

43

If the EPA concludes that the

state's water quality standards are inconsistent with the CWA, it must
notify the state within ninety days specifying the necessary changes in
order to bring the proposed standards into compliance.' 44 If the state
fails to adopt the recommended changes, EPA will propose a federal
water quality standard under 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (4) (A). 45
While the court stated that the City raised "realistic technical concerns" to support its argument that the tribe's water quality standards
were unattainable, it found that "[t]he EPA reviews proposed water
quality standards only to determine if they are stringent enough to
protect the proposed water quality standards," and that the agency
"does not believe it is authorized to reject proposed standards because
they are more stringent than background levels.'

46

The court further

upheld a finding that "EPA lacks the authority to reject stringent standards on the grounds of harsh economic or social effects.' '

47

The re-

cord reflected that the EPA had suggested to the tribe that they consider a relaxation of the standards during low flow periods.' 48 The tribe
responded that its people use the river more intensively for ceremonial
purposes during low flows, and that those ceremonies involve con140.

Id. at 739-42.

141.
142.
143.

City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996).
City of Albuquerque, 865 F. Supp. at 738 (citing 33 U.S.C. §1314(a)).
Id. at 738 (citing 48 Fed.Reg. 51,400, 51,411 (1983)).

144.

Id. at 739.

145. Id.
146. Id. at 741.
147. Id. (citing Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1283 (D. S.D.
1979)).
148. Id.
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sumption of the water necessitating stringent standards, and as a result
"it would
be particularly inappropriate to relax standards at those
1 49
times.',

In upholding the EPA's decision, the court noted that the City
raised "some very troubling issues" because the EPA appears inconsistent in its position regarding water quality standards of downstream
states. The court stated that:
EPA will impose this stringent limit on the City despite the fact that
arsenic occurs naturally in Albuquerque's ground water at relatively
high levels and is not discharged to the water by industrial polluters.
If pure water is discharged at the City's outfall, it is possible that the
arsenic levels in water flowing through the Pueblo will remain relatively high.' 5
This is the very issue raised by scientists in Hawaii to support their position that use of enterococci as an indicator bacteria is inappropriate
for tropical environments because enterococci is naturally occurring in
the soils just like arsenic occurs naturally in Albuquerque's ground
water.' 5' As a result, enterococci as an indicator bacteria for tropical
environments does not accurately measure the health threat posed by
sewage present in water, just as the stringent arsenic standard may be
unattainable and not accurately reflect arsenic discharge into the river
by the City. The District Court in City of Albuquerque v. Browner recog-

nized this quandary regarding the application of rigid standards, but
did nothing to reconcile the issue, nor did it instruct EPA to do so.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did not discuss his issue on appeal.
The EPA's role in formulating water quality standards is purportedly limited-the states are primarily responsible for establishing
water quality standards under section 303 of the CWA. When states
enact water quality standards, they must also submit them to EPA's Regional Administrator to determine whether the new standard is consistent with the CWA.' 52

This understanding is reflective of the Tenth

Circuit Court of Appeals' 1996 determination that "EPA's sole function, in this respect, is to review those standards for approval," as
"Congress clearly intended the EPA to have a limited, non-rulemaking
role in the establishment of water quality standards by states...." 153 In
1976, the Fourth Circuit cited this appreciation for the need of malleability in the regulatory process when it explained, in Appalachian
Power, that variances are appropriate particularly for "regulations hay-

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id. at 742.
See Fuijoka, supra note 22.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2000).
City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 425 (10th Cir. 1996).
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ing presumptive applicability throughout the nation.' 54 The Appalachian Power court reasoned that when the EPA seeks to implement a
policy of strict application of its regulations, it should consider nonwater quality environmental impacts such as technological difficulties
and economics.' 55 However, the Fifth Circuit in 1980 ignored the wisdom of the Appalacian Power decision-that diversity in regulatory programs is necessary and appropriate-rather, the Fifth Circuit stated
that water quality criteria set for a specific use are "more amendable to
uniformity."5 6 In so concluding, it upheld EPA's authority to promulgate a federal water quality standard in place of a standard promulgated by the state when the Administrator finds the state standard inconsistent with the CWA and the state's justification for the standard
unpersuasive.' Ironically, the court ordered the decision after detailing the legislative history of the CWA. The court noted that Congress
gave the states primary authority to set water quality standards because
Congress was "[c]oncerned that federal promulgation...'would place
in the hands of a single Federal official the power to.. .control the use
of... land within watershed areas'....',15

The Fifth Circuit ignored their

own recitation of the CWA's history, pointing to the fact that the Conference Committee, in adopting amendments providing for the
NPDES permit program, deleted reference to state authority in the
water quality standard adoption scheme.'5 9 In 1993, the New Mexico
District Court noted that "[s] tates are free to draw upon EPA's recommended water quality criteria, but are equally free to use other criteria
for which they have sound scientific support."' ° In upholding the
EPA's approval of an Indian tribe's very stringent standard against
challenges by the City of Albuquerque, the court acknowledged a dilemma in the application of rigid standards that raised "technical concerns" of attainability, but neither acted to reconcile the issue nor instructed the EPA to do so.' Without reconciling issues of attainability,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that "EPA's sole function,
in this respect, is to review those standards for approval," as "Congress
clearly intended the EPA to have a limited, non-rulemaking role in the
establishment of water quality standards by states."

62

This position ap-

pears to conflict with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' interpretation
of the CWA, but supports the Fourth Circuit's interpretation that the
role of establishing water quality standards is a function of the state. As
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1358-59 (4th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1359.
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a result, a state seeking to promulgate a water quality standard that the
EPA resists may succeed under the Fourth and Tenth Circuits' reading
of the EPA's authority under the CWA, given the legislative intent for
states to have authority in water quality standard adoption.
IV. CONCLUSION
Water quality standards set the basis of nearly all CWA programs.
These programs include active public involvement in their execution
and implementation, with water quality standards serving as the core
basis of these programs. These standards determine what constitutes a
pollution problem and what constitutes a health impact. Although the
EPA may desire to be the sole determiner of this critical element, it is
not.
There are many opportunities to challenge EPA's authority. The
use of the public comment period is an effective tool to challenge the
EPA during the rulemaking process, but may not lead to the actual
change or result sought because the Agency is only legally obligated to
hear the public's comment on its regulations and acknowledge receipt
of these comments. It is not obligated to implement any of the public's suggestions, regardless of how scientifically sound or reasonable
they may be. As a result, using public comment and participation to
challenge the Agency's selection of water quality standards and influence change looks bleak and very prone to the political ebb and flow
of the Administration. Nonetheless, it is important for stakeholders to
use this opportunity to begin a dialogue with the Agency for the following reasons: (1) it is the cheapest, most direct means to challenge EPA
and, if successful, the easiest way to facilitate change; (2) even if comments are met with resistance and ignored by the Agency, the stakeholder has established a record that it can use in court to challenge the
Agency. Litigation is costly, time consuming, and the least amicable
means to facilitate change, but it is an option. If a court hears the case,
it will look over the rulemaking process and likely pay special attention
to the dialogue of the parties during the comment and response to
comment periods.
The Constitution is another tool with which to challenge the
Agency's authority to establish nationwide standards by referring to the
role of federalism and states as social laboratories. While it is clear by
the language of the CWA that Congress intended to preempt states'
exercise of police power over water quality in an effort to protect the
nation's waters, it is also clear that by requiring federal permits for development, the CWA usurps local land use development discretion.
Congress enacted the water quality standards portion of the CWA
largely to protect public health and the environment, not to regulate
economic activity:
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It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the
primary responsibilities and rights of states to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in the exercise of his
authority under this chapter. 163
However, under the CWA the federal government regulates "waters
of the United States" in an effort to protect the navigability of and interstate commerce on the nation's waters.'
Under the Lopez categories of interstate commerce, ' regulation of water quality affects the
channels of interstate commerce and substantially affects interstate
commerce by ensuring the nation's waters are fishable and swimmable.
Both fishing and swimming can be characterized as economic in nature and impacting interstate commerce-from the basic sale of fish
for consumption to tourism related to recreational activities. Additionally pollution, by its nature, often flows interstate and as a result
"tt] he general problem of environmental harm is often not susceptible
of a local solution. "'66
Furthermore, when the federal water quality standards are evaluated under the Chevron doctrine of administrative deference, the provisions again are well within the Constitution limits. It is clear by the
language of the CWA that Congress intended to preempt the state's
exercise of police power over water quality in an effort to protect the
nation's waters.
Several Supreme Court decisions upholding environmental laws
against Commerce Clause challengers support the conclusion that the
CWA is immune from these types of challenges. 67 In these opinions,
the Court provided necessary "guidance regarding the nature and extent of Congress's power to regulate pollution that has interstate effects. ' "' 8 The Court specifically stated in Hodel that "the power conferred [on Congress] by the Commerce Clause [is] broad enough to
permit congressional regulation of activities causing air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects in more
than one State." 69 Since water pollution creates environmental and
health threats that are not confined to the discharging state, these discharges may interfere with the channels of commerce. In light of the

163. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000).
164. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (6).
165. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554-59 (1995).
166. Johnson, supra note 61, at 44 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S.
1,20 (1989)).
167. See New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
168. Johnson, supra note 61, at 60.
169. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 282.
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stare decisis precedential effect of Hodel and the Philadelphia line of
cases, Lopez may have little effect on the constitutionality of the federal
water quality standards established under the CWA. As a result, using
the Commerce Clause to challenge the constitutionality of section 303
of the CWA is not likely to succeed.
The application of stare decisis is probably the most efficient yet uncertain way to challenge the Agency in its effort to apply nationwide
water quality standards. The body of case law has not addressed the
larger constitutional issues and arguments. Instead, it has directly challenged specific EPA decisions regarding the approval or disapproval of
a water quality standard or variance. This appears to indicate that
"EPA's sole function, in this respect, is to review those standards [proposed by the states] for approval," as "Congress clearly intended the
EPA to have a limited, non-rulemaking role in the establishment of
water quality standards by states.... ,,"170While the Fifth Circuit Court of

Appeals does not appear to support this interpretation of the CWA, the
Fourth and Tenth Circuits have held that the role of establishing water
quality standards is a function of the state. As a result, a state seeking
to promulgate a water quality criterion or standard that is met with
resistance by EPA may succeed under the Fourth and Tenth Circuits'
reading of EPA's authority under the CWA given the legislative intent
for states to be given authority in adoption of water quality standards.
Such states can supplement their legal position with a persuasive policy
argument supporting states as social laboratories. Inherent in the
goals of the CWA is the protection of biodiversity and the general
health of the nation's waters. At times, the CWA recognizes the
uniqueness and diversity of the nation's ecosystems and waterways,
such as in the implementation of its TMDL program. This program
recognizes that no two water bodies have the same flow rates, biota, or
uses. However, the goal of uniform water quality criteria and standards
for the nation's waters unfortunately overlooks these varying ecological
factors.

170.

City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 425 (10th Cir. 1996).
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Abstract: Water rights tide insurance is becoming a hot topic in
Colorado water rights transactions. However, the jury is still out as to
whether it will gain traction as a useful tool in conveying water rights.
This article provides an update to an article previously published in the
University of Denver Water Law Review. See Amy W. Beatie & Arthur
R. Kleven, The Devil in the Details: Water Rights and Tire Insurance, 7
U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 381 (2004).
I. INTRODUCTION
Establishing a chain of tide for water rights is a significant part of a
water rights due diligence analysis.' The process typically involves reviewing recorded documents in the Clerk and Recorder's Office of the
county in which the water rights are located. Every time I have had to
conduct a water rights title analysis, however, I think to myself that
there has to be a more civilized way to establish and review the chain.
This feeling was particularly acute after spending two days in the Jackson County Clerk and Recorder's Office in Walden, Colorado, on an
ancient, rickety, wooden step-ladder, poring over volume after volume
of dusty old Grantor/Grantee indices that made me sneeze. I mean
really sneeze.
Around the time I was wading through the title documents in Walden, rumors had been circulating that the title insurance industry was
considering providing water rights title insurance. I dismissed the idea

t

Associate Attorney, White &Jankowski, LLP

1. See Amy W. Beatie & Arthur R. Kleven, The Devil in the Details: Water
Rights and Title Insurance, 7 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 381, 383 (2004) (provid-

ing information about what is involved in a water rights due diligence analysis).
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out of hand, assuming there were too many problems with the process,
only some of which were:
*

The tremendous initial effort to compile information into a
water rights title plant or a similar document bank could not
be easily balanced by appropriate premiums that people
would be willing to pay;

*

Title insurance for land depends largely on repeat business
(e.g., providing title insurance for well-churned subdivisions),
and the conveyance of a water right is never so formulaic or
frequent. Water rights are seldom sold, and they are almost
never immediately resold. Thus, it would be difficult to create a market for the product;

*

A water right chain of title is rarely if ever clean because,
among other reasons, it is extremely difficult to determine
the original appropriator from which the chain commences
as there is generally no recorded document similar to the
patent for land title. A water right is created by appropriation, the conjunction of intent and action by one or more individuals. This is usually an unrecorded and undocumented
act. As a result, the industry would always be insuring over
clouded titles; and

*

Water rights title insurance could only cover "naked legal title," which is of little value in the context of water rights, especially in the change context. After all, a water right is a
usufruct, and its value is related solely to its reliability as such.
Thus, in addition to obtaining insurance for just the legal title, a water right purchaser would still need a lawyer and engineer to review the historical use of the water right and
other associated issues (including, perhaps, reviewing the title
documents themselves, which procurement of title insurance
alone would not provide).

Given those problems and others, I didn't believe the insurance
would provide much value. But, still curious, I began researching.
Could water rights tile insurance obviate at least the rickety ladders,
the hours poring over blinding microfiche, the sneezing, and the cold,
dark vaults in the basements of county buildings? Would the industry
be able to create reasonable exceptions to a water right tile insurance
policy without rendering the insurance meaningless with those exceptions?
While researching, I contacted a company that was marketing the
insurance to see if it would provide a sample policy to review; I was unable to obtain one. Without that benefit, I could only guess what the
industry might include as exceptions, how it would conduct the chain
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of tide research, and what the cost of the insurance would be. The
result of the research was this: in addition to confirming the problems
identified above, the research indicated that the industry would have to
confront other factors before water right title insurance would become
as commonplace (and useful) as real estate tide insurance.2

II. THE POLICY
Then it happened. I was involved in a real estate transaction for
the seller of property in Pitkin County with water rights for sale as part
of the transaction. Lo and behold, the buyer requested title insurance
for the water rights. At last, my opportunity to see a policy! Once the
title commitment arrived, I went straight to the exceptions and there it
was, the anticipated exception, eleven subsections long:
Loss or damages arising from (a) a future action to adjudicate water
rights as provided for in Colorado Revised Statutes §§ 37-92-101, et
seq., as amended; (b) use of waters (including historical use, actual
use, type of use, location of use or diversion, or partial or total forfeiture due to non-use since the Division [] Engineer Abandonment list
dated

); (c) terms and conditions of the decree; (d)

adverse or prescriptive use or claims against the waters; (e) any reservations of rights by the United States of America, and rights created
by federal claims, and any prior rights held by another state, territory,
sovereign tribe, nation or country obtained by appropriation, treaty,
compact, legislation or otherwise; (f) local, state or federal laws or
regulations; (g) future administrative action by the State Engineer/Division of Water [Resources]; (h) lack of right of access to or
transport from the point of diversion and/or well bores and drilling
of wells; (i) any consequence of the insured not having right, title, or
interest in the historic place of use or the place of use as set out on
the decree; (j) lack of priority of the water right and/or that the water
right will be in priority to be diverted at all times; and (k) lack of
physical availability or existence of water.

2. See id. at 402-06 (detailing the conclusions from the research).
3. This article focuses only on the standard water-related exceptions; obviously, each transaction will have its own specific exceptions which may or
may not be objectionable. Although unrelated to this article, it is important to
note that the commitment contained a perplexing exception. It read:
"Terms, conditions, provisions, and obligations contained in the conveyance
document dated
Reception No.

and recorded on
at
in
County." The title company explained this to mean that it was excepting from coverage the very

document that would convey the water right to the buyer. A mighty mission,
albeit successful, ensued to have that exception removed.
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IU. THE EXCEPTIONS
At first, I thought the eleven sub-exceptions collectively were big
enough to drive a truck through, and so broad they did indeed swallow
the effectiveness of the insurance. However, upon more extensive conThe lettered subsideration, they began to seem reasonable.
exceptions fell into one of three categories: (1) excepting water use
issues, not tile-related issues; (2) excepting water rights administration
issues, not tide issues; or (3) excepting tide issues common to all title
insurance.
Exception (a), excepting from coverage "a future action to adjudicate water rights," simply recognizes there is no feasible way an insurer
of water rights could cover the effect of future water litigation. The
exception does not except from coverage a quiet title action, a cause of
action that would not be governed by Colorado water statutes, and the
jurisdiction of which would be in the district court, not water court. A
quiet title proceeding would be the exact kind of proceeding for which
the title insurance would prove invaluable. As a result, sub-exception
(a) is reasonable.
Exception (b), excepting from coverage "use of waters" is also reasonable. The parenthetical explanation of "use of waters" contained in
Exception (b) relates to information to be obtained, not in a title
analysis, but by the purchaser's engineers. A title company should not
and could not entertain those technical analyses. This exception relates to how the right is used, not who owns it.
Exception (c) excepts "terms and conditions of the decree."
Again, this exception relates to use, not ownership. It is analogous to a
tide company's exclusion of zoning and covenants from a land policy.
The exception serves as a reminder that an attorney conducting a potential purchaser's water rights due diligence analysis must carefully
review terms and conditions in decrees relating to the water right at
issue in the transaction and clearly communicate their effects to the
potential purchaser.
Exception (d), which excludes from coverage "adverse or prescriptive use or claims against the waters," simply provides that the insurer
cannot insure against actions that cannot be discovered by recorded
documents, or even a physical inspection, at the time of the conveyance. This exception is common to land policies, and is perfectly reasonable as applied to water rights. Recognizing that adverse possession
of land is a tricky area of conveyancing, I believe it is even trickier in
the water rights context.
Exception (e) excepts from coverage claims whose effects would
manifest within the priority system. As a result, it is unrelated to tide.
By excluding the kinds of claims excluded in Exception (e), it is again
clear that the policy covers title alone. Because tidtle insurance only
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insures "naked legal title" and not yield, excepting from coverage the
Exception (e) types of claims is reasonable.
Exception (f), the exclusion from coverage of "local, state or federal laws or regulations," is vague, but is likely intended to except from
coverage the effect of laws or regulations that are analogous to zoning,
and any other laws or regulations that affect the use of the water right,
not its title. In doing so, it also appears reasonable.
By excluding from coverage "future administrative action," Exception (g), similar to Exceptions (b) and (c), addresses use, not title.
Injury from future administrative action would be speculative to insure
at best, unless it relates to the policy holder's tide to the water right.
Again, the exception is reasonable.
Exception (h) excludes from coverage injury from "lack of right of
access to or transport from the point of diversion and/or well bores
and drilling of wells." Access is not a title issue. However, it is likely
the insurer could include access as part of the policy, if so desired. I
am sure it would add to the premium.
Exception (i), which excludes "any consequence of the insured not
having right, tide, or interest in the historic place of use or the place of
use as set out on the decree," is also related to water use, specifically
the place of use. Whether the water has been used at its decreed place
of use, and whether the purchaser of the water right has title to or an
interest in that property is a matter for the attorney and the engineer
to determine, not the title company.
Exceptions (j) and (k), "lack of priority of the water right and/or
that the water right will be in priority to be diverted at all times" and
"lack of physical availability or existence of water" are administrative
and use issues. Again, they are unrelated to title and as such are reasonable exclusions.
Really, then, each sub-exception is reasonable. Notwithstanding, I
could not help but be disappointed. The disappointment stemmed
from the realization that the insurance indeed only insured "naked
legal title." Remembering that researching chain of title is only one
aspect of a water right due diligence analysis, it is clear that the insurer
was careful to limit its coverage to that aspect. I remain unsure of what
else I expected the insurance to accomplish, but believe the disappointment stemmed from a desire-perhaps unreasonable-that water
rights title insurance would contribute something more to the due
diligence process.
And, in addition to my disappointment, unreasonable or not, I had
many lingering questions. Would the industry insure over irregularities, nearly universal in a water rights chain of title? What about circumstances in the chain of tide in which the water rights passed as an
appurtenance to property? Would the industry be able to divine the
intent of the grantor under those circumstances? How would the in-
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dustry conduct its research? Given the unique nature of water rights,
what would trigger the insurer's duty to defend?
The most important lingering question to me, however, is this: if
the exceptions except all aspects of use from coverage, what does the
insurance insure in practical effect? After all, a Colorado water right is
defined as "a right to use in accordance with its priority a certain portion of the waters of the state by reason of the appropriation of the
same." 4 Take, for example, the following scenario. Seller conveys to
Buyer 1 cubic foot per second ("cfs") in a particular ditch, and the
Buyer obtains a title policy for the 1 cfs. The conveyance is recorded.
Three days later, the Seller conveys the historic consumptive use (e.g.
irrigated acreage) associated with the same 1 cfsjust sold to the Buyer
to someone else. Because the title policy does not cover issues associated with use, only naked legal tide, would the policy protect the
Buyer?
IV. THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX
With the lingering, unanswered questions, I remained uncertain
about whether water rights title insurance provided value to the due
diligence process. Would I suggest it to a client, or agree to use it if a
client requested it? I needed answers; the need got me thinking. The
exceptions seem to be clearly derived from lessons the insurance industry has learned in dealing with land. However, as explained in the
example above, the principles that apply to water and land transactions
are not fungible. What if the industry approached water rights from
"outside the box"? In other words, what if it created a product that was
as different from land title insurance as a water right conveyance is
from land conveyance? What if that product were not tide insurance at
all? What if the role the industry served was document collection, similar to creation of an abstract of title, allowing instead for the attorneys
to draw the conclusions about the viability of the chain of title. The
attorney would no longer have to conduct the from-scratch research
that water rights title assessment requires-the travel to county recording offices, the up and down the step ladders, the pouring over
the dusty Grantor/Grantee indices, the endless hours of whizzing microfiche-but would still be able to obtain all the necessary documentation.
V. CANVASSING
Uncertain about the abstract of title idea, and about my conclusions about the usefulness of water rights title insurance, I engaged in a
"process," a decision-making-by-committee if you will. The process
4.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(12) (2006) (emphasis added).
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involved canvassing water attorneys well-seasoned in conducting water
transactions to obtain their opinions on water rights title insurance.
When asked about the insurance, each attorney agreed that the insurance was useful only to insure naked legal title, and conceded that determining marketability of title is only one aspect of the water rights
due diligence process. Each also agreed that the circumstances would
be unusual in which the due diligence analysis did not necessitate consulting title documents for purposes unrelated to title and that by obtaining a title insurance policy, the attorney would not have immediate
access to those documents. Each of the attorneys also agreed that obtaining a collection of documents similar to an abstract of title would
be valuable, if obtaining the product would not cost any more than
having someone in-house conduct the document collection, and if they
could trust someone outside their own offices to obtain all of the relevant documents.
Notwithstanding these concessions, several of the attorneys I consulted had used title insurance in water transactions. Themes emerged
from their decisions to do so. In each case, cost was the primary motivator. The title company had offered a policy ranging from somewhat
to significantly less expensive than their estimate for the cost of a stand
up Grantor/Grantee search. Convenience was another motivator.
And still another was the nature of entities involved in the transaction;
an east coast lender, for example, may be so accustomed to land title
insurance policies that the purchase of real property, no matter what
kind, without title insurance, might seem ludicrous. Indeed, that was
the case with one of the transactions discussed. To be sure, there are
still questions; time will answer them. Even so, water attorneys are beginning to give the tide insurance a try. The result of the canvassing:
the jury is still out.
VI. CONCLUSION
I still find the stand up Grantor/Grantee searches for piecing together a water right chain of title a bit uncivilized and I learned in my
research that others do, too. An attorney friend of mine spent two days
in an unheated vault in the basement of a county building during the
winter wearing a hat, coat, and gloves while viewing microfiche under a
single bare light bulb. My experiences, although less medieval, are
always unique. And while I hope the rickety step-ladders and dusty
Grantor/Grantee indices are things of my past, my research and canvassing indicate that water rights title insurance may not be the panacea I had originally hoped it would be. So as of now it looks as though,
under most circumstances, I am heading back to the ladders and the
sneezing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Upon first glance, adverse possession of water rights in a system of
prior appropriation seems somewhat counterintuitive. If one can simply usurp the "first in time, first in right" system, then a water right
would become valueless.' Colorado grappled with this confusion as
early as the turn of the last century, and the notion of adverse possession of water evolved with the doctrine of prior appropriation.2 The
Colorado Supreme Court provided clarification in Meadow Ditch and
IrrigationCompany v. ParkDitch and Reservoir Company.3 A rival claimant
can, in fact, establish adverse possession of water diverted from the
stream as long as the adverse possessor satisfies the statutory provisions.4 Such adverse possession is possible because it is hostile to the
priority owner; not to the stream, junior appropriators, or the public.5

1. The general theory behind the doctrine of prior appropriation is that the first
one to place water to beneficial use has the first priority; in other words, first in time,
first in right. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
2. Lower Latham Ditch Company v. The Louden Irrigating Canal Company, 27
Colo. 267, 273-74 (1900).
3. Meadow Ditch and Irrigation Co. v. Park Ditch and Reservoir Co., 130 Colo.
537, 539 (1954).
4. Id. See also In re Water Rights of V-Heart Ranch, Inc., 690 P.2d 1271 (Colo.
1984) (affirming the adverse possession of water rights).
5. Meadow Ditch v. Park Ditch, 130 Colo. at 540.
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Adverse possession of water involves many areas of law, obviously
including property law and statutory limitation of actions. Nonetheless, the Colorado Court of Appeals determined in May 2006 that only
the water court has competent jurisdiction to entertain claims of adverse possession of water.6 According to statute, water courts have exclusive jurisdiction over "water matters."7 To many, this decision came
as a surprise. It merely demonstrates, however, that the concept of
adverse possession of water rights is still evolving and requires further
clarification from the Colorado Supreme Court to reconcile adverse
possession and the doctrine of prior appropriation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE PARTIES

Ralph Archuleta and Ted Gomez are both record owners of portions of three irrigation ditches in south central Colorado. These
ditches, the Manzanares Ditch No. 1, priority 26, the Archuleta Ditch,
priority 30, and the Manzanares Ditch No. 2, priority 31, all draw water
from the Huerfano River, which begins near Blanca Peak in the Sangre
de Cristo Mountains and eventually flows into the Arkansas River
downstream of Pueblo. Both parties have rights to the river dating
back to the 1960s. Archuleta's father, Lupe Archuleta, deeded the interests to Ralph in 1991 by a personal representative's deed. Lupe
Archuleta acquired the rights in 1967. Gomez obtained his rights in
1968.
B. THE FACTS
Beginning in 1968, Ted Gomez acquired water rights to portions of
the three ditches at issue. Since such time, Gomez used the water for
irrigation purposes, maintained the headgates, and contributed funds
for cleaning and repairs to the ditches. The evidence sustained at the
trial court indicates that neither Archuleta, nor his predecessors, used
their water rights from 1968 until 2003 or 2004. Archuleta argued that
he gave his uncle, Felipe Archuleta, who lives in the vicinity, permission to use his water rights, thereby maintaining his ownership right.
Felipe Archuleta testified, however, that he only began using the water
around 1999. Nonetheless, Archuleta argued that Gomez was interfering with his rights. Furthermore, Archuleta asserted that Gomez's interference caused damage to his personal property, including firewood, 40-year-old siding, and tools.

6.
7.

Archuleta v. Gomez, 140 P.3d 281 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
C.R.S. 37-92-203(1).
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C. THE PROCEDURE
On July 27, 2004, the dispute between Archuleta and Gomez came
before the district court for Huerfano County in Walsenburg, Colorado. At the trial level, the court found that the statute of limitations
barred all of Archuleta's claims. Through "actual, adverse, hostile,
open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous use of the water for the
prescribed statutory period," Gomez established ownership rights
through adverse possession.8 Furthermore, the trial court found that
Archuleta failed to demonstrate any damages resulting from Gomez's
alleged interference sufficient to sustain his burden of proof. The
court found any damage that occurred to Archuleta's personal property was de minimis. Archuleta then appealed the district court's decision to the Colorado Court of Appeals.
HI. ARCHULETA V. GOMEZ
A. QUESTIONS RAISED
The principal question raised sua sponte by the Colorado Court of
Appeals concerned the trial court's jurisdiction to hear this matter.
According to the Court of Appeals, the water court has exclusive jurisdiction over "water matters" and has authority to quantify "an existing
beneficial use of water," establish a priority date for the water right,
and confirm "pre-existing beneficial uses."9 "Actions to determine the
legal right to use water are water maters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the water courts," whereas actions to determine the ownership of
a water right are matters for the district court. ° Actions to determine
ownership include, for example, "interpretation of deeds, chains of
title, quiet title proceedings, real estate transfers, dissolution proceedings, and foreclosures."" The Court of Appeals applied these principles to the facts of the case to answer the jurisdictional question.
B. THE COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING

The court of appeals ultimately determined that adverse possession
primarily concerned the legal right to use water, not the ownership of
a water right. 2 Because an adverse possession case necessarily involves
"both the enforcement of a water right and an assertion that the right
to use the water should be terminated and awarded to another based
8.

Archuleta v. Gomez, No. 2003 CV 2 (Dist. Ct. Huerfano County, Colo. Sept.

15, 2004).
9. Archuleta v. Gomez, 140 P.3d at 284. See Humphrey v. Sw. Dev. Co., 734 P.2d
637 (Colo. 1987).
10. Archuleta v. Gomez, 140 P.3d at 284.
11. Id. at 285.
12. Id. at 286.
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on beneficial use of the water," the water court is the only appropriate
court to hear such a case. 3 The court found that only the water court
can provide an adequate consideration of water law principles and a
sufficient comparison with property law principles. Consequently, the
district court lacked jurisdiction and the court of appeals vacated the
decision regarding adverse possession.
The court of appeals affirmed, however, the district court's decision with regards to the damages to Archuleta's personal property.
Finding that these damage claims were not ancillary issues directly affecting the water rights, the district court did have proper jurisdiction. 4 The court had no reason to find the trial court's findings clearly
erroneous.
IV. CBA WATER LAW SECTION SEPTEMBER LUNCHEON
The Water Law Section of the Colorado Bar Association ("CBA")
hosts a monthly luncheon that addresses current issues in the practice
of water law. For the month of September, Moye White LLP, hosted
the luncheon, which addressed Archuleta v. Gomez. Henry "Hank"
Worley, the attorney for Gomez, presented his perspective on the
court's decision and its implications to a relatively large audience of
approximately thirty CBA members. Worley, a graduate from Colorado College and the University of Colorado School of Law, is a shareholder in the law firm of MacDougall, Woldridge, and Worley, P.C. in
Colorado Springs. Worley presented for thirty minutes and then
opened up the floor for questions from both the audience present and
those listening from one of the Colorado Bar Association's nine regional locations across the state.
In a light-hearted effort to explain the "unfortunate" outcome in
Archuleta v. Gomez, Worley started his presentation by proposing that
the location of his practice and the "remote" locale of his cases must be
disconnecting him from the mainstream water law practice and procedure. When the audience failed to respond with laughter, he concluded that the silence was implicit evidence that his proposal was, in
fact, correct.
Turning to the case, Worley laid out the facts as he saw them. Gomez had come to his office, seeking representation in an action filed
by Archuleta to enjoin Gomez from interfering with his water rights in
ditches stemming from the Huerfano River. Worley filed an answer on
behalf of Gomez, alleging limitation of actions as an affirmative defense. Worley explained that limitation of actions, by its nature, implicitly includes an adverse possession claim. The District Court for
Huerfano County agreed, finding Archuleta's claim barred by the fact
13.
14.

Id. at 287.
Id. at 285.
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that Gomez had adversely possessed the water rights in question. On
appeal, much to Worley's dismay, the Court of Appeals vacated the
district court's decision on jurisdictional grounds that adverse possession of water rights is a matter for the water court, not the district
court. Neither Worley nor the opposing attorney raised this issue.
Worley proceeded to discuss his difficulties with this decision. First
of all, he contested the court of appeals' determination that adverse
possession constitutes a "water matter" pursuant to C.R.S. § 37-92301(1). He cited C.R.S. § 37-92-101 and 37-92-301(2) as enumerating
what constitutes water matters, and argued that the court's interpretation did not align with these statutory provisions. Secondly, Worley
argued that this decision, which establishes that the water court is the
only court with jurisdiction to determine title in an adverse possession
case, contradicts the 1959 Colorado Supreme Court decision which
declared that water court decrees of water rights do not establish title. 15
Worley also discussed his confusion over the language used in the
opinion. He found the terms "grant" and "termination" to be inappropriate, or at least perplexing descriptions of the process of adverse
possession. Lastly, Worley questioned why the court went into a discussion on abandonment and forfeiture of water rights, as neither attorney raised those issues.
During the question and answer period, members of the audience
raised several interesting points. In particular, one attorney asked
whether the limitation of actions affirmative defense used by Worley is
sufficient for future cases, or whether a counter-claim for adverse possession is necessary. After consultation via conference call with the
opposing attorney from the case, Worley explained that since the court
of appeals did not reach this issue, it is still unclear. Worley concluded
by suggesting that any attorneys who lost previous cases in district
courts regarding adverse possession of water should seek "another bite
at the apple," because the decisions necessarily are invalid since the
district court apparently lacked jurisdiction. On a final note, Worley
advised the attorneys to file adverse possession of water rights cases in
water court in the meantime.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Many questions remain regarding the adverse possession of water
rights in a system of prior appropriation. First and foremost, is the
water court the proper venue for adverse possession disputes? Even
though the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over "water
cases involving priorities or adjudications," it decided the appropriate
venue for the adverse possession of water rights. 16 For purposes of de15.
16.

See Saunders v. Spina, 140 Colo. 317, 324 (Colo. 1959).
Archuleta v. Gomez, 140 P.3d at 284.

140
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termining what "water matters" includes, clarification as to the distinction between the classifications of the "legal right to use water" and the
"ownership of water" is necessary. Hopefully the Colorado Supreme
Court will provide guidance.
MariaE. Hohn

CONFERENCE REPORTS
THIRD ANNUAL
WATER LAW CONFERENCE
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
Steamboat Springs, Colorado

June 30 -July 1, 2006

INTRODUCTION
The Third Annual Colorado Bar Association ("CBA") Water Law
Conference took place at the Sheraton Steamboat Resort and Conference Center. For the third consecutive year, the CBA held the Water
Law Conference concurrently with the CBA's Agricultural and Rural
Law Roundup and Environmental Law conference, offering attendees
the opportunity to cross disciplines and attend sessions hosted by all
three CBA sections. The chairs of each section were pleased with this
interdisciplinary approach, and plan to continue to grow this largerscale conference in the future.
DAY ONE: FRIDAYJUNE 30, 2006
After a welcome from each of the respective CBA section chairs,
four panelists convened a general session and presented a multidisciplinary case study entitled A Ditch Runs Through It. Agricultural
section attorney Allen Sparkman presented a hypothetical fact pattern
which revolved around the choice of entity, real property, water law,
environmental and mineral rights issues surrounding the sale of rural
property held by a LLC. First, Mr. Sparkman addressed the management and decision-making considerations practitioners should be
mindful of when advising an LLC client. Second, David Halford addressed the representations and warranties, change of water rights, and
groundwater aspects of transferring water rights appurtenant to rural
property. Third, Deborah Freeman discussed endangered species,
wetlands, and "produced water" issues prevalent on rural property.
Finally, Jim King addressed mineral and oil and gas rights concerns.
Following the general session, former Colorado Supreme Court
Justice Rebecca Love Kourlis delivered the keynote address, entitled
Problems in the Legal System and Possible Solutions. Justice Kourlis
highlighted her efforts to enact long-needed reforms to the American
judicial system as Executive Director of the Institute for the Advancement of the Legal System at the University of Denver.
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The CBA Water Law Section's first breakout session, entided HB
1177 One Year Later - The Colorado River Basin Roundtable, featured
three members of the newly constituted Colorado River Basin Roundtable: David Merritt, Chief Engineer of the Colorado River Water Conservation District; Lurline Underbrink Curran, County Manager of
Grand County, Colorado; and Gregory Trainor, Director of Utilities for
the City of Grand Junction, Colorado. The panelists highlighted the
roundtable's river basin focused attempt to enable the myriad of
smaller tributary basins and smaller municipalities within the Colorado
River system to inject their priorities and concerns into Colorado's water supply policy regime, which has long been dominated by Denver
and other Front Range cities. Ms. Underbrink Curran very eloquently
elaborated the roundtable system's tendency to highlight intra-basin
conflicts and sensitivities, and to offer traditionally underdog local
governments an opportunity to reclaim some decision-making and
policy-setting authority in Colorado's water supply infrastructure.
The second Water Section session featured a discussion of NonPoint Source Water Pollution, presented by EPA Region 8 Water Protection Specialist Marcella Hutchinson. Ms. Hutchinson focused on
how Clean Water Act Section 319 addresses non-point source ("NPS")
water pollution, as well as the relationship between the Clean Water
Act's total maximum daily load ("TMDL") requirements and their implementation ties to EPA's NPS program.
Finally, the conference's first day concluded with the CBA Water
Section's annual Awards Banquet. Colorado Supreme Court Justice
GregoryJ. Hobbs presided over the dinner, which included the induction of several long-standing Colorado water law figures into the honorary "Order of the Water Buffaloes."
DAY TWO: SATURDAYJULY 1,2006
On its second day, the Water Law Conference concluded with a
session entitled Nuts and Bolts of How a Water Call is Administered,
presented by Ken Knox of the Colorado Division of Water Resources
and Dick Stenzel of the Applegate Group, Inc. Mr. Knox and Mr.
Stenzel delivered a thorough overview of the daily administration of
both surface and groundwater rights in Colorado. They presented
general background on the nature of Colorado water law and of the
structure of Colorado's water courts and the State Engineer's department, as well as the communications, documentation, reporting and
physical infrastructure components that combine to enable water users
to assert and benefit from water calls on a daily basis. This session concluded the third annual CBA Water Law Conference.
ChristopherJensen
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WATER QUALITY
IN COLORADO WATER RIGHTS CASES
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
WATER SECTION
Denver, Colorado

October 13, 2006

INTRODUCTION
William A. Paddock, Esq. of Carlson Hammond & Paddock LLC of
Denver, Colorado, gave the opening speech for the one-day CLE conference on water quality issues in Colorado water rights cases on October 13, 2006. Mr. Paddock introduced the speakers for each section
and moderated the panel discussions.
SECTION 1: OVERVIEW OF WATER QuALIrY REGULATION

Mr. Jerry Raisch, an attorney with Vranesh & Raisch LLP, commenced the conference with an overview of water quality law and regulation. He provided a thorough discussion of the classifications and
water quality standards under both the Federal Clean Water Act and
the Colorado Water Quality Control Act.
Mr. Raisch emphasized the methodologies that create the framework for classifications and standards for segmentation in each individual Colorado River basin. He outlined the adopted protective use
classifications of recreation, agriculture, domestic water supply, and
aquatic life and the standards (narrative and numeric). Mr. Raisch
highlighted the three designations of antidegradation in Colorado: (1)
outstanding waters, (2) use protected, and (3) reviewable. He also
discussed the total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs") under the Clean
Water Act, which require states to identify priority rankings for all waters not meeting water quality standards, the "303(d) List." Once a
state lists a river segment, a TMDL must be developed. A TMDL is a
pollution budget that establishes the maximum pollutant load that a
listed segment can carry and still be in compliance with water quality
standards.
Mr. Raisch concluded by noting how water quality regulations may
directly impact the use of water rights under the Clean Water Act section 401. Thus, under section 401, applicants must obtain a federal
license or permit for any activity that may result in discharge into state
waters to provide certification that the discharge will comply with,
among other things, state water quality standards.
Caitlin Quander
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SECTION 2: NoN-POINT SOURCE POLLUTION: MODELING WATER
QUALITY IMPACTS OF ON-SITE WASTEWATER TREATMENT SYSTEMS

Dr. Mengistu Geza of the Colorado School of Mines, gave a presentation about a new computer modeling program that he has been
working with to model water quality impacts of on-site wastewater
treatment systems, typically seen in septic tanks in rural communities.
The modeling program, called the Watershed Analysis Risk Management Framework ("WARMF"), differs from other modeling systems in
that it takes into account pollution created by on-site wastewater treatment systems; other programs typically ignore this source of pollution.
On-site wastewater treatment systems serve about twenty-five percent of the population of the Unites States, and nationally treat fifteen
billion liters of wastewater daily. These systems treat wastewater at the
site of the use, either through a septic tank or a septic tank and media
filters such as sand, before delivering the treated water into the soil
and, subsequently, into adjoining ground water systems. On-site
wastewater treatment systems release various contaminants into water
systems including: organic contaminants, such as solvents, fuels, pharmaceuticals, and personal care products; inorganic contaminants, such
as nitrates, phosphates, and metals; and microbial contaminants such
as viruses, protozoa, and bacteria.
Most modeling systems ignore these inputs and instead focus on
meteorological conditions, managed flows, point source pollution and
watershed characteristics, such as land use and soil layers. However,
while WARMF takes these inputs into account, it also accounts for pollution created by on-site wastewater treatment systems, thereby providing a more comprehensive model of contaminant pollution in waters.
WARMF consists of five modules, all of which allow for inputs at various stages during the development of the model: (1) engineering, (2)
knowledge, (3) data, (4) TMDL, and (5) consensus. In the engineering module, the user inputs different land use practices, conversion of
septic systems to sewer systems, and application of best management
practices. In the knowledge module, the user can store data on laws,
regulations, and case studies, as well as cost benefit information. In the
data module, the user inputs time series information, such as diurnal
and seasonal flows. The TMDL module calculates TMDLs based on
water quality criteria and whether pollution is either point or nonpoint source. The consensus module allows stakeholders to participate
in the decision-making and modeling processes.
Additionally, WARMF has the capability to account for nutrient
removal achieved by on-site wastewater treatment systems to evaluate
the efficiency of such wastewater treatment systems in comparison with
wastewater treatment plants. This information will allow communities
primarily served by on-site wastewater treatment systems to more effectively analyze their need to convert to wastewater treatment plants.
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Dr. Geza stated that his work has shown that WARMF is a more
suitable tool for watershed studies in areas that use on-site wastewater
treatment systems than other computer models. He further stated that
WARMF is a decision-making tool to evaluate whether using an on-site
wastewater treatment system or a traditional centralized sewer system
will create more pollution to a certain body of water.
Nora Pincus
SECTION 3: TEMPERATURE REGULATION-GENESIS

Mr. William C. Allison, V of the Colorado Attorney General's Office focused on the Colorado Water Quality Control Commission
("CWQCC"); the agency in charge of setting water quality standards,
and the Water Quality Control Commission ("WQCC"), the agency
charged promulgating temperature standards. The existing standards
for temperature regulation were established in 1978 and remain unchanged. In 2001, the WQCC undertook to change the standards. His
presentation discussed the issues that must be resolved in the promulgation of the new standards.
Mr. Allison began by outlining CWQCC's authority of the granted
by the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). Section 101 authorizes the regulatory authority of the state, in this case the CWQCC, to oversee the biologic integrity of water, including heat pollution. Mr. Allison emphasized that not all temperature fluctuations are considered pollution,
and spoke of the important role that natural fluctuations play in the
aquatic community. The temperature fluctuations that the CWQCC
and the WQCC are concerned with regulating are "man-made" or
"man-induced" changes from activities such as water treatment discharges, power plants and other industrial uses of water, and water
management activities. Mr. Allison stated that the temperature control
standards must be protective, as the temperature of a water body provides a barometer of its overall health.
The existing standards consist of a numeric temperature limit, as
well as a narrative description of the of the temperature standard.
Stakeholders have criticized these standards as containing no clear
basis, encouraging inconsistent application, and creating disagreements regarding attainment of the standards. Because of these problems, the WQCC convened a workgroup made up of stakeholders to
address new standards. At the June 2005 rulemaking hearing, the
stakeholders could not reach a consensus regarding the new standards.
The stakeholders diverged in their recommendations as to whether the
new standards should be numeric only, narrative only, or some combination of the two. Consequently, the WQCC scheduled a rulemaking
hearing forJanuary 2007.
Mr. Allison next addressed the central temperature criteria concepts that the WQCC must address in order to best protect the water
body. These include the reproductive functions of organisms living in
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the water body, the normal pattern of seasonal and diurnal variations,
and the risk of thermal shock posed to organisms. In addition to factors relating to the overall health of the water body, issues relating to
permitting, water management, and prior decrees must also be taken
into account. Mr. Allison stated that the January 2007 hearing will focus on determining how to best serve these needs while formulating a
cohesive and consistent set of standards.
Nora Pincus
SECTION

4: DETERMINING WATER QUALITY IMPACTS FROM CHANGES IN
WATER USER PRACTICES

Using multiple case studies, Mr. Pat Edelman, the Chief of the
Southeast Office for the Colorado Water Science Center of the USGS
Colorado Water Resource Division, discussed water quality impacts
from changes in water user practices, including engineering challenges
that one may encounter when attempting to quantify the impacts.
The first case study simulated the effects of water exchanges on
stream flow and specific conductance in the Arkansas River upstream
from Avondale, Colorado. The study's objective was to simulate potential effects of future water-exchange scenarios on stream flow. The
second case study simulated the effects of irrigation on salinity in the
Arkansas River Valley in Colorado. Utilizing a two-dimensional flow
and transport model, scientists evaluated the potential effects of
changes in irrigation on the quantity and quality of water in the alluvial
aquifer and along an eleven mile stretch of the Arkansas River. The
third case study simulated the effects of proposed operations of Sulpher Gulch Reservoir on Colorado River quantity and quality. Using a
stochastic model to incorporate the random and uncertain nature of
the quantity and salinity of hydrological variables, the model provided
results regarding probable ranges of values for the hydrologic variables
and salinity that would result from the proposed reservoir operations.
The fourth case study utilized statistics to evaluate relations of stream
flow and specific conductance trends to reservoir operations in the
lower Arkansas River in Southeastern Colorado. The fifth case study
provided a methodology to identify real-time changes in background
water quality on the Arkansas River and Fountain Creek. This method
assessed real-time estimates and determined if significant changes in
salinity concentrations, loads, and flow-adjusted concentrations were
likely to result from changes in water operations.
Mr. Edelman identified some of the challenges that one may encounter in attempting to quantify water quality impacts. These challenges include: (1) sufficient data to address spatial and temporal
variations; (2) limitations of analytical solutions/methods; (3) oversimplifying assumptions or numerical solutions that simplify complex
hydrologic and/or biological, chemical or geochemical processes; (4)
sufficient time, or; (5) sufficient funds to comprehensively assess the
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impacts. However, Mr. Edelman emphasized that numerous technological advances for obtaining data and in analytical tools may be used
by scientists to improve quantification of impacts in future studies.
Caitlin Quander
SECTION

5: COMMON LAW OF WATER QUALITY IN COLORADO

Mr. John McCarthy, an attorney with Holme Roberts & Owens
LLC, provided a thorough overview of the common law remedies available to persons who believe they have been impacted by or suffered
from water pollution. Mr. McCarthy noted that while federal and state
statutes have created programs that regulate water quality and provide
for civil and criminal penalties and injunctive remedies, these laws do
not always provide the appropriate remedy for an individual or other
entity adversely impacted by water pollution. Therefore, by applying
common law tort causes of action to water quality, remedies become
available to redress the harm caused by the pollution of surface and
ground water and to the associated real property impacted by such
contamination.
Utilizing a hypothetical throughout his discussions, Mr. McCarthy
analyzed claims of negligence, negligence per se, trespass, nuisance,
ultrahazardous activity, claims against the state, and claims against the
federal government. He began with an analysis of negligence claims,
noting the elements of negligence and issues of comparative negligence. Some of the remedies that may generally be available under
negligence theory are compensatory damages, diminution of value or
restoration costs, lost profits, and exemplary damages. He continued
by describing negligence per se, noting the elements and that compliance with a statute or regulation will normally defeat negligence per se
claim.
Mr. McCarthy also analyzed the common law cause of action for
trespass. Under trespass, he described the elements and the differences between continuing and permanent trespass, both of which are
available as claims in Colorado. He also discussed the liability of prior
property owners or lessee's and the remedies under trespass. In addition, Mr. McCarthy covered the elements, conduct required, and
remedies for a nuisance cause of action. He noted that a nuisance action does not require physical intrusion on the plaintiff's property.
Therefore, a landowner without water rights may have a nuisance claim
for ground water contamination, provided he can demonstrate significant interference with his or her use and enjoyment of the overlying
property and measurable damages. He also emphasized that a plaintiff
may receive annoyance and discomfort damages under a nuisance
claim. Mr. McCarthy included a discussion of ultrahazardous activities,
a strict liability claim, under both Colorado appellate and federal
courts which apply different scopes and tests for ultrahazardous situations.
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Mr. McCarthy concluded with an analysis of claims against the state
and federal governments. Except for a few situations, the state of
Colorado is generally immune because of the Colorado Governmental
Immunity Act. Claims against the federal government are also generally abrogated by sovereign immunity. However, Mr. McCarthy provided a succinct outline of situations where the doctrine of sovereign
immunity and remedies may be partially waived.
Caitlin Quander
SECTION 6: UPDATE ON MICCOSUKEE TRIBE OF INDIANS OF FLORIDA V.
SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT

Mr. Peter D. Nichols, of the law firm Trout, Raley, Montano, Witwer & Freeman, discussed the implications and impacts of Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians of Florida v. South Florida Water Management District, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) ("Miccosukee") on Western water law.
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court found in Miccosukee
that transfers among meaningfully distinct bodies of water required a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit
under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The case is currently on remand
for a determination of whether the water bodies at issue are "meaningfully distinct."
Mr. Nichols stated that the imposition of an NPDES permit requirement on transfers of water from one waterbody to another raises
complex issues, particularly in the western States. He argued that requiring such permits for engineered transfers is contrary to the plain
language of the CWA and Congress' mandate to defer to the states'
allocation of water. He stated that in the CWA Congress expressed its
clear intent to preserve state water allocations and individual water
rights. Mr. Nichols argued that the requirement of an NPDES permit
would undermine the principles of prior appropriation and disturb
numerous vested water rights. He argued that if required to operate
under a permit, many western water users would have no alternative
but to curtail their transfers to meet the CWA's water quality standards
and anti-degradation requirements, as it would be impractical and cost
prohibitive to construct treatment facilities.
Finally, Mr. Nichols stated that Congress created a number of tools
in the CWA to address water quality in water transfers while giving
states independent authority over water transfers. He argued that by
using these tools states can protect both water quality and water rights
allocated under state law.
Nora Pincus
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SECTION

7: WATER QUALITY STANDARDS IN AUGMENTATION PLANS AND

EXCHANGES: WHAT ARE THEYAND WHAT SHOULD THEY BE?

Presented by Ms. Susan G. Pray of Godfrey & Lapuyade PC, Ms.
Sarah A. Klahn of White & Jankowski LLP, and Mr. Kelly DiNatale of
Camp Dresser & McKee, Inc., this afternoon section of the conference
dealt with water quality standards in relation to exchange and augmentation plans. The speakers framed the discussion of water quality standards in relation to the Denver Exchange Case (Case No. 96CW145)
between the cities of Denver and Thornton.
Denver applied for declaratory judgments that imposing water
quality standards after issuing a NPDES discharge permit is unconstitutionally ex post facto; water quality is not a factor in consideration of a
diligence application; and water quality is not a factor in making absolute a conditional right. Thornton argued for consideration of water
quality in diligence applications and absolute right declarations; for
the application of can and will requirements to findings of diligence in
section 37-92-305 (9) (b) of the Colorado Revised Statutes; and for Denver's obligation to meet statutory water quality standards of section 3780-120(3). The District Court, Water Division No. 1, held Thornton
improperly framed its can and will arguments and refused to address
the issue; proof of quality of substituted water is not necessary to a
showing of diligence; and Denver's conditional decree could not be
made absolute until Denver proved the water it substituted under the
exchange meets the requirements of section 37-92-305(5) of the Colorado Revised Statutes.
Ms. Pray represented Thornton in the case. Ms. Pray proposed that
section 305 mandated that both quantity and quality of the water substituted in an exchange or augmentation must meet the requirements
the senior appropriator "has normally been used to." Additionally,
Ms. Pray contended that the Colorado legislature enacted the Colorado Water Quality Control Act ("CWQCA") to protect the state's waters by regulating discharges of pollutants into the state's waters. The
Act established the Water Quality Control Commission ("WQCC") to
classify and set water quality standards, and the Water Quality Division
("WCD") to enforce regulations instituted by the WQCC. Ms. Pray
asserted that a water court should impose water quality standards, beyond those promulgated by the WQCC and WCD, sufficient to ensure
that downstream senior appropriators received water of equivalent
quality to that historically diverted. Thornton claimed injury to its appropriation because the substitute water Denver supplied under the
exchange was more expensive to treat for its historical use as Thornton's drinking water.
Ms. Klahn represented Denver in the case. Ms. Klahn juxtaposed
the "requirements" established by statute and the "standards" adopted
under the CWQCA, against a water court's inherent ability to deter-
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mine water quality injury based on the facts of any given injury action.
Under the first theory, statutory quality requirements and the standards set by the WQCC bind water courts, eliminating court discretion
to set water quality standards. Under the second theory, water courts
may make quality determinations based on the evidence on a case-bycase basis. Ms. Klahn stated her preference for the first theory on the
basis that the legislature is better-equipped to deal with the complex
issues surrounding water quality. Furthermore, in contradiction to Ms.
Pray's supposition, Ms. Klahn suggested that water courts do not have
the expertise to determine water quality standards in relation to the
myriad of regulated and non-regulated water constituents. Specifically,
water courts should not impose standards beyond those propagated by
the WQCC, nor beyond those determined by permit from the WCD.
Ms. Klahn took the analysis a step further by detailing some of the
pitfalls associated with litigation of water quality issues and possible
practitioner mitigation efforts. Ms. Klahn suggested that practitioners
consider quality at both discharge and diversion; initiate thorough
sampling programs as a water quality case is only as good as the data
collected; learn the language of the scientific and technical aspects of
the issue; advise clients that costs of such cases are exorbitant, retain
the best experts possible; and ask for a bench trial due to the long
length of the trial.
Mr. DiNatale, an expert in water quality and a registered professional engineer, outlined the basic issues and arguments from both
sides of the spectrum. Mr. DiNatale suggested that municipal effluent
is a reliable source of water in an over-appropriated watershed, considerably less expensive than purchasing or developing new water rights,
and sufficiently regulated under the NPDES permit process. Further,
Mr. DiNatale suggested that a NPDES permit might constitute "prima
facie evidence that a permitted discharge is acceptable water quality for
downstream uses." On the other hand, Mr. DiNatale pointed out that
downstream users might be injured if water substituted by an upstream
user degrades water quality and the downstream user already invested
significant resources to insure a high water quality. Simply, Thornton's
injury may be legitimate given that non-regulated constituents present
in municipal effluent might necessitate expensive filtration processes
not required prior to the exchange.
Matthew Smith
SECTION 8: SHOULD WATER QUALITY BE REGULATED IN CHANGES OF
WATER RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS?

The final section of the conference concerned whether giving the
water courts jurisdiction over quality issues in change of water rights
cases would address perceived decreases in water quality. Mr. Paddock
moderated the discussion.
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Mr. Peter D. Nichols of Trout, Raley, Montano, Witwer & Freeman,
P.C. was the first panelist to speak. Mr. Nichols supported granting
jurisdiction to water courts over quality issues in change of water rights
cases. Mr. Nichols addressed past legislative proposals to grant water
courts jurisdiction over quality issues, including the recent Colorado
House Bill 1352 ("HB 1352"), which the Colorado Senate voted down
by one vote in May of 2006. HB 1352 permitted a water judge to consider decreases in water quality caused by a change of the type of waterrights use. The bill also allowed judges to include a term or condition
when they issued a decree to address the decrease in water quality.
This legislation would have established jurisdiction only to cases that
included a change in the point of diversion of at least 1000 acre-feet of
water per year.
Mr. Nichols argued that while the trigger of 1000 acre-feet might
seem arbitrary, it represented an attempt to limit the water courts' jurisdiction to address concerns that the bill would effectively stop all
water transfers. Supporters of HB 1352 were concerned that if the legislature did not speak at all on this issue, courts would be left to create
their own rules. Mr. Nichols also highlighted general community support to address publicly perceived negative quality impacts from the
water change proceedings. Thus, HB 1352 represented an attempt to
address any impairment to water quality resulting from transfers while
not broadly impairing the process of transfers in the water courts.
Conference attendees voiced numerous concerns, including the
bill's methods for determining the standards by which a change in
quality would be measured and the bill's silence as to how or what the
entity must do to guarantee the quality following a change.
Mr. Brian Nazarenus of Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite, P.A., was the
next panelist to speak. Mr. Nazarenus opposed granting jurisdiction to
water courts over quality issues in change of water rights cases. Mr.
Nazarenus' concerns could be broken down into three main arguments: (1) impacts to water quality resulting from the change or exchange are marginal; (2) water court decisions affect only a minor
amount of flow; and (3) historical land use activities and impacts from
non-point sources are the major cause of decreases in water quality. In
effect, Mr. Nazarenus argued that shifting the burden onto entities that
pursue a change or exchange will provide only minimal benefits in
addressing water quality. Giving water courts jurisdiction to impose
water quality limits in change cases, however, would impose social
costs, such as increases in litigation costs and delays in change of water
rights cases.
Instead, Mr. Nazarenus argued, Colorado should consider methods
to create and institute a systemic approach to improve the water quality
of historically impaired streams. Mr. Nazaraenus suggested that any
bill the legislature proposes concerning water quality improvement
should first broadly address watershed restoration and the quality of
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intervening reaches by obtaining funding to help clean up non-point
sources. Additionally, Mr. Nazaraenus argued, the United States Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") strategic plan through 2011
identifies watershed restoration as a main priority. Accordingly, the
EPA. will in any event soon require that Colorado identify the processes by which watershed restoration will occur within the state. Thus,
Mr. Nazaraenus' proposed legislation would address not only the more
certain causes of poor water quality in Colorado, but would also anticipate the EPA's strategic plan.
Patrick Greenleaf

BOOK NOTES
Alice Outwater, Water: A Natural History, Basic Books, New York, NY
(1996); 212 pp; $15.00; ISBN 0465-03780-1.
WATER: A NATURAL HISTORY tells the story of water's relationship
with the land, the animals, and humanity on the North American continent from the time before European discovery through today. Outwater, an environmental engineer, divides the book into two parts.
Part one, Dismantling the Natural System, focuses on how man has
changed the natural systems that once filtered fresh water on the continent. Part two, Engineeringthe Waterways, discusses man's attempts to
artificially control water from colonization onwards.
Outwater describes water as the "blood of the land" coursing across
the continent from mountain to valley, rivulet to lake, nurturing life
from plant to animal to human. The book investigates how the natural
biological systems that evolved to clean and control water in North
America changed over the last 500 years. Outwater describes how even
today, with all our modern technology, our waters are more polluted,
less biologically diverse, and harder to control than when they ran free.
The book traces the intentional and accidental changes man has
wrought on natural water systems over more than five centuries, ultimately concluding that often nature is still the best hydrologist.
Part one begins with The Fur Trade. This chapter discusses the pivotal role that the desire for fur coats and hats played in the transformation of water systems in the early years of colonization. Fur, being not
only decorative but also extremely insulating, was a popular garment
during the damp cold winters of the middle ages. By the time the New
World was discovered Europe had almost wiped out its supply of furbearing animals. America, however, was rich with fox, rabbit, and most
important, beaver. Beaver made the finest furs being both dense and
waterproof. It was Europe's insatiable desire for fur that spurred much
growth, exploration, and investment in the new colonies.
Chapter two, Nature's Hydrologists, focuses on the effect the fur
trade had on beavers, and indirectly water. Beavers are natures dam
builders, and the dams they build affect the water around them. Beaver dams slow water during seasonal runoff, decrease turbidity, deter
erosion, provide pools for fish spawning, create wetlands and promote
bacteria growth. Wetlands, and the flora and fauna they attract, do an
excellent job of cleaning water that passes through them. As the beaver disappeared so did the dams and the benefits they produced. The
loss of so many beavers was the first significant change in the North
American water cycle.
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Chapter three, The Woods, discusses the role forests play in the water cycle. Forests play a vital role in a watershed. Trees protect the soil
from erosion, create natural dams when they fall across streambeds,
drop organic materials into the water, and are homes for riparian animals. Forested watersheds absorb more water than barren ones, and
decrease runoff and silt that can clog rivers or streams damaging habitat. Early Americans harvested more than furs. Wood served as the
primary fuel for homes and industry for much of the first few centuries
after colonization. Additionally, forests provided wood for building
and settlers cleared them for agriculture. As America's settlers felled
old growth forests, watersheds lost a second natural ally.
In the fourth chapter, The Voyage of Rainfall, Outwater explores the
relationship between trees and the water cycle. Trees affect rain by
slowing droplets before they crash to the ground. Debris below the
canopy helps keep the soil in place. Over half of the rain that falls in a
forest returns to the atmosphere by evaporation, creating its own forest
microclimate. Much of the water that reaches the ground percolates
through the soil easily along roots, animal burrows and gaps in the soil
recharging underground aquifers. Forests control seasonal runoff by
absorbing more water than barren riparian zones. Once harvested, the
trees and forest in a riparian zone disappear, runoff increases, as does
erosion, and evaporation declines, resulting in more extreme seasonal
fluctuations and flooding in a given watershed.
A Sea of Grass, the fifth chapter, examines the interrelationship between water and the Great Plains. Before early Americans cleared the
prairies of natural vegetation for agriculture, great swaths were covered
with grasses. Rainfall in natural prairies clings to the grasses and either
evaporates or percolates underground. The buffalo that once roamed
the plains in huge numbers helped recharge underground aquifers
from the wallows they created. Buffalo burrowed great numbers of
mud holes that created natural pool areas and increased ground water
absorption. The massive prairie dog towns that once dotted the plains
also created direct routes for ground water recharge. However, the
buffalo and the prairie dog were enthusiastically hunted. The buffalo
shot for meat and its tongue, the prairie dog poisoned for being a nuisance to farmers. Prairie dogs are a keystone species, their burrows
providing homes for snakes, rabbits, turtles, toads and other creatures.
Once the prairie dog and the buffalo were gone, so were many of the
other species indigenous to the Great Plains, and underground water
replenishment decreased.
Chapter six, Plowing the Plains, picks up on chapter five and discusses the changes agriculture brought to the water cycle of grasslands.
Repeatedly plowing and planting wind-laid soil like that of the prairie
destroys its natural ability to hold moisture and clump, making the soil
light and easily blown away. Combined with the loss of grasses that
once held the soil in place, it was a recipe for disaster. That disaster
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came in the form of the dust bowl. Prairie ranges from relatively wet to
arid. Farmers looking for water for crops and to stave off windborne
erosion turned to the underground water the plains had stored up
naturally over millennia. Groundwater mining of aquifers like the
Ogallala became the common way of irrigating plains farmland.
Groundwater is pumped out at alarming rates on the Great Plains today, with little recharge in return.
Part two, Engineering the Waterways, begins with chapter seven, The
Water over the Dam. Here Outwater discusses the changes to the natural
water cycle brought on by the large reclamation projects of the early
20E' century. Once a river is dammed, the waterway changes dramatically. Seasonal pulse flows and floods cease. Water near the bottom of
the impound lake becomes oxygen poor, stagnant and cooler. Water
near the surface is warmer and oxygen rich. Sediment that once
rushed towards the sea now settles out, coating the lake and streambeds. Plants and animals that once thrived find their habitat destroyed,
and new species become dominant. Rivers that once teemed with life
that naturally cleaned and filtered the water became dead zones. Fish
that once spawned there have difficulty reaching their breeding
grounds. River ecosystems turn slowly and irreversibly to reservoir
habitats.
Mussels, Gators and the Corps, the eighth chapter, tells the story of
rivers straightened and species lost. The Corps of Engineers undertook massive dredging, river straightening and flood control in an effort to tame the wild rivers of North America. During this process
much of the wetlands that naturally occur along winding rivers were
destroyed as were the mussels that once coated the river bottoms.
Mussels are nature's water filters. They intake tiny food particles and
release clarified water. Dredging, channeling and other river reclamation projects devastated many of the North American mussel species as
well as the biota that called the adjacent wetlands home. The Corp
created deep, straight, and fast moving rivers, great for the commercial
use of the river, but devastating for the species that had adapted to a
slow meandering river ecosystem.
The ninth chapter, Aqueducts and Toilet Bowls, chronicles the development of modern sewage and water treatment systems. It is only in
the past 100 years, and mostly the past fifty, that the United States developed large-scale water treatment systems. Before that organic matter, human waste, chemicals, and agriculture runoff found their way
into rivers and streams untreated. This, as we now know, played havoc
with the water ecosystems and was a breeding ground for diseases like
cholera. The advent of modern treatment systems and chemical
cleaners helped turn the tide, both for water pollution and water-born
diseases by the middle of the 20"' century.
Chapter ten, Down the Drain, Up the Stack, and chapter eleven, What
Sludge Tells You, describe modern waste treatment and water purifica-
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tion systems. During the late 60s and early 70s Americans began to
take steps to clean up their waterways. Decades of sewage, toxic wastes,
and assorted runoffs were taking a visible toll on rivers, streams and
lakes. Environmental consciousness joined with new regulations to
clean up and prevent more pollution from entering the nation's waters. At least for industrial pollutants, the environmental regulations
have been very successful and technology has made today's wastewater
treatment plants extremely effective. Yet, 30 percent of our streams
and 40 percent of our lakes remain polluted. Nature was the waters
best cleanser. The loss of beavers and their dams, prairie dogs and
their dens, bison and their wallows, grasslands and their aquifers, forests and their soils, and mussels and their beds removed from North
America the natural systems that once cleaned our waters. Outwater
argues that today, even with our modern technology, we cannot duplicate the systems nature once used to ensure our waters ran clean and
clear.
WATER: A NATURAL HISTORY succeeds in doing exactly what it sets
out to do-educate. Not all of those that work with, care about, or
endeavor to preserve our nation's waterways have the educational background of a hydrologist or environmental scientist. Outwater's book,
eloquently, and in a readable fashion, presents the history of water
cleaning systems, both natural and man made though present day.
The reader is given a clear understanding on how the natural systems
once worked, and how we try to replace them today. WATER: A
NATURAL HISTORY provides the necessary groundwork to understand
today's clean water challenges by educating the reader on how we got
here. The book forms a good foundation for further and more technical reading on water related science and is a good addition to any nonscientist's water library.
Matthew Willson
Trout, Witwer & Freeman, P.C., Acquiring, Using, and Protecting
Water in Colorado, Bradford Publishing Company, Denver, CO
(2004); 273 pp; $65.00; ISBN: 1-883726-98-0.
This book presents the collective experience and expertise of several individuals from a Denver based law firm specializing in water law,
environmental law, and related matters. Robert V. Trout, brings 28
years of experience in water rights and related environmental law.
James S. Witwer brings his experience representing municipal, business, and agricultural clients in the areas of water rights, eminent domain, public lands, and environmental law. Deborah L. Freeman focuses on natural resources and environmental law, with emphasis on
the federal Endangered Species Act, Clean Water Act, and NEPA compliance. Peggy E. Montano brings her experience as a First Assistant
Attorney General for Colorado, Chair of the Colorado State Parks
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 126 S.Ct. 1843 (2006)
(holding that the operation of a dam has the potential to result in a
"discharge" as defined under section 401 of the Clean Water Act and
therefore, the applicable state must certify a dam does not violate its
water laws before a federal operating license may be issued).
S. D. Warren Company ("Warren") operated hydroelectric dams
along the Presumpscot River in Maine. Warren's dams captured water,
passed it through turbines, and then released it back into the river. To
renew its operating licenses, Warren applied for state certification from
the Maine Department of Environmental Protection ("MDEP") in accordance with section 401 ("§ 401") of the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
However, Warren applied under protest claiming its operations did not
trigger § 401 because it did not "discharge" anything into the river.
The MDEP issued the state certifications subject to stipulations that
required Warren to maintain minimum stream flow levels and to allow
for the passage of fish and eels. After an unsuccessful appeal to the
administrative tribunal, Warren filed suit against MDEP in the Cumberland County Superior Court of Maine. The trial court rejected
Warren's argument and, on appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine affirmed. The United States Supreme Court also affirmed,
holding that a dam does result in a "discharge" under § 401.
Warren claimed that Congress intended the meaning of "discharge" to include the requirement of an addition. Warren first argued that the theory of noscitur a sociis should be applied when interpreting "discharge" under § 401. Under this theory, a broad term
paired with a narrower term is restricted within the confines of the
narrow term. The Court opined this was not the general way to use
language and that the interpretive canon was not applicable here.
Next, Warren asserted that South Florida Water Management District v.
Miccosukee Tribe controlled. The Court held that the case was not on
point, because Miccosukee dealt with section 402 of the CWA and the
two sections were not interchangeable. Finally, Warren claimed that
the CWA's legislative history indicated that Congress left the word "includes" in § 401 as an oversight because of the lengthy amendment
debates. Warren argued that removing "includes" from § 401 necessitates reading "discharge" as requiring an addition. The Court found
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that this illustration instead reinforced the notion that Congress makes
textual decisions deliberately and with great care.
The Court determined which meaning Congress intended to attach to "discharge" as it appears in § 401. The Court began its analysis
by looking at its own interpretation of "discharge" in past water cases.
The Court found that it had uniformly read the word according to its
plain meaning. The Court specifically pointed out that in PUD No. 1 v.
Washington Department of Ecology, its only other case that dealt specifically with § 401, all the parties and the court applied the plain meaning
to "discharge" without comment or objection. The Court also examined the use of "discharge" under § 401 in the administrative context
and found that regulatory agencies regularly applied the plain meaning as well.
The Court bolstered its reasoning for adopting the plain meaning
of "discharge" by discussing the CWA's overarching goal of achieving
and sustaining certain water quality levels. The Court opined from
amici briefs and admissions made by Warren that the alteration of a
natural watercourse did impact water quality. The Court concluded
that the CWA is the vehicle through which Congress has empowered
states to set water quality standards and that they specifically created §
401's certification process so that states could accomplish this task.
The Court, therefore, held that applying the plain meaning to "discharge" was the best way to properly delegate this authority to the
states.
The Court rejected all three of Warren's arguments as to why the
Court should interpret "discharge" in § 401 to require an addition be
made to the water. The Court applied the plain meaning because that
was the interpretation the Court and administrative agencies had used
in the past. The Court also held that this reading better aligned with
the goals of the CWA and its delegation to the states of ensuring water
quality within their boundaries. The Court then examined Warren's
operating procedures and held that the process of removing and replacing water constituted a "discharge" under the plain meaning of the
word. The Court applied § 401 and concluded that the operation of a
dam is an activity which "may result in a discharge," thereby affirming
the judgment of both the trial court and the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine. The Court concluded that because dams may create a discharge, the state must certify a dam before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission can issue a federal operating license.
Mary E. Byrne
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UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
NINTH CIRCUIT
Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 460 F.3d 1125
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding the Army Corps of Engineers satisfied the National Environmental Policy Act's "hard look" requirement through
extensive examination of the cumulative, direct, and economic impacts
of the proposed channel deepening project).
In 1989, seeking to facilitate the navigational needs of larger vessels, Congress directed the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to assess the feasibility of a plan to deepen the Columbia River's navigation
channel by three feet.
In August 1999, the Corps responded to Congress' directive by releasing a Final Integrated Feasibility Report and Environmental Impact
Statement. The report contained analyses of possible environmental
and economic impacts of the proposed project and its alternatives;
devised a plan to dispose of dredged material from the project; and
outlined implementation of the project. Following the release of the
report, a number of key supporters to the plan, including the NOAA
fisheries ("NOAA") and the states of Oregon and Washington, withdrew their support, citing new information that cast doubts upon the
report's findings. In response, the Corps undertook additional studies,
this time employing independent agencies to corroborate their conclusions. In January 2003, the Corps issued its Final Supplemental Integrated Feasibility Report and Environmental Impact Statement which
incorporated the 1999 report with revised and expanded analyses.
Following the release of the revised report, both Oregon and Washington certified the project, and in January 2004 the Corps issued its Record of Decision approving the channel deepening project.
In response to ongoing and proposed dredging activities in the Columbia River which threatened to exacerbate coastal erosion, the
Northwest Environmental Advocates ("NWEA") filed suit in United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington, claiming
in an amended complaint that the Corps violated the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") by failing to take a "hard look" at the
channel deepening project's various environmental and economic impacts. Following the trial court's ruling that the Corps took the required hard look, the NWEA contended in its appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the Corps' analyses failed to properly evaluate the cumulative impact on coastal erosion, the cumulative
impact of the channel deepening project in light of past and future
actions, the direct impact on river toxicity and salinity, and the projected economic impacts of the proposed project.
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Under NEPA, federal actions which significantly affect the quality
of the human environment require an agency to prepare an environmental impact statement which catalogues the proposed project's cumulative impact. The cumulative impact analysis must satisfy a hard
look requirement and provide a useful analysis of the cumulative impact of past, present, and future projects.
Addressing NWEA's assertion that the Corps failed to take a hard
look at the cumulative impact on coastal erosion, the court noted the
Corps' thorough analysis of the potential for sediment loss resulting
from unfettered deep water disposal of dredged materials. The analysis included a worst-case scenario impact statement and included a
plan to structure disposal in such a way as to minimize disposal at that
site. Furthermore, the Corps studied the potential impact of reducing
the availability of sediment within the river and changes in river hydraulics resulting from channel deepening, concluding the impact to
be marginal at most. By acknowledging the potential for coastal erosion from excessive deep water disposal and conclusively analyzing the
potential for sediment loss and then conscientiously structuring a plan
to minimize any identifiable loss, the court found the Corps satisfied
the hard look requirement.
In dismissing NWEA's contention that the Corps failed to evaluate
the cumulative impact of the channel deepening project in light of
past, present, and future actions, the court underscored the detailed
record of historical salinity levels provided by the Corps. Additionally,
the court noted, the Corps provided the results of extensive testing on
current levels and submitted a third party opinion on the projected
future effects of dredging in the Columbia River. Based on the records
submitted, the court found the Corps' analysis to satisfactorily comply
with the NEPA requirements for a cumulative impact analysis.
Next, NWEA claimed the Corps failed to take a hard look at the direct impacts of channel deepening by neglecting to test toxicity levels
outside of the navigation channel and by using antiquated methods to
test estuary salinity. On both claims the court rejected NWEA's arguments, adopting instead the belief that the toxicity tests were unnecessary and the salinity test was still an effective test.
Finally, NWEA challenged the Corps' economic analysis on the
grounds that it failed to adequately consider all of the costs associated
with the channel deepening project. Again, the court rejected
NWEA's reasoning, finding an analysis which includes a thorough accounting of costs and benefits corroborated by third party data satisfies
the NEPA requirements.
Responding to the majority's decision, the dissent argued that the
Corps failed to satisfy the NEPA requirements. In its reasoning, it
found the Final Supplemental Integrated Feasibility Report and Environmental Impact Statement devoid of an adequate study of past, present, or future impacts of dredging in the Columbia River. It further
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found Corps' methodology for measuring economic impact deeply
flawed and prejudicial. Because of these deficiencies, the dissent
urged for reversal of the judgment.
Despite the dissent's arguments, the majority agreed with the trial
court that the Corps took the required hard look and affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.
Tim Cronin
TENTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Hubenka, 438 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding
that the United States Army Corps of Engineers regulated tributaries to
navigable waters under a permissible interpretation of the Clean Water
Act because there was a sufficient nexus where pollution discharged in
tributaries had a potential to move downstream and pollute navigable
waters).
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a ruling by the
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming which found
Edward Hubenka ("Hubenka") guilty of three counts of discharging
pollutants into the Wind River in violation of the Clean Water Act
("Act"), 33 U.S.C §§ 1311(a) and 1319(c) (2) (A). Hubenka sought to
divert the flow of the Wind River, which was a braided stream, to prevent the erosion of its banks from threatening an irrigation channel
supplying his nearby property. The Wind River, after joining the Little
Wind River and the Popo Agie River, eventually becomes the Big Horn
River which joins the Yellowstone River in Montana and ultimately
flows into the Missouri River.
On appeal, Hubenka alleged that the Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") unconstitutionally interpreted the Act to apply to a nonnavigable tributary. Further, Hubenka alleged that he did not violate
the Act by discharging pollutants because he did not add materials
from outside the river's banks. The court reviewed the construction
and the applicability of the Clean Water Act de novo.
The court first considered the constitutionality of the Corps' interpretation of the Clean Water Act. Under the Act, the Corps has the
authority to regulate dredge and fill activities on "navigable waters."
The statute defines "navigable waters" broadly as "waters of the United
States." The issue in the case was whether the Corps, which originally
applied the statute only to navigable-in-fact waters, could revise its
regulations to include tributaries of navigable waters under the broad
language of the statute.
In answering this question, the court utilized the two-step approach
prescribed in Chevron v. NaturalResources Defense Council,Inc. for reviewing an agency's interpretation of the statute it administers. Under this
test, the court must first determine whether Congress specifically ad-
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dressed the question at issue and if so, it will give express congressional
intent deference. However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous, the
court will give the agency's interpretation deference as long as it is
permissible. Here, the court found that under the broad language of
the statute, along with its definition of navigable waters, Congress intended to regulate at least some non-navigable waters. However, because Congress did not delineate the extent of that regulation, the
court deemed the statute ambiguous and proceeded to the second step
of the analysis to determine whether the Corps' interpretation was
permissible.
The court evaluated the Supreme Court's decision in Solid Waste
Agency of North Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC"),
to determine whether it had bearing on the Corps' interpretation. In
SWANCC, the United States Supreme Court struck down the Corps'
regulation of isolated, intrastate waters used as habitats for certain migratory birds on the premise that there was not sufficient "nexus" between the regulated waters at issue and navigable waters under the Act.
The SWANCC Court distinguished the holding in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. because the wetlands in that case were adjacent
to navigable waters, and thus had sufficient nexus for regulation. In
this case, the court concluded that although the tributaries that the
Corps sought to regulate were not adjacent, any pollution or fill
dumped in the tributaries had the potential to move downstream and
affect the quality of navigable waters, and thus sufficient nexus between
the tributaries and the navigable waters existed as required by the Supreme Court. The court held that the Corps' interpretation of the
Act's applicability to non-navigable tributaries was, therefore, permissible.
Finally, the court considered whether Hubenka violated the Act.
Hubenka argued that he did not add pollutants to the Wind River because he only disturbed the waters' banks. However, the Act prohibits
the discharge of any pollutant into waters of the United States and defines pollutant to include "dredged spoil," "rock," and "sand." The
court held that disturbing particulate matter on the banks without a
permit fell within this definition and affirmed the trial court's holding
regarding Hubenka's violations.
The court affirmed the ruling of the district court and held that
the Army Corps of Engineers' interpretation of the Clean Water Act
was permissible, that tributaries of navigable waters were within the
scope of regulation, and that Hubenka violated the Act.
Kathleen Ott
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, AC v. United States,
438 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Nev. 2006) (holding that the Bureau of Reclamation All-American lining project does not require a Subsequent
Environmental Impact Statement for impacts to wetlands, groundwater, air quality, and seepage flow in Mexico, and the Bureau of Reclamation was not required to reinitiate consultations with the Fish and
Wildlife Service for impact to Mexican wetlands and the Peirson's milkvetch).
The All-American Canal, located in California's Imperial Valley,
provides a route through which Colorado River water is delivered to
the Mexicali Aquifer underlying the Imperial Valley and the Mexicali
Valley in Mexico. In 1988, the San Luis Rey Indian Water Rights Settlement Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to line the AllAmerican canal to reduce water seepage and increase water flows. The
Bureau of Reclamation ("Reclamation") conducted an environmental
study considering the impacts of the All-American Canal lining project
and other alternatives and issued a Final Environmental Impact Statement ("FEIS") in 1994. Reclamation authorized the project later that
year. In 1996, Fish and Wildlife Services ("FWS") issued a conference
opinion, confirmed later as a biological opinion, regarding the effects
of the All-American lining project on the Peirson's milk-vetch.
In February 2006, Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali
("CDEM"), Citizens United for Resources and the Environment
("CURE"), and Desert Citizens Against Pollution ("DCAP") (collectively "CDEM") filed suit in United States District Court for the District
of Nevada asserting eight claims seeking injunctive and declaratory
relief. The court dismissed these claims and CDEM filed an amended
complaint. After dismissing six claims of the amended complaint for
lack of standing, the court allowed CDEM's claims asserting Reclamation violated the National Environmental Protection Act ("NEPA") and
the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") by failing to issue a supplemental
environmental impact statement ("SEIS") and reinitiate formal consultation on the Peirson's milk-vetch following the discovery of significant
new information and circumstances. CDEM moved for summary
judgment and Reclamation cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that no significant new information, circumstances, or substantial
change required an SEIS or reinitiating formal consultation.
Regarding the alleged NEPA violation, CDEM argued that existence of new information on the canal's impact to Mexico, including
its transboundary effects, and domestic impacts required the Reclamation to issue an SEIS. Reclamation argued that the court should have
dismissed CDEM's claims involving impacts to Mexico on three
grounds: (1) the issue presented a non-justiciable political question;
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(2) NEPA does not require federal agencies to analyze extraterritorial
effects; and (3) Reclamation was only required to look at the effects
within the extent of the agency's control.
The court held that the political question doctrine, which prevents
the federal courts from intruding unduly on certain policy choices and
value judgments that are constitutionally committed to Congress or the
executive branch, did not apply. Reclamation argued the 1944 Water
Treaty between Mexico and the United States made this a matter of
diplomatic consultation, invoking the political question doctrine.
CDEM countered, arguing NEPA compliance does not constitute a
dispute between the United States and Mexico subject to the political
question doctrine. The court held that although the United States and
Mexico engaged in diplomatic negotiations regarding the lining project, whether NEPA requires an extra-territorial examination was a
purely legal question of statutory interpretation and the political question doctrine did not apply.
However, the court found that NEPA did not apply extraterritorially. CDEM argued that that the significant impacts to Mexico's wildlife, economy, water flow, and air quality required Reclamation to prepare an SEIS. Reclamation conversely argued that NEPA does not apply outside of the United States and therefore does not require it to
analyze the lining project's impacts in Mexico. The court agreed and
found that nothing in NEPA suggested Congress intended it to apply
extra-territorially. Furthermore, the court found that the environmental impacts fell exclusively within Mexico, the agency action was
entirely within the United States, and the United States did not have
legislative control over the impacted area. Accordingly, the court held
NEPA did not apply to the All-American Canal.
Finally, CDEM argued that the transboundary impacts damaged
wildlife, reduced crop importation and trade, and led to increased illegal immigration, therefore invoking NEPA. Reclamation argued that it
sufficiently considered transboundary impacts using reasonably available information and reciprocal impacts to allocation of water share
were beyond agency control because such effects were governed by the
1944 Water Treaty. The court agreed and found all information was
too speculative and attenuated to support CDEM's claim and therefore
NEPA's "rule of reason," which does not require agencies to consider
remote and highly speculative consequences, did not necessitate Reclamation to prepare an SEIS regarding those impacts. Accordingly, the
court denied CDEM's motion for summary judgment and granted Reclamation's cross-motion for summary judgment on the NEPA claim.
Regarding the ESA claim, plaintiff CURE argued Reclamation's
critical habitat rule for the Peirson's milk-vetch was unlawful and the
loss of the Mexican Andrade Mesa Wetlands, a critical habitat to the
protected Yuma Clapper Rail, required Reclamation to consult with
the FWS to re-initiate formal consultation. Reclamation argued that it
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met its obligation under the ESA and sufficiently consulted with the
FWS. Similar to the NEPA claim, the court found that the Andrade
Mesa Wetlands were located outside of the United States and therefore
did not require further action. In addition, the court found that a new
critical habit legal fact did not exist, Reclamation did not act arbitrarily
or capriciously, and therefore Reclamation was not required to reinitiate consulting. Accordingly, the court granted United States' motion
for summary judgment.
Because CDEM could not show entitlement to the declaratory and
injunctive relief requested for the alleged NEPA and ESA violations,
the court granted summary judgment to Reclamation on both counts.
Jeffrey Conklin
Friends of the Earth v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 446 F.3d 140 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (holding that Congress was unambiguous when creating the
total maximum daily load provision of the Clean Water Act, and therefore the EPA must issue only daily maximum loads).
Friends of the Earth brought suit against the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") alleging that the Clean Water
Act ("CWA") required daily loads under the Total Maximum Daily
Load ("TMDL") provision rather than the seasonal or annual loads
established by the EPA for the Anacostia River. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor of the EPA on
summary judgment, stating that Congress did not indicate a clear intent to require only daily loads, and therefore, EPA's approval of the
TMDL was not arbitrary and capricious. Friends of the Earth appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision, finding that the CWA
clearly requires a TMDL to designate a daily load.
On appeal, the court conducted a Chevron analysis of the agency's
interpretation of "total maximum daily load," finding that Congress
spoke directly to the issue. Therefore, the EPA was foreclosed from any
differing interpretations. The court looked to the CWA's language,
citing the use of the term "daily" in the statute as indicative of Congress's intent was to require daily maximum loads when establishing
TMDLs for "pollutants which the Administrator identifies as suitable
for such calculations." The court held the term "daily" in "total maximum daily load" requires a daily maximum load for all TMDLs.
Furthermore, the EPA had the discretion to determine which pollutants were suitable for a TMDL. The EPA argued that daily loads for
various pollutants were impractical due to the nature of the pollutant,
and the pollutants at issue were perfect examples of such pollutants.
However, according to previous EPA regulations, the EPA concluded
that all pollutants were "suitable for such calculations." Therefore, the
court found that the EPA must establish daily loads for the pollutants
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at issue because they were "suitable" for a TMDL according to the previous EPA determination.
The court suggested the EPA may amend its current regulation to
better classify the suitability of daily loads for the pollutants, which
would allow the EPA to avoid establishing TMDLs for certain pollutants where daily loads are inappropriate. Additionally, the court suggested that Congress may adopt new legislation expanding the current
statute to include a broad maximum load timeframe. However, the
court cannot interpret daily to mean anything other than its plain
meaning because it must follow the unambiguous terms of the CWA.
Therefore, daily means daily for all pollutants currently identified by
the EPA as suitable for a TMDL.
Finally, the court addressed the special circumstances surrounding
combined sewer systems in regards to water quality standards. The
court recognized Congress's more flexible approach in the legislation
involving water quality standards for these systems, but again held, despite Congress's conflicting approaches, the court must follow express
terms of the TMDL statute within the CWA.
Ultimately, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded
with orders "to vacate the non-daily 'daily' loads."
Diane O'Neil
STATE COURTS
CALIFORNIA
Barnes v. Hussa, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding
water users may change the place where they use the water so long as
the change does not adversely affect the rights of other water users).
In May 2000, Rodney and Jan Barnes ("Barneses") brought suit in
the Superior Court of Modoc County requesting an injunction against
John and Linda Hussa ("Hussas"), and sought an order that the Barneses had an irrevocable right to the use of a pipeline. The Hussas, believing the Barneses abused their water rights by extending a pipeline,
began to dig up the pipeline that traverses Barnses' property. The trial
court issued a preliminary injunction in June 2000 preventing the Hussas from interfering with the Barneses' pipeline. In September 2000,
the Hussas filed a cross-complaint for contempt and declaratory and
injunctive relief. The trial court found that the Barneses had an irrevocable license to use the pipeline, that the extension of the pipeline
did not substantially harm the Hussas, and that there was no evidence
to support the Hussas' claim of forfeiture. The Hussas filed an appeal
in the California Court of Appeals contending the trial court erred in
holding that the Barneses did not injure them, that the Barneses did
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not expand their license for the pipeline by extending the pipeline,
and that the Barneses' predecessors had forfeited their right to additional water. The court found no error in the trial court's decision that
the Barneses did not harm the Hussas by extending their pipeline.
The court held that Water Code section 1706 governed the case because the Barneses' predecessors acquired their water rights before the
Water Commission Act came into effect in 1914. As a result, the controlling test was that a water user may change the place where one uses
the water as long as the change does not adversely affect the rights of
other water users. Furthermore, the court held that the person seeking to change the place of use does not carry the burden of demonstrating that the change will not affect the rights of other water users.
The court held that the Barneses' predecessors in interest did
not forfeit the right to use water that did not fit through the pipeline.
Under California law, a water user forfeits the water rights the user
does not exercise within a five year period. The court was unable to
determine if the lower court believed the testimony of the witnesses. It
found that even if the lower court believed the testimony regarding the
excess water, the testimony was not sufficient to establish forfeiture of
rights through the nonuse of the water. The court reasoned that the
Hussas would have had to proffer evidence that water had been available for diversion for at least five years and that the Barneses' predecessors failed to divert it. The Hussas failed to proffer such evidence.
In affirming the trial courts decision, the court held that the
Barneses had an irrevocable water right and that extending their pipeline to use water at a different location did not adversely affect the
Hussas.
Jacki Lopez

N. Gualala Water Co. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d
821 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the California State Water Resources Control Board had jurisdiction over North Gualala Water
Company when it pumped from two wells that drew groundwater from
a subterranean stream; that the Board correctly construed a statute
compelling the Water Company to obtain a permit to pump groundwater from the two wells; and that the Board appropriately interpreted
pumping limitations placed on the permit).
The North Gualala Water Company ("NGWC") provided water service for approximately 1,000 customers in the town of Gualala. Between 1965 and 1989, NGWC held a permit from the California State
Water Resources Control Board's ("Board") predecessor which allowed
them to operate an infiltration gallery to divert a limited amount of
surface water directly from the North Fork of the Gualala River.

In

1989 and 1996, NGWC developed two production wells near the North
Fork. When developing the wells, NGWC believed the well pumped
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percolating groundwater, which was not subject to permitting by the
Board. The Board first agreed that the pumped water was percolating
groundwater and did not require a permit. However, the Board later
determined the water was from a subterranean stream. The Board
notified NGWC of this change in status and subsequently advised it to
submit a water right application to legalize the extraction of water from
the wells.
In 1993, NGWC filed a petition to change the authorized points of
diversion in its permit to include the wells while stating it reserved the
right to challenge the Board's determination that the wells pumped
from a subterranean stream. In January 1998, NGWC's consultants
filed a report which concluded the North Fork did not recharge the
groundwater under the wells and that the water did not flow from a
subterranean stream. The Board's Division of Water Rights ("DWR")
responded that it still believed the water pumped by the wells was subject to the Board's jurisdiction, because they understood the water was
flowing in a known and definite channel. DWR told NGWC that if it
wished to withdraw its petition, DWR would recommend the Board
hold a groundwater classification hearing. NGWC informed the Board
that it wanted to reserve the issue of groundwater classification for a
future hearing and wished to carry on the process of petitioning the
wells to be included in its diversion permit. In August 1999, the Board
granted an order accepting NGWC's petitions to substitute the wells
for the prior points of diversion. As conditions on the order, NGWC
had to present a surface flow measurement plan to guarantee compliance with the original permit and prepare a water flow contingency
plan to address how it would meet the customers' water needs. While
preparing the plans, NGWC requested a hearing to determine the classification of the groundwater and to discuss the Board's application of
the original permit. After receiving the plans from NGWC, DWR denied approval because it determined the terms of the original permit
applied. DWR encouraged NGWC to petition the change of bypass
flow requirements in the original permit and take the matter of
groundwater classification to the Board.
NGWC challenged the validity of the evidence supporting the
Board's denial of the plans and contested the interpretation of the
original permit by filing a declaratory relief and a writ of mandate.
The Superior Court of Mendocino County stayed the case to allow the
Board to conduct a groundwater classification hearing to resolve the
issue. After a formal request from NGWC, the hearing took place in
June 2002. The Board applied the test from the 1999 In re Garrapata
Water Co. case which determined:
[F]or groundwater to be classified as a subterranean stream flowing
through a known and definite channel, the following physical conditions must exist: (1) A subsurface channel must be present; (2) the
channel must have a relatively impermeable bed and banks; (3) the
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course of the channel must be known or capable of being determined
by reasonable inference; and (4) groundwater must be flowing in the
channel.
NGWC determined that the wells did not meet the requirements of
the test because the only subsurface channel present did not contract
or narrow, the bedrock forming the bed and banks of the alluvial
channel was not adequately impermeable, and that the groundwater
did not flow with the channel. The Board rejected these arguments
and affirmed that the subterranean stream under the wells met all
elements of the Garrapatatest. In May 2003, NGWC filed a new writ of
mandate, and the trial court held the Garrapatatest was appropriate
and that substantial evidence supported the Board's findings. NGWC
appealed to the California Court of Appeals, First Appellate District,
Division One.
The court established that it would uphold the Board's findings
unless the Board lacked substantial evidence in making its decision.
NGWC argued for a de novo review alleging that the Board did not
make any findings of fact on the disputed factual issues. The court first
used the four-part test to determine the level of deference the court
should give to the Board's interpretation. The court found that the
Legislature intended the Board's jurisdiction over groundwater to be
the exception to the rule, and the court did not need to defer to the
Board's views on this matter. The court then went on to examine the
issues that NGWC raised.
NGWC argued there was a distinction between flowing and percolating groundwater. NGWC alleged that a subterranean stream is of a
defined character and flows in known and definite channels and, thus,
does not apply to their wells. NGWC argued that the "relatively impermeable" wording of the Board's four-point test concerning the bed
and banks of the channel was not consistent with the pre-1913 case law.
NGWC argued the four-part test omitted important restrictive factors
which are implicit in the City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy case and in doing
so was over inclusive and overstated the Board's statutory authority.
NGWC also asserted that since Pomeroy defined channels as contracted
and bounded, there was no channel below the wells because the
groundwater did not contract and the bed and banks were not sufficiently impermeable to bind the groundwater. The court ruled that
the evidence did not support the assumption that a channel must contract to be a definite channel and that NGWC's absolute standard that
subterranean channels be watertight was unrealistic. The court also
held that the pre-1913 cases better supported the Board's position that
confinement of the groundwater once it entered the channel proved
the existence of a subterranean channel.
The court then addressed the relevance of flow direction. NGWC
argued the flow should be parallel to the channel or at least always
flowing in the same direction. The Board countered that nothing in
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the statute or the case law required the subterranean stream follow the
exact flow of the channel. The court held that as long as the subterranean stream flowed in the same general direction as the channel it
would suffice to meet the test and the directional deviation would be
irrelevant. The Board noted that the channel which runs beneath the
wells deviated from flowing parallel to the subterranean stream when it
hit the less permeable clay sediments near the wells, which forced the
streamflow into more permeable soils. The Board argued that the divergence of the groundwater flow was consistent with the general
downstream flow of the subterranean stream. The court found this
explanation to be adequate to explain the perpendicular flow.
Finally, NGWC argued that the four-part test be replaced with the
classifications found in 1911 treatise authored by Samuel C. Wiel,
Wiel stated that known underground streams were rare and the presumption was against their
presence. The court found that the pre-1913 case law distinguished
subterranean streams as a subclass of underground streams, which
when looked at together failed to support NGWC's claims. The court
held that the four-part test was consistent with the language and objective of the statute and that substantial evidence supported the Board's
findings. The court also found that NGWC waived the issue of the
Boards application of the original permit when it failed to raise it in
1999. The court then noted that even if NCWC had timely raised the
issue, it would not be persuasive because courts extend considerable
deference to an administrative agency's explanation of its own regulations and language.
The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that
the Board accurately interpreted a statute to determine whether
groundwater fell within the Boards permitting authority.
Kathleen Brady
WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES.

COLORADO
Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Meadow Island Ditch Co. No. 2, 132 P.3d
333 (Colo. 2006) (holding that the recipient of a contractuallydelivered water right may not change its use without the consent of the
appropriative owner and that a plan for augmentation does not violate
a contractual prohibition against changing the point of diversion for a
subject water).
The Public Service Company of Colorado ("PSCo") derived its water rights in the subject water through its 46.25% ownership in the
Beeman Ditch and Milling Company ("Beeman"). Meadow Island
Ditch Company No. 2 ("Meadow") and Beeman, under a 1905 decree,
shared a head-gate on the South Platte River, where each diverts its
respective water rights. In 1925, a dispute arose between Meadow and
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an organization representing Beeman, Consolidated Ditches Company
of District No. 2 ("Consolidated"). That same year, Consolidated and
Meadow reached a settlement, the Consolidated/Meadow agreement,
which limited Meadow's draft of water to 40 c.f.s. and prohibited
changing the point of diversion for Meadow water.
Also in 1925, Beeman and Meadow entered into a separate agreement, the Beeman/Meadow agreement, which incorporated the terms
of the above 1925 agreement, and further specified that Meadow
would deliver its water in excess of 40 c.f.s. to Beeman. Furthermore,
Beeman owned 12 of the 90 outstanding shares of Meadow. Thus,
Beeman, and therefore PSCo, had an interest in Meadow's excess water as well as an interest in the 40 c.f.s. which Meadow normally diverts.
As a shareholder in Beeman, the above 1925 agreements give PSCo
a pro-rata interest in both the excess water and the 12/90ths water.
However, the agreements only give PSCo a contractual right to
Meadow's excess water. PSCo does not have an ownership right in this
excess water as it is a contractually-delivered right governed by the
1925 agreements. Conversely, PSCo's interest in the 12/90ths water is
an adjudicated water right.
On July 31, 2002, PSCo applied for a change of water rights and
sought approval of a plan for augmentation. Meadow objected to
PSCo's application and proposed plan. Meadow argued that PSCo did
not own the water rights, but rather had a contractual right to receive
the subject water. Additionally, Meadow argued that the agreements
under which PSCo claimed its water rights were unambiguous and expressly prohibited PSCo from changing the point of diversion for
Meadow water.
The District Court for Water Division No. 1 issued a pre-trial order
holding that PSCo could not change the use of the excess water under
the controlling 1925 agreements. The water court also issued a posttrial order approving PSCo's plan for augmentation, as these same
agreements did not bar PSCo from using its subject water to augment
out-of-priority diversions. In an appeal by PSCo, challenging the water
court's Pre-Trial Order, and a cross-appeal by Meadow challenging the
water court's Post-Trial Order, the Colorado Supreme Court considered the scope of water rights governed by the two 1925 agreements.
Regarding PSCo's appeal, the court looked to the 1925 contractual
grant to use the adjudicated water right to determine whether PSCo
may change the use of the water. The Beeman/Meadow agreement is
silent regarding whether Meadow granted the right to change the use
of the subject water to Beeman, and thus to PSCo. The agreement's
silence permitting or prohibiting any change of use of the excess water
did not allow for an implied grant to change this use. Instead, the
court interpreted the absence of such language to do the opposite.
Because PSCo's contractually-delivered water right was different than a
water right acquired by original appropriation, diversion, and applica-
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tion to beneficial use, the court declined to interpret the contract's
silence as granting PSCo the right to change the use of the water.
The court concluded that the rights represented by the 1925 Beeman/Meadow agreement were not water rights with statutory right to
change use. The court noted that the 1925 agreements had a single
intent, which was to limit Meadow's diversions to 40 c.f.s. The court
viewed PSCo as a consumer, whose rights were determined by the
terms of its contract. Meadow had retained ownership of its water
rights, and the contract had not bargained for a change in the use of
Meadow's excess water. Thus, the court held that the holder of a contractually-delivered water right, PSCo, may not change its use without
the consent of the appropriative owner, Meadow.
Regarding Meadow's cross-appeal, the court examined the contractual restriction on PSCo's adjudicated water right to determine
whether PSCo may operate its proposed plan for augmentation without violating the 1925 agreements. The 1925 agreements maintain a
prohibition on changing the point diversion of the subject water.
PSCo's plan for augmentation would not change the point of diversion
and provided for continued use of the South Platte River head-gate.
Further, PSCo's plan allowed use of the 12/90ths share of water as replacement water to satisfy holders of vested rights. The court noted
that out-of-priority diversions, such as the one proposed by PSCo, were
not contemplated by the parties at the time of the 1925 agreements,
because the legislature had not yet authorized such a use.
The court concluded PSCo's plan for augmentation did not involve
changing the diversion points for the subject water. Rather, the proposed plan and subject water replaced the water diverted from upstream wells. Additionally, PSCo performed the proper water law procedures and quantified and limited the planned augmentation so
Meadow's water right did not exceed 40 c.f.s. This effectuated the intent of the 1925 agreements as it did not allow for an enlargement of
Meadow's water rights. Thus, the court held that PSCo's plan for
augmentation furthered the intent of the original 1925 agreements
and did not violate the agreements' prohibition on changing the point
of diversion for the subject water.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the decisions of the water court.
The 1925 Beeman/Meadow agreement was silent on change of use
and there was no evidence of a bargain for this change of use. The
court stated that PSCo's right was a contractually-delivered right, and
as such it may not change the use of its water without the consent of
Meadow. Additionally, the court affirmed PSCo's plan for augmentation reasoning that the point of diversion was not changed; the 1925
agreements did not contemplate the out-of-priority diversions; and the
proposed plan did not violate the intent of the original agreements.
David Riddle
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Vaughn v. People ex reL Simpson, 135 P.3d 721 (Colo. 2006) (holding
that an owner of ground water rights who authorized pumping of his
well in violation of a valid order of the diversion engineer was a "person who diverts ground water" pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-503,
and that the State presented sufficient evidence to support imposing
liability on the owner).
Michael Vaughn ("Vaughn") appealed ajudgment of the Colorado
District Court Water Division No. 1 ("water court"), which assessed a
monetary penalty against him for diverting water in violation of a valid
order of the division engineer. The two primary issues before the
Colorado Supreme Court were: (1) whether the statute at issue could
be interpreted to impose liability only on the individual who personally
turned on the well pump; and (2) whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support the water court's finding that Vaughn diverted or authorized diversion of ground water in violation of the engineer's order.
Pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-503, the state and division engineers filed a complaint against Vaughn alleging violations of the division engineer's order to discontinue diverting water from a permitted
well that Vaughn owned. At trial, the State presented direct evidence
of the following: the division engineer posted the order according to
statutory requirements; Vaughn received notification in the mail; and,
following the order to discontinue, a person (or persons) pumped over
six million gallons of water from Vaughn's well. However, the State
only presented circumstantial evidence regarding the particular persons who operated the well and how those persons ultimately used the
water. In his defense, Vaughn argued that the statute imposed liability
only on the person who actually operated the well in violation of the
order, and the State therefore failed to present sufficient evidence that
either he or someone acting as his agent actually operated the pump.
The Colorado Supreme Court began with an analysis of the statutory construction and legislative intent of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-503 to
determine whether an owner or user of water rights could be found
vicariously liable for the conduct of others within the meaning of the
statute. Subsection (6) (a) of the statute provided that "[a] ny person
who diverts ground water contrary to a valid order of the state engineer
or division engineer... shall forfeit and pay a sum not to exceed five
hundred dollars for each day such violation continues." The court
found that "person" and "divert" acquired particular significance beyond their common use through their definition in the Water Right
Determination and Administration Act of 1969. Unless indicated otherwise, "person" referred to an individual or a public or private legal
entity, including partnerships, corporations, municipalities, the state,
or even nations. The statute defined "divert" as the relocation of water
by means of a structure or device. Taken together in the context of a
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larger regulatory scheme and the legislative intent to prevent persons
from using wells in violation of discontinuance orders, the court found
that § 37-92-503 demanded an interpretation that included liability for
the acts of others. The court did not examine the outer limits of this
rule regarding liability for others' acts; rather, the court restricted its
holding to a ruling that the statute imposed liability on an owner to
whom the division engineer issued a discontinuance order and whose
well continued to be used with his authorization.
The court concluded with a brief analysis of the State's evidence at
trial including the volume of water removed from the well, the success
of Vaughn's alfalfa crop the year in which the water use was discontinued, and the improbability that an intruder would remove over six million gallons of water from Vaughn's well without him having noticed.
Based on this evidence and Vaughn's admission that he delegated the
farming and irrigation of the crop to his father and his children, the
court found that the water court correctly concluded that Vaughn was
a person who diverted water within the meaning of the statute. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the water court.
Michelle Young
In re Water Rights of Elk Dance Colorado, LLC, 139 P.3d 660 (Colo.
2006) (holding that the doctrine of issue preclusion bars a homeowners' association from re-litigating the ownership of disputed water
rights previously litigated in district court; and prevents the homeowners association from collaterally attacking the district court's subject
matter jurisdiction because it did not raise a jurisdictional challenge
either at trial or on direct appeal).
Members of a homeowners' association ("HOA") appealed Colorado Water Court, District Number 5, orders dismissing their petitions
to set aside decrees granting Elk Dance Colorado ("Elk Dance") authority to amend certain features of a previously decreed water augmentation plan. The water court held that a previous Summit County
District Court decision, determining Elk Dance owned the disputed
water rights, collaterally estopped the HOA from asserting ownership.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the water court's decision,
holding that the Colorado doctrine of issue preclusion barred the
HOA from claiming it owned the disputed water rights and prevented
a collateral attack on the district court's subject matter jurisdiction.
The water law issues and the parties in this case derived from a series of transactions commencing in 1980, when a real estate development group ("Development Company") acquired 6000 acres of land in
Summit County and obtained a decree for a water augmentation plan
providing for 175 acre feet of water per year ("Original Decree").
Shortly thereafter, the initial group of residential lot owners formed a
homeowners association ("HOA"). In 1989, the Development Com-
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pany defaulted on its loan, prompting the lender ("Lender") to foreclose on the property, which it then sold to the Lane family ("Lanes").
This sale included the water rights associated with the Original Decree.
In 1999, the Lanes sold the property and associated water rights to Elk
Dance. In 2000, Elk Dance and the HOA entered into an agreement
whereby Elk Dance agreed to provide the HOA with water if the HOA's
current water service agreement proved insufficient for the fourteen
residences on the property. However, several HOA members refused
to sign the agreement, claiming that the HOA, and not Elk Dance, actually owned the water rights granted by the Original Decree, and that
the current board of directors did not have authority to contract on
behalf of the other owners.
The HOA filed suit in district court seeking a declaratory judgment
validating its authority, and a partition of the disputed water rights
among its members. The district court determined that the board of
directors had the authority to contract on behalf of the HOA, but denied the partition request. The district court held that Elk Dance
owned the disputed water fights, finding that: (1) the Original Decree
granted water rights to the Development Company; (2) the Lender
assumed the water rights upon foreclosure of the mortgage; (3) the
Lender conveyed the water rights to the Lanes; (4) the Lanes conveyed
the water rights to Elk Dance; and (5) there was no evidence supporting the HOA's ownership claim.
Subsequently, Elk Dance obtained water court decrees amending
the Original Decree in order to change the location of a well on the
property and the method of wastewater treatment specified in the water augmentation plan. The HOA petitioned the water court to set
aside these decrees pursuant to Colorado Revised Statutes section 3792-304(10) (allowing a person, adversely affected by a substantive error
in a water court judgment to petition the water court for its correction), continuing to claim that it owned the water rights in the Original
Decree. The water court dismissed the HOA's petitions, holding that
the district court judgment collaterally estopped the HOA from relitigating the ownership issue.
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the water court's
decision, applying the Colorado doctrine of issue preclusion which
bars re-litigation of an issue when: (1).it is identical to an issue actually
litigated and necessarily adjudicated in a prior proceeding; (2) the
party against whom estoppel is sought was a party to, or in privity with,
a party to the prior proceeding; (3) the previous suit resulted in a final
judgment on the merits; and (4) the party seeking to avoid application
of the doctrine of issue preclusion had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.
First, the court found that the HOA actually litigated ownership of
these water rights in the district court, which necessarily adjudicated
the issue to deny the HOA's partition request. Second, the court de-
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termined that the members representing the HOA in this case were
either identical to, or in privity with, the HOA members in the district
court case. The court reasoned that both cases involved substantially
similar interests, which the HOA members in the district court case
represented and protected on the association's behalf. Third, the
HOA's failure to directly appeal the district court's decision resulted in
a final judgment on the merits. Finally, the court found that the HOA
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the ownership of the disputed
water rights in district court. The court observed that the HOA members in this case either already argued the ownership issue in district
court, or had notice of the issues scheduled for litigation but chose not
to appear.
Moreover, the court determined that the doctrine of issue preclusion also prevented the HOA from challenging the district court's subject matter jurisdiction because it failed to do so during the district
court trial, or on direct appeal. The court reasoned that allowing the
HOA to collaterally attack the district court's jurisdiction would "undermine the finality of the judgment and could lead to conflicting factual determinations" over the ownership of the water rights in the
Original Decree.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the water court's decision and held
that the doctrine of issue preclusion bars the HOA from asserting
ownership of the water rights in the Original Decree, and prevents the
HOA from collaterally attacking the district court's subject matter jurisdiction.
Cameron Banko
GEORGIA
Black v. Floyd, 630 S.E.2d 382 (Ga. 2006) (affirming that Georgia
holds title to all tidewaters within the state except where a private party
can trace their title to a valid Crown or state grant containing an explicit conveyance).
Russell and Josie Black (collectively "Black") claimed that two
Crown grants gave them title to property along the tidewaters of Sterling Creek. Douglas Floyd, Thomas Garrett and Tami Garret (collectively "Floyd"), owners of adjacent property, joined the State of Georgia as a necessary party in a declaratory judgment action maintaining
that the State of Georgia held title to the property along Sterling
Creek. The Bryan County Superior Court entered judgment in favor
of Floyd and the State of Georgia. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
Georgia, Black argued that navigability of tidewaters is a factor for determining tidewater ownership.
In Georgia, tidewaters include the sea as well as all rivers and arms
of the sea affected by the rise and fall of the tide, useable for fishing,
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passage, navigation, commerce, or transportation. At common law,
tidewater beds extended to the high water mark and the Crown owned
the soil between the high-water mark and the low-water mark. The
court reiterated the rule that Georgia now holds title to the beds of all
tidewaters within the state, except where a private party can trace its
title to a valid crown or state grant which explicitly conveys the tidewater beds. The burden is on the grantee to show an explicit conveyance
that demonstrates clear intent on the part of the crown to part with
ownership of the tidewater beds in question. Further, the court strictly
construes any ambiguity in Royal grants against the grantee.
Upon reviewing Black's grant, the court found that the words were
completely illegible. The court held that indecipherable Crown grants
were inadmissible at summary judgment and Black failed to present
other evidence supporting his claims at the motions hearing. The
court added that, even if the Crown issued grants containing the language alleged by Black, they would still lack clear intent on the part of
the Crown to convey ownership of the tidewater property along Sterling Creek. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the lower
court and granted summary judgment in favor of Floyd and the State
of Georgia.
JonathanLong
KANSAS
Hawley v. Kansas Dep't of Agric., 132 P.3d 870 (Kan. 2006) (holding
that the Kansas Division of Water Resources correctly applied a Kansas
water right forfeiture statute because the Kansas legislature intended
for water rights to comply with a "use it or lose it" philosophy).
Karen and Marlin Hawley ("Trustees") inherited the right to appropriate water from the Republican River in Kansas from their father,
Max, who had received the right from his father, E.E. Conzelman. The
record showed that the water users failed to put this water right to
beneficial use for thirty-one successive years, from 1971 to 2001. In
May 2003, the owners of other water rights in the same area requested
the Kansas Department of Agriculture's Division of Water Resources
("DWR") pursue a abandonment trial for the water right.
In December 2003, the DWR filed a report concluding the Trustees
had made no beneficial use of the water from 1971 to 2002 and had
not shown sufficient cause for the non-use. DWR gave notice to the
Trustees of a hearing to determine whether the water right should be
abandoned and terminated under the Kansas Water Appropriation
Act.
After a formal termination hearing, the chief water engineer
adopted the DWR hearing officer's recommendation to issue an order
of termination of the water right. The Trustees filed a petition forju-
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dicial review, and the Republic County District Court entered judgment in their favor and set aside the DWR's termination of the water
right. The DWR appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Kansas.
The sole issue before the court was whether the DWR correctly interpreted a Kansas statute originating from the Kansas Water Appropriation Act which allowed for the termination of a water right after
five successive years of non-use. The statute contained a notice provision requiring the chief engineer to notify the water right holder after
three years of non-use that abandonment and termination procedures
would commence if the water right holder failed to beneficially use of
the water within five years. The Kansas legislature designed this provision to give the water right holder the opportunity to take action to
remedy the situation to preserve the right.
The Trustees did not use their water right for thirty-one successive
years, and thus the debate concerned whether or not this lengthy period negated the notice provision. The DWR argued that the lengthy
period of non-use made the three year notice requirement a moot issue, while the Trustees maintained that the notice requirements were
substantive, remedial, and should have been applied retroactively. The
Trustees further argued that the DWR's compliance with the notice
provision of the Kansas statute was a condition precedent to the termination of a water right, no such notice had been given, and as a result,
the court should have set aside the termination order.
The court engaged in an extensive discussion of the history and
development of Kansas water law, which is based on a system of prior
appropriation for water rights, to ascertain legislative intent. The court
concluded that the Kansas legislature intended to create an act of forfeiture in the statute. It based this conclusion upon three foundations:
case law from other jurisdictions with similar statutes such as Nevada;
the interpretation of the phrase "shall be deemed abandoned" in general property law; and the 1999 amendment to the Kansas Water Appropriation Act. The 1999 amendment increased the permitted nonuse period from three to five years, and the court determined that this
did not change the original interpretation of the statute as one of forfeiture and not abandonment, but merely extended the timeframe for
termination of a water right.
Accordingly, the court found that the DWR correctly interpreted
the Kansas statute. Specifically, the court held that the DWR's interpretation of the statute agreed with the fundamental principle that
"[b]ecause all water within the state is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to control and regulation of the state, then
holders of water rights who fail to use the rights lose the rights." The
court concluded that the State could place conditions on the retention
of a right that it created.
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The court also found that the Kansas statute contained other safeguards to prevent a water right holder from losing his or her right.
These safeguards included a provision that the water right holder may
demonstrate good reason for non-use, and a list of acceptable reasons
for non-use. Because these safeguards are built into the statutory
scheme and the overriding motivation behind the scheme is "use it or
lose it," the legislature could not have intended to provide for other
safeguards it did not explicitly mention.
Based upon its holdings, the court reversed the district court's order and affirmed the DWR's decision declaring that the water right
should be abandoned and terminated.
Charles Sweet
MONTANA
Mont. Trout Unlimited v. Mont. Dep't of Natural Res. and Conservation, 133 P.3d 224 (Mont. 2006) (holding an interpretation of groundwater must consider prestream capture of tributary groundwater).
Montana Trout Unlimited and eleven other petitioners (collectively "Trout") filed suit in the District Court of the First Judicial District, County of Lewis and Clark, against Montana Department of
Natural Resources and Conservation ("DNRC") seeking writ of mandate compelling DNRC to make a determination of whether groundwater was immediately or directly connected to surface water before
processing groundwater applications on the Upper Missouri River basin under the Basin Closure Law. Trout also argued that DNRC's definition of "immediately or directly connected to groundwater" inappropriately excluding prestream capture of tributary groundwater.
DNRC and Trout entered into a stipulation where DNRC agreed to
consider whether groundwater was immediately or directly connected
to surface water prior to processing permits, but retained its definition
of groundwater. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of DNRC. The issues on appeal in the Supreme Court of Montana
are whether Trout exhausted its administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief and whether DNRC's interpretation of groundwater-immediately or directly connected to surface water-was correct
as a matter of law.
The court determined that Trout need not exhaust its administrative remedies because the futility exception applied. The court found
that Trout was not required to participate in agency proceedings that
were costly and expressly prohibited by the legislature. The Basin Closure Law expressly prohibited DNRC from processing applications for
groundwater which were immediately or directly connected to surface
water. Therefore, it was futile to require Trout to wait for DNRC to
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process such a permit before allowing Trout to contest DNRC's interpretation of groundwater.
The court also found DNRC's interpretation of groundwater conflicted with the Basin Closure Law. It held that the interpretation did
not provide sufficient protection demanded by the statute because it
failed to take into consideration the impact of prestream capture of
tributary groundwater. The court reversed the decision of the trial
court and remanded for further proceedings to re-interpret the meaning of groundwater within the statute.
Jacki Lopez
NEBRASKA
Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 713 N.W.2d 489 (Neb. 2006) (denying
an irrigation district's motion to intervene as a plaintiff in an action
brought by a surface appropriator against several ground water users
because the district's complaint did not allege a direct and legal interest in the subject matter of the action and it would not gain or lose
anything by ajudgment in favor of either party).
The Nebraska Supreme Court considered whether the Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District ("Central") had a right to
intervene in an action between an individual surface appropriator,
Spear T Ranch ("Spear T"), and several ground water users pursuant
to Section 25-328 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes. The court remanded the original action, giving Spear T leave to amend its complaint. Subsequently, Central moved to intervene as a plaintiff in the
District Court for Morrill County. The district court denied the motion to intervene and Central appealed. The Nebraska Supreme Court
reviewed the district court's decision de novo.
The court first detailed the applicable law concerning the underlying dispute. In the initial action between the parties, prior to remand,
the court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 858 to govern
disputes between surface appropriators and ground water users, which
stated a ground water user was not liable for a beneficial use of appropriated water unless the withdrawal (1) had a direct and substantial
effect on a watercourse or lake, and (2) unreasonably caused harm to a
person entitled to use of its water. The court then outlined the requirements for Central's intervention in the action. Under Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 25-328, Central could intervene as a plaintiff or a defendant in
the action only if it initially alleged a direct and legal interest in the
subject matter of the dispute such that it would lose or gain as a direct
result of the judgment rendered. An "indirect, remote, or conjectural
interest" was not enough to support intervention.
The court considered Central's complaint in detail and concluded
that it did not allege a direct and legal interest. Although Spear T al-
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leged specific damages including harm to crops, insufficient water for
livestock, and diminished beauty and value of its property, Central
made no specific damage claims. While Spear T sought injunctive relief to prevent future harm by the removal of water that would specifically be available to it but for the defendants' actions, Central sought
injunctive relief to prevent defendants' use of water that would be
"otherwise available" to it primarily for storage. Spear T limited its
complaint to that amount of water which defendants "unreasonably"
removed, while Central sought to enjoin all upstream uses by the defendants. Finally, Spear T's complaint sought relief from particular
defendants, while Central generally opposed ground water appropriators. The underlying law required that the court balance the specific
competing interests of the surface users and the ground water appropriators. Because Central's claimed interests did not align with those
claimed by Spear T, the court did not find an adequate link between
Central's claims and the subject matter of the action such that ajudgment rendered for either party would directly affect Central.
The court affirmed the district court's denial of Central's motion
to intervene, noting that Central was free to bring an action against the
defendants based on its own interests in preventing ground water appropriation.
Kathleen Ott
NEW HAMPSHIRE
In re Town of Nottingham, 904 A.2d 582 (N.H. 2006) (affirming the
Department of Environmental Services issuance of an extensive
groundwater withdrawal permit to USA Springs, Inc., for a proposed
water bottling plant based on the Department's reasonable interpretation of the statutory language contained in the Groundwater Protection Act).
In May of 2001, USA Springs, Inc. ("Springs") applied to the New
Hampshire Department of Environmental Services ("DES") seeking a
groundwater withdrawal permit to withdraw over 400,000 gallons of
water per day from a single spring and three bedrock wells. Subsequent to hydrogeologic testing, DES denied the application in August
of 2003. DES denied the application due to failure to meet regulatory
requirements regarding withdrawal quantities and quality. DES
granted a rehearing, but DES again denied the application. Four
months later, Defendant submitted a second application for the same
withdrawal permit and in March of 2004, DES approved the application and issued the groundwater withdrawal permit.
Two New Hampshire Towns, Nottingham and Barrington, along
with the environmental group, Save Our Groundwater (collectively
"SOG"), challenged DES's issuance of the permit to USA Springs un-
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der New Hampshire's Groundwater Protection Act ("GPA") and filed
suit in New Hampshire Supreme Court.
SOG contended that DES erred in finding no requirement to consider the public trust to manage the groundwater to the maximum
public benefit as required by the GPA. SOG first contended that DES
erred in not requiring Springs to apply for a dredge and fill permit as
required by the GPA and that the DES should have held a "prime wetlands hearing" also pursuant to the GPA. Secondly, SOG contended
that DES's granting of the application was an unconstitutional taking
and that DES failed to hold the required adjudicative hearing. Plaintiffs also contend that the DES should have granted Plaintiffs an appellate review before DES as required under the GPA. Third, SOG argued that the DES erred in accepting Springs' hydrologic model as it
was rife with error, including unexplained gaps, contradictions of data,
poor testing conditions, and stabilization of wells during testing. Finally, SOC argued that DES violated its own rules by accepting a resubmission of the same application, a decision contrary to the GPA.
In evaluating DES' issuance of the permit, and the Plaintiffs allegations, the court relied on the statutory language of the GPA. Looking
to the words of the GPA statute, the Court rationalized all of DES's
decisions.
The court found that the GPA directs DES to adopt rules including
criteria and procedures for requiring applicants to identify and address
impacts of withdrawals on surface water, subsurface water, waterrelated natural resources, and public, private, residential, and farm
wells within the anticipated "zone of contribution" to the withdrawal.
The court first held that the GPA provided the criteria that DES
had to follow in issuing permits and that the Act imposed no specific
additional test that DES was required to apply. Next, the proposed
groundwater withdrawal was not subject to the permitting requirements of the GPA referring to fill and dredge in wetlands; thus, DES
was not required to hold a public hearing. The court went on to find
that granting the permit was not a taking because the right of user of
groundwater was not a protected property interest. The fact that the
town was entitled to notice and to submit comments under the GPA
did not make it a party entitled to an adjudicative hearing in a contested case. Although the GPA failed to define "need," the court
looked to the dictionary, and found the definition of "need" was "requisite, desirable, or useful." From that definition, the court found that
DES could have reasonably concluded that the description of need
complied with the GPA and that DES had not failed to follow its own
rules.
The court affirmed the decision of the DES to grant a large withdrawal permit to USA Springs, Inc.
Brandon Saxon
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NEW MEXICO
Herrington v. State Eng'r, 133 P.3d 259 (N.M. 2006) (holding that senior appropriators who have their groundwater intercepted by junior
appropriators are entitled to use a supplemental well under the
Templeton doctrine if the well draws from the same groundwater
source that feeds the baseflow; that a supplemental well does not have
to be positioned upstream of a surface point of diversion to comply
with Templeton; and that statutory transfers of water rights do not have
to meet the Templeton requirements).
Ellis B. and Laverne Herrington (collectively "Herrington"), long
time irrigators in the Rio de Arenas Valley, applied with the state engineer to change their point of surface diversion from its original point
to a 100-foot-deep well. Herrington sought this alternative means of
drawing water from the Rio de Arenas because junior appropriators
were diminishing the surface water at their point of diversion by pumping water upstream. They relied on the Templeton doctrine, which
allows a senior appropriator to use the full amount of their appropriation by tapping into groundwater sources using a well if junior appropriators are intercepting water previously discharged to the surface.
The state engineer and the hearing examiner denied the Herrington
application holding that the proposed well would draw from a different source of water and create a new appropriation that would impair
other water rights owners.
Herrington appealed the denial to the Grant County, New Mexico,
District Court. The district court examined several issues regarding
the effects of the proposed well, and ultimately held that the well
would violate the Templeton doctrine because it would allow access to
a new water source. The district court also held that moving the point
of diversion to a downstream location would conflict with the understood principles established by the Templeton doctrine.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the district court,
agreeing that both the topographic location and the depth of the proposed well would result in Herrington accessing a new source of water.
The court also concluded that the Herringtons did not have a right to
change their point of diversion based on the Templeton doctrine.
Herrington appealed to the New Mexico Supreme Court. The
court looked at the facts in question to determine whether Herrington
was requesting a new appropriation in the underground water basin or
just requesting to follow the source of their appropriations. Specifically, the issue in dispute was whether the proposed well would tap one
aquifer or two aquifers separated by an impermeable or semi permeable boundary. If the well taps just one aquifer, the Templeton doctrine may not prohibit it. If the well taps a second, deeper aquifer, the
Templeton doctrine would prohibit it.
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The court also reviewed the district court's determination that if
the Herringtons did place the proposed well downstream of the original point of determination, then the Templeton doctrine could not
apply because all downstream wells result in a new appropriation. After reviewing the facts, and noting that the Templeton well itself was a
downstream well, the court determined that while a downstream location may be an indicator of whether the new well draws from a new
source, it is not an absolute determination. Therefore, an upstream
requirement cannot be a universal requirement and must instead be
case specific.
In addition to reviewing Herrington's Templeton doctrine claim,
the court reviewed the issue of statutory transfer. The court of appeals
concluded that statutory transfers must meet the Templeton requirement, and thus Herrington did not qualify. Both Herrington and the
state engineer sought reversal of this decision because the right to
change the point of diversion is a right that was previously determined
to be one of the incidents of ownership as long as the proposed transfer only allows the applicant to draw from the same hydrologic unit.
Ensuring that a transfer occurs within the same hydrologic unit is different than applying the narrow Templeton same source requirement,
as statutory transfers may apply for new uses for the water over significant distances. The court therefore rejected the Templeton doctrine
in statutory transfers, as it would make transfer requirements too specific, curtail the state engineer's discretion, and threaten sound water
policy.
After clarifying specific aspects of the Templeton doctrine, the
court reversed the court of appeals decision and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
CarrieStanley
OHIO
Portage County Bd. of Comm'rs v. City of Akron, 846 N.E.2d 478
(Ohio 2006) (holding Akron's use and sale of water from Cuyahoga
River reasonable insofar as it maintains a release of between 8.1 and
9.5 million gallons per day ("MGD") to protect downstream riparian
rights).
After a devastating fire in 1909, the City of Akron ("Akron") sought
to develop a new source of water, ultimately deciding to construct a
large water reservoir. In 1911, the legislature passed a statute conferring a right to divert the Cuyahoga River, and the Governor deeded a
right of use to Akron. The deed purported to convey Akron all water
rights to the Cuyahoga not used by the state for the maintenance of
the Ohio Canal. Shortly thereafter, Akron began construction of the
reservoir in Portage County, now known as Lake Rockwell, along the
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Cuyahoga River. Seeking to expand its water rights in the Cuyahoga
River, Akron began annexing land from townships in exchange for a
commitment to provide them with water. Concerned that supplying
water to the annexed towns constituted an interbasin water use, Akron
entered a lease with the Ohio Department of Natural Resources
("ODNR") in which it pledged to release 3.5 MGD from Lake Rockwell
in exchange for an ODNR determination that Akron did not need a
permit for interbasin water use.
The Portage County Board of Commissioners, along with the cities
of Kent, Cuyahoga Falls, and Munroe Falls, and the village of Silver
Lake (collectively, "the County") brought suit against Akron, following
Akron's lease with the ODNR, in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio, claiming unreasonable use of water and
seeking declaratory judgments, injunctions, and damages. The suit
stemmed from the County's fear that Akron's water lease with the
ODNR as well as its sale of water to other towns would result in water
quality problems. The County contended that the 1911 grant only entitled Akron to a right to use water from the Cuyahoga, not to sell it,
and that the sales constituted an unreasonable use. The trial court
entered summary judgment in favor of the County regarding its interpretation of the rights transferred in the 1911 deed, but conducted a
bench trial to evaluate the County's claims of unreasonable use. The
trial court ruled that riparian rights belong only to those who own land
along a river, and because Ohio owned no land along the Cuyahoga, it
could not transfer any riparian rights to Akron in the 1911 deed.
However, the trial court found Akron's taking from the Cuyahoga to
be reasonable in light of its subsequent land purchases along the
Cuyahoga, and its 5.0 MGD intentional and 3.1 to 4.5 MGD incidental
releases from Lake Rockwell. The trial court denied Akron's petition
for an injunction.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District, Portage County,
affirmed, reasoning that although Akron failed to prove Ohio had any
riparian rights along the river, its purchase of Lake Rockwell entitled it
to sell water. However, the court remanded the case for a determination of how much water the doctrine of reasonable use required Akron
to release from Lake Rockwell so as to not injure any downstream riparians.
Both Akron and the County filed appeals. The Ohio Supreme
Court granted review to assess the effect of the 1911 grant, to evaluate
Akron's rights to the water, and to address what obligation, if any, Akron owed to the County to release water from Lake Rockwell. Akron
contended that the appellate court misinterpreted the deed, and that
it granted them water rights that the state owned as well as those based
on the state's inchoate ability to seize water for public use. Akron argued the deed rightfully entitled them to all of the water in the Cuyahoga beyond that necessary to maintain the Ohio canal. Ohio law in-
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corporates traditional riparian principles, under which water rights are
derived from ownership of waterfront property, based on use not possession, protected from injury from other users, and obtained by the
state solely through eminent domain. The court, therefore, interpreted the grant as having conveyed only the right to use the water
utilized by the state to supply the canal, and incapable of transferring
riparian rights necessary for subsequent sales. However, Akron's subsequent land acquisitions, including Lake Rockwell, vested it with riparian rights, and the ability to sell water to other towns.
The court next reviewed the reasonableness of Akron's use of the
Cuyahoga, balancing the effect of the Akron's sales of water to other
towns and its releases to the river from Lake Rockwell. The County
presented evidence regarding the discharges necessary for preservation
of the river's aquatic life and maintaining EPA water standards, and
sought a declaration forcing Akron to release 8.5 to 10.9 MGD. Akron
argued that the changing and competing nature of riparian rights
made any declaration merely hypothetical, and that the appellate court
erred in remanding for a declaratory judgment. In reviewing the record, the court noted that Akron's 1998 lease with ODNR stipulated
that it release 3.5 MGD but that it regularly exceeded the obligation
and released 5.0 MGD. Moreover, the County presented expert testimony estimating the aggregate flow to be 8.1 to 9.5 MGD, resulting
from a 3.1 to 4.5 MGD unintentional release.
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Ohio conveyed only the
right to use the water it held title to at the time of the transfer, and that
Ohio had no rights in the Cuyahoga at the time of the 1911 deed.
Therefore, Akron's water rights in the Cuyahoga were limited to rights
gained through its subsequent purchases of riparian lands. Furthermore, the court affirmed and modified the court of appeals decision to
remand for issuance of a declaratory judgment regarding Akron's reasonable use of the Cuyahoga River. On remand, the court ordered the
trial court to issue a declaratory statement holding Akron's use of the
Cuyahoga to be reasonable insofar as it maintains an aggregate release
flow from Lake Rockwell between 8.1 and 9.5 MGD.
Christian Troncoso
SOUTH DAKOTA
Apland v. Butte County, 716 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 2006) (holding Butte
County Director of Equalization's methodology for assessing the value
of rangeland was clearly erroneous when it failed to consider the value
of appurtenant and nontransferable water rights).
John Apland and other Butte County landowners (collectively
"Apland") appealed the Butte County Board of Equalization's decision
regarding Apland's rangeland property assessments for the 2002 and
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2003 tax years. The Fourth Judicial Circuit Court, Butte County, affirmed the Board's decision, finding that the Director of Equalization
("Director") properly assessed the value of Apland's rangeland property. On appeal to the Supreme Court of South Dakota, Apland asserted that the Director assessed his rangeland at substantially higher
values than other rangeland with similar market value by failing to consider appurtenant and nontransferable water rights, thereby violating
the Constitutional requirements of equality and uniformity.
In determining market values for rangeland property tax assessments, the Director considered factors such as location, soil quality,
time of sale, use of property, and climate conditions. Using these factors, the Director determined both the median county market value
and neighborhood market values. The Director determined that the
market value for rangeland property in Apland's neighborhood deviated from the median county market value by more than ten percent.
South Dakota Codified Laws § 10-6-33.6 allows the Director to establish
separate market values per acre for land within the county that deviates
by more than ten percent from the county's median market value.
Therefore, the Director established separate market values per acre for
Apland's neighborhood. Apland's property did not have appurtenant
or nontransferable water rights, but the Director's methodology resulted in a higher tax assessment for Apland's property than for other
rangelands with appurtenant and nontransferable water rights.
Throughout this process, the Director's methodology failed to consider the value of appurtenant and nontransferable water rights.
The court evaluated the Director's methodology to determine
whether it was clearly erroneous to use sales of land with appurtenant
and nontransferable water rights, without adjusting for the market
value of water rights, when determining the median market value and
deviations from that value. The court first reiterated the constitutional
principle that property valuation for tax purposes must reflect equally
and uniformly the property's true and full value. Next, the court noted
that water rights increase the value of land by increasing the land's
irrigability. The court found that the Director's methodology resulted
in higher market values for properties without water rights than for
similar properties with appurtenant and nontransferable water rights.
These discrepancies in market value were a result of the Director's
failure to consider appurtenant and nontransferable water rights. Because of these discrepancies in valuation, the court held that the Director's methodologies violated the constitutional requirements of equality and uniformity. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's
affirmation of the Director's methodologies and remanded.
JonathanP. Long
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UTAH
Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co., 133 P.3d 382 (Utah 2006) (holding
that when evaluating an application for change in use of a water right:
(1) district courts enjoy significant, but not broad, discretion, when
determining whether evidence of impairment is sufficient for application denial; (2) the applicant seeking change need only show reason to
believe that approval of the proposal will not impair vested water
rights; (3) the applicant bears the burden of persuasion throughout
the application process; and (4) a party protesting the application may
defeat the change application by relying exclusively on circumstantial
evidence that demonstrates the probability of impairment).
Lawrence and Ann Searle purchased undeveloped property in
Sampete County, Utah. The building permit application process required the Searles to establish the presence of an on-site water source
sufficient to meet the needs of a prospective cabin. The Searles purchased a water right with a priority date of 1956, but with a diversion
point that was a significant distance from the cabin and therefore did
not satisfy the on-site requirement. The Searles subsequently sought to
change the water right's point of diversion and nature of use to a
closer existing well, known as the Jacobsen well. The Searles appropriately filed a change application with the Utah State Engineer ("State
Engineer") and advertised the application.
Milburn Irrigation Company ("Milburn") opposed the Searles'
change application. Milburn distributed water to its twenty-six shareholders by means of gravity-pressured sprinkler irrigation systems.
Milburn owned a water right with a priority date of 1876, entitling it to
divert 8.875 cubic feet of water per second from the South San Pitch
River; however, Milburn typically was not able to satisfy the entire
amount of its water right. It opposed Searle's application out of concern that the Jacobsen well was in the drainage area that contributed to
the South San Pitch and that the use of the well could lead to additional water shortfalls.
The State Engineer heard testimony from both parties concerning
the possibility of an impairment to Milburn's water right based on a
possible connection between the Jacobsen well and Milburn's water
source. The State Engineer consequently rejected the change application, and the Searles appealed to the Sixth District Court for the State
of Utah. The district court heard testimony from expert witnesses
from both parties and held that, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, approving the application would impair Milburn's
rights. The Searles then appealed to the Supreme Court of Utah.
On appeal, the Searles, Milburn, and the State Engineer each argued that the court should modify the approach taken by the district
court, raising three issues: (1) whether the district court properly in-
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voked the preponderance of evidence standard of proof; (2) whether
the district court correctly allocated the burden of persuasion; and (3)
whether a change application may be undermined by circumstantial
evidence demonstrating the probability of impairment. The court addressed each issue separately.
As a threshold issue, the court determined that district courts enjoy
significant, but not broad, discretion when determining whether evidence of impairment is sufficiently compelling to deny an application
approval. However, because of the strong public policy interest in
promoting consistent and predictable results when adjudicating water
rights, the court found it appropriate to constrain district court discretion in this area.
The parties presented two arguments regarding the appropriate
standard of proof. The State Engineer and Milburn argued that the
decision-maker should deny an application when a preponderance of
the evidence establishes that vested rights will be impaired, while the
Searles argued that the decision-maker should deny an application
only if direct, noncircumstantial evidence clearly demonstrates that
impairment would result from the approved application. The court
held that the proper standard lies between the two positions. advanced
by the parties: the change application process requires an applicant
only to show reason to believe that no impairment will result from application approval. The court reasoned that this standard of proof
provided a balance between twin policy goals: putting water to the
most beneficial use possible, and simultaneously guarding vested water
rights.
Next, the court addressed the proper burden of persuasion. The
district court shifted the burden of persuasion from the Searles to Milburn, based on a common misunderstanding of previous court opinions. Here the court emphasized that the burden of persuasion should
remain on change applicants throughout the application process. This
burden, the court reasoned, is analogous to the burden usually imposed upon the moving party in a lawsuit. Moreover, the applicant
must persuade the decision-maker that there is no reason to believe
that vested rights will be impaired if the application is approved. This
burden exists even when there is no opposition to the application, and
as a result unopposed applications can still fail.
Last, the court held that circumstantial evidence may be included
in the decision-making process. The court acknowledged that a protesting party faces a difficult task in producing evidence sufficient to
block approval, and that in many cases impairment only can be illustrated by relying on conjecture or probability.
The court remanded the case because the district court invoked the
wrong standard of proof and improperly allocated the burden of persuasion in its review of the State Engineer's decision.
PaulRodney
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In re Uintah Basin, 133 P.3d 410 (Utah 2006) (holding: (1) ownership
of water rights requires existence of beneficial use, (2) federal contract
matters must be deferred to federal court, (3) state law governs recapture applications, and (4) the United States is subject to joinder in
state court water rights adjudication proceedings).
The Strawberry Water Users Association and the Strawberry High
Line Canal Company ("Strawberry") brought suit against the Bureau of
Reclamation ("Reclamation"), the United States, and the Department
of the Interior ("DOI"), on behalf of individual users, over competing
claims to water rights in the Strawberry Valley Project ("Project").
Strawberry petitioned for an interlocutory decree concerning Utah
general water rights adjudication statute in the Utah State District
Courts for the Third and Eighth Districts. Both courts dismissed the
motions and Strawberry appeals to the Supreme Court of Utah.
Reclamation initiated the Project in 1905 pursuant to the Reclamation Act of 1902 ("Act") to bring Project water from the Duchesne
River drainage through the Wasatch Mountains to lands in southern
Utah County. Prior to the completion of the Project, a lone user filed
an appropriation application which was eventually assigned to Reclamation. The United States used this certificate of appropriation to
prove its ownership of Project water. After completion of the Project
in 1915, individual settlers contracted with the United States for appropriation rights for beneficial use, which became rights to water in
perpetuity after repayment of construction costs. These users officially
formed Strawberry in 1922, and Strawberry assumed the federally contracted water rights in exchange for stock paid for by the users. Strawberry made the final payment for the Project to the United States in
1974, and removed any United States right to the water pursuant to the
combined federal reclamation contracts of the individual users represented by Strawberry. However, Reclamation initiated another Utah
project facility and constructed a new dam in 1985 that increased the
capacity of the Strawberry Reservoir. Consequently, the parties formed
the 1991 Operating Agreement ("Agreement") which guaranteed that
Strawberry would receive a regular annual delivery of water.
The current case spawned from three separate petitions filed by
Strawberry in the Third and Eighth District Courts for the State of
Utah for declarations of Strawberry's equitable title to Project water, its
rights to usage, and its right to file change applications independent of
the United States under Utah state law. In response, the United States
claimed federal reclamation contracts granted Strawberry its water
rights and therefore state law did not apply. The Utah Supreme Court
found no basis for this argument in case law or statute, and examined
the United States' counterclaim from a concurrent pending federal
court action to bring clarity to the issue. The United States repeated
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its argument that Strawberry's rights were solely contractual, and,' in
addition, advanced the claim that the Agreement superseded any prior
water rights Strawberry established. The court could not make a determination on the Agreement or the prior federal reclamation contracts because these issues were not before the court. Instead, the
court delineated between state and federal jurisdiction and Utah state
water law.
First, because the United States claimed that its certificate of appropriation gave it sole control of the Project water rights, the court
sought to define "ownership" under Utah water law. The court noted
that water rights were not the same as property rights associated with a
specific piece of property; rather, water rights are limited to use of a
certain amount of transitory water for a certain time, place, and purpose. The court found that the right of use limited ownership and that
ownership is based upon the beneficial use by the appropriator. A certificate of appropriation, absent beneficial use, is not sufficient on its
own to prove ownership of water rights. The court held that Strawberry had ownership of its water rights because its individual users
gained that right in perpetuity by applying the water to beneficial use.
From this definition, the court found that the Utah statutes entitled
Strawberry to file change applications and the United States was unable to legally resist.
Second, the court addressed the issue of the United States' claims
concerning federal reclamation contracts. Because the contracts were
based on federal statutes, the court deferred jurisdiction on these matters to the federal court. In light of the deferment, the court pointed
out that federal determination of Utah users' water rights may be in
conflict with the Congressional intention of Section 8 of the Act, which
stated that nothing in the Act would interfere with states' water rights
law.
Third, the court focused on the general adjudication of recapture
applications forwarded by both Strawberry and the United States, noting the strong precedents set forth in state law. Under Utah law, an
original appropriator can reuse water as long as it remains in his control, but once the water escapes to the channel from which it came or
some other channel, the appropriator cannot reclaim it from others
who have made use of it. Additionally, once irrigation water has reentered the natural water table, it is no longer owned by the irrigators
and is subject to subsequent appropriation and use by others. Because
of these well-established principles concerning the recapture of return
flow, the court found that Utah law governed. The court found the
United States' claim of a right to recapture seemingly groundless without a legitimate right of use, but granted state court the right to adjudicate these proceedings under Section 8 of the Act.
The court also responded to the United States' argument that, because this was a private dispute between itself and Strawberry, the
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United States had sovereign immunity from joinder in state water law
general adjudication. The court rejected the United States argument,
referencing Congressional intent to allowjoinder of the United States
in state court when the controversy relates to water rights as outlined in
the McCarran Amendment. In addition, the court noted the longreaching effects that the outcome of these adjudications could have on
downstream users as further reasoning against characterizing this controversy as a private dispute.
In conclusion, the court determined that federal jurisdiction was
appropriate for federal reclamation contract disputes, while issues of
water usage rights belonged within state jurisdiction. The United
States was subject to joinder in the proceedings of both the courts because of the McCarran Amendment. Finally, settling the disputes in
general adjudication was appropriate because the dispute reached beyond a mere private interaction.
The court remanded the case to the Eighth District Court, ordering a postponement of the Eighth District Court's proceedings pending the outcome of the Third District Court and the federal court.
The court ordered the Third District to defer to federal court law if the
parties focus adjudication on their contractual duties, and subsequently decide how the federally-interpreted contracts exist under
Utah water law.
Ryan Malarky
WASHINGTON
Fort v. Dep't of Ecology, 135 P.3d 515 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (holding
the futile call doctrine does not apply in the State of Washington).
In September 1921, a decree adjudicated the rights and priorities
to Beaver Creek resulting in 18 classes of water rights. Michael D. Fort
("Fort") held class 1, 8, and 9 rights under the decree. Class 1 is the
most senior right on Beaver Creek. Fort's point of diversion for all
three rights is the last one on Beaver Creek before its confluence with
the Methow River. In 2001, insufficient water was available to satisfy all
classes of water users on Beaver Creek. Accordingly, the Department
of Ecology ("Ecology") ordered all rights junior to class 5 shut off.
However, Fort continued to divert his class 8 and 9 rights. Ecology
issued Fort a notice of regulation. Fort appealed to the Pollution Control Hearings Board ("Board") which granted summary judgment in
favor of Ecology. Fort appealed to the Okanogan County Superior
Court, which denied his petition for judicial review. He then appealed
to the Court of Appeals of Washington.
The court limited its review of the Board's decision to the administrative record before the Board. The court held that it will only reverse
an agency decision if the decision is outside of its statutory authority or
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jurisdiction, erroneous, not supported by substantial evidence, or arbitrary and capricious. The burden of demonstrating the invalidity of
agency action is on the party asserting invalidity.
Fort claimed that, because his diversion point is farthest downstream, it does not interfere with other parties' respective priorities
under the futile call doctrine. The futile call doctrine provides that a
senior appropriator may prevent a junior appropriator from diverting
water only when doing so will benefit the senior. The court held that
the State of Washington does not recognize the futile call doctrine.
Refusing to read provisions into an adjudication decree that do not
exist, the court held that the focus of the decree was the prioritization
by class and the decree's priority system must be respected regardless
of whether some users can exercise their rights by virtue of their location on the creek.
Fort further argued, without citing authority, that excess water allowed to travel past his head gate is "wasted" if he is not allowed to divert it to satisfy his class 8 and 9 rights. Fort did not raise this argument
before the Board. The court refused to consider the issue because issues not raised before the agency may not be raised on appeal.
The court held that the Board properly upheld the notice of regulation requiring Fort to curtail his class 8 and 9 water rights. Affirmed.
Kelly L. Snodgrass

